[
https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-41435?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
]
LuChengxiang updated FLINK-41435:
---------------------------------
Description:
h2. Summary
Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them through
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver currently adds new credentials to
UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() on the thread that performs the refresh.
Long-lived Hadoop clients, especially checkpoint storage, can capture a
UGI/Subject when their DFSClient is created and use that captured identity for
later RPC connections.
If the refresh path resolves to a different current UGI from the one captured
by a long-lived client, the client can continue using its startup token even
though a new token was obtained successfully. The failure appears at the 24h
HDFS token deadline as SecretManager$InvalidToken.
The observed Kubernetes reproduction is in the initial token acquisition path.
The receiver mismatch is not limited to that path: it applies whenever a
refresh task resolves to a different current UGI. In this issue, "UGI" means
the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper, while "Subject" means the identity
carried by that UGI; identity comparisons between wrappers use Subject identity.
h2. Observed failure
This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using
ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The
primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
{noformat}
CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
-> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
-> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
-> DFSClient.mkdirs
{noformat}
The checkpoint storage client reported InvalidToken for the startup token after
the refresh had created a new HDFS token and the receiver reported success. The
same JVM also showed a FileSystemJobResultStore stack using the expired token
during cleanup. The job-result store is a secondary long-lived client with the
same failure mode, not the primary trigger.
Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is
timing-dependent: it requires a long-lived Hadoop client to have captured one
Subject/UGI lifecycle while the refresh path later resolves to a different one.
Installation idempotency is out of scope. A diagnostic build that skipped the
second security installation still failed at the 24h HDFS token deadline.
h2. Root cause
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver targets UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of
the thread executing the refresh. That current UGI is resolved from the
thread's effective AccessControlContext and is not guaranteed to be the UGI
held by HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI captured by a long-lived
checkpoint-storage or job-result-store DFSClient.
The controlled Kubernetes probe observed the initial token acquisition path
({{ResourceManager.onStart}} -> {{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} ->
{{startTokensUpdate()}}), not a later scheduled refresh; the later scheduled
refresh is submitted through the cluster-io executor. The startup FJP expansion
is observed; the same mechanism is possible for any provider {{doAs}} on a
ForkJoinWorkerThread with a blocking HDFS RPC, but that later path has not been
directly reproduced in this probe.
{noformat}
provider thread = default-dispatcher-12
freshUGI Subject = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
current Subject before doAs = 1333938290
current Subject inside doAs = 817147333
current Subject after doAs = 1333938290
FJP workers created during the provider's blocked RPC:
default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12
later cluster-io worker:
cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
current Subject = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
{noformat}
Here {{HadoopSecurityContext Subject}} means the Subject of the UGI held by the
installed {{HadoopSecurityContext}}. In this probe it is the same Subject
identity as the login user; that is not guaranteed in general.
The fresh Subject is not created by HadoopSecurityContext or by the dispatcher.
It belongs to the UGI returned by
{{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls
{{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}.
That call performs a Kerberos login and returns a newly constructed UGI for the
same principal; it does not replace the process login user.
During {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}}, {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} performed an
HDFS delegation-token RPC and blocked in {{CompletableFuture.get()}}. Because
the caller was a ForkJoinWorkerThread, ForkJoinPool entered its managed-block
compensation path and created new dispatcher workers while the fresh Subject
was active. The Thread constructor captures the {{AccessControlContext}}
snapshot returned by {{AccessController.getContext()}}. That snapshot reflects
the current thread's effective, stack-derived context, including the active
{{Subject.doAs(...)}} Subject; it is not the entire live Java stack and not
merely a reference to one stack frame. The new thread stores this snapshot in
its {{inheritedAccessControlContext}}. After {{doAs}} returned, current on the
creator resolved to the login Subject again, but the new workers retained the
inherited fresh Subject.
A dispatcher worker created during the {{doAs}} window later created
{{cluster-io-thread-3}}. On {{cluster-io-thread-3}}, current Subject was the
fresh Subject, while login and HadoopSecurityContext Subjects remained
{{1333938290}}. The current JM-local receiver writes credentials to
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, so a receiver invocation on this
worker would target the fresh Subject instead of the UGI held by the long-lived
client. This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation
of {{UserGroupInformation}}. The probe covers only the JobManager receiver
path; TaskManager receivers receive token updates through the ResourceManager.
h2. YARN status and scope
In a controlled YARN application-mode probe, the provider also ran on a Pekko
default-dispatcher worker. Its provider window stayed at {{poolSize=3}} /
{{active=2}} with no {{tryCompensate}} or {{createWorker}}, so no new
dispatcher worker was created while the provider's fresh Subject was active.
YARN did show ForkJoinPool expansion during the separate JobGraph-generation
startup path, so this is not evidence that YARN is immune.
This is one YARN sample; the provider's {{CompletableFuture}} state was not
instrumented, so the YARN trigger is not established. YARN is not listed as a
confirmed reproduction, but it is not claimed to be exempt.
h2. Proposed change
This issue addresses the case where a token is obtained successfully but the
refreshed credentials do not reach long-lived Hadoop clients, primarily
checkpoint storage.
* Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
* In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, add refreshed credentials to the UGI held
by HadoopSecurityContext, the current UGI, and the login UGI. Deduplicate the
target UGI references by object identity; this prevents duplicate
{{addCredentials}} calls for the same wrapper, but does not merge distinct UGI
wrappers that reference the same Subject. The UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext
is the primary target; the other two preserve non-secured deployments and
previous behavior.
