In your previous mail you wrote: > ... nor will have an opportunity to work on the code that is needed > to try to break the RSA. I do not agree with what Christian posed > about being able to easily break it mathematically in a few seconds > and I will work on proving him wrong.
=> not only I agree with Christian Huitema but I showed a proof that in the RSA case the proposal can be broken in a time frame similar to the key pair generation one and independently of the number of bits, i.e., 48 as in the proposal or up to 64 which is the maximum from the Interface ID. So my conclusion is for the security an attempt to provide the same level than CGAs should only reinvent CGAs. About privacy I have the same concerns about the proposal than about RFC 3041/4941, i.e., to change the IID doesn't help when the assigned prefix is kept. Regards [email protected] -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list [email protected] Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
