Information Security Management
Corporate Technology Office
John Hancock Financial Services
Voice: (617) 572-4974
Cell: (617) 435-0517
"If you didn't log it, it never happened"
-----Original Message-----
From: Jeffrey Kok Chew Mun [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2002 9:47 PM
To: Beker Eli; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: [ISSForum] P2P applications and IDS/IPSHi,We stumbled onto a traffic shaping device called Packetshaper from Packeteer which did a pretty good job in classifying traffic based on applications (instead of ports). What we did was to deny or limit traffic coming from undesirable applications like Kazaa, Gnutella, iMesh, etc. In fact, it did a pretty good job in filtering nimda and codered as well. Since the deployment of the Packetshaper, we have had almost zero complaints about copyright issues and all.This worked very well for our campus but there are some limitations though. A traffic shaping devices isn't built like a FW. In case of congestion, the traffic shaping devices will pass traffic instead of drop which is the opposite of a FW which will drop traffic.Hope this helps.cheers,Jeffrey KokNational University of Singapore-----Original Message-----
From: Beker Eli [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, December 04, 2002 5:35 PM
Subject: [ISSForum] P2P applications and IDS/IPSHi,
Lately we are facing more and more P2P applications, exposing the corporate internal networks to
unknown external access. some of the applications require a detailed installation with username and
passwds, like GoToMyPC https://www.gotomypc.com/ and ViAir WirelessInbox http://www.viair.com/products_WI.htm
but there might be some, that probably run out of the box, like Kazza and others.
The common denominator of all those programs are they use well known open ports on the corporate
firewall, such as http, https or ftp. they automatically switch between the ports to find an open one.
and some of them can even pass proxy servers.
This is not new to the security community, we all remember the famous ping tunneling, ssh, https and
http tunneling where the idea is almost the same. the difference, which doesn't make it better, was that
internal users did in purpose to their systems outside the network. and today's applications, are using
a 3ed unauthorized party "Broker" to set the connection.
I believe that a strict corporate policy should eliminate part of the problem, but still we've to stand guard
and catch the security violators.
I would like to hear what you are doing and what can be done to mitigate this problem?
maybe adding another section to RS, like back doors, for P2P applications?Regards,
Eli Beker
Comverse