* Add tests covering (a) a refresh thread whose current user differs from the
login user, and (b) a UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext distinct from the
current/login user; verify that all applicable targets receive the credentials.
Out of scope for this issue:
* Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring inside
{{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool worker.
* Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh
Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
* SecurityUtils.install idempotency.
The proposed receiver change does not rely solely on the refresh thread's
inherited Subject. It does not by itself guarantee that a client already
created under a different Subject is rebound. That remains a separate lifecycle
concern.
h2. Testing
* A controlled Kubernetes application-mode probe recorded the chain from
{{fs.addDelegationTokens()}} through Hadoop ipc {{Client.getRpcResponse()}},
{{CompletableFuture.get()}}, {{ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()}},
{{tryCompensate()}}, and Pekko {{ThreadFactory.newThread()}}. The creator and
the new dispatcher workers had the same fresh Subject identity.
* The same probe recorded {{cluster-io-thread-3}} created by
{{default-dispatcher-15}} with {{subjectId=817147333}}, while the
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject remained {{1333938290}}.
* Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and
verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool workers are
created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
* Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's
{{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized in "YARN
status and scope".
* A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and
continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the
checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token, and verify the
job-result-store client separately because it can capture a different UGI.
h2. Acceptance criteria
* A token refresh updates the UGI used by checkpoint storage and other
long-lived Hadoop clients.
* Refresh delivers credentials to the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext
regardless of which Subject a pooled dispatcher or cluster-io worker inherited.
* A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.
was:
h2. Summary
Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them through
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver currently adds new credentials to
UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() on the thread that performs the refresh.
Long-lived Hadoop clients, especially checkpoint storage, can capture a
UGI/Subject when their DFSClient is created and use that captured identity for
later RPC connections.
If the refresh path resolves to a different current UGI from the one captured
by a long-lived client, the client can continue using its startup token even
though a new token was obtained successfully. The failure appears at the 24h
HDFS token deadline as SecretManager$InvalidToken.
The observed Kubernetes reproduction is in the initial token acquisition path.
The receiver mismatch is not limited to that path: it applies whenever a
refresh task resolves to a different current UGI. In this issue, "UGI" means
the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper, while "Subject" means the identity
carried by that UGI; identity comparisons between wrappers use Subject identity.
h2. Observed failure
This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using
ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The
primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
{noformat}
CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
-> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
-> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
-> DFSClient.mkdirs
{noformat}
The checkpoint storage client reported InvalidToken for the startup token after
the refresh had created a new HDFS token and the receiver reported success. The
same JVM also showed a FileSystemJobResultStore stack using the expired token
during cleanup. The job-result store is a secondary long-lived client with the
same failure mode, not the primary trigger.
Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is
timing-dependent: it requires a long-lived Hadoop client to have captured one
Subject/UGI lifecycle while the refresh path later resolves to a different one.
Installation idempotency is out of scope. A diagnostic build that skipped the
second security installation still failed at the 24h HDFS token deadline.
h2. Root cause
HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver targets UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() of
the thread executing the refresh. That current UGI is resolved from the
thread's effective AccessControlContext and is not guaranteed to be the UGI
held by HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI captured by a long-lived
checkpoint-storage or job-result-store DFSClient.
The controlled Kubernetes probe observed the initial token acquisition path
({{ResourceManager.onStart}} -> {{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} ->
{{startTokensUpdate()}}), not a later scheduled refresh; the later scheduled
refresh is submitted through the cluster-io executor. The startup FJP expansion
is observed; the same mechanism is possible for any provider {{doAs}} on a
ForkJoinWorkerThread with a blocking HDFS RPC, but that later path has not been
directly reproduced in this probe.
{noformat}
provider thread = default-dispatcher-12
freshUGI Subject = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
current Subject before doAs = 1333938290
current Subject inside doAs = 817147333
current Subject after doAs = 1333938290
FJP workers created during the provider's blocked RPC:
default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12
later cluster-io worker:
cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
current Subject = 817147333
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
{noformat}
Here {{HadoopSecurityContext Subject}} means the Subject of the UGI held by the
installed {{HadoopSecurityContext}}. In this probe it is the same Subject
identity as the login user; that is not guaranteed in general.
The fresh Subject is not created by HadoopSecurityContext or by the dispatcher.
It belongs to the UGI returned by
{{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls
{{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}.
That call performs a Kerberos login and returns a newly constructed UGI for the
same principal; it does not replace the process login user.
During {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}}, {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} performed an
HDFS delegation-token RPC and blocked in {{CompletableFuture.get()}}. Because
the caller was a ForkJoinWorkerThread, ForkJoinPool entered its managed-block
compensation path and created new dispatcher workers while the fresh Subject
was active. The Thread constructor captures the {{AccessControlContext}}
snapshot returned by {{AccessController.getContext()}}. That snapshot reflects
the current thread's effective, stack-derived context, including the active
{{Subject.doAs(...)}} Subject; it is not the entire live Java stack and not
merely a reference to one stack frame. The new thread stores this snapshot in
its {{inheritedAccessControlContext}}. After {{doAs}} returned, current on the
creator resolved to the login Subject again, but the new workers retained the
inherited fresh Subject.
The dispatcher worker created during the {{doAs}} window later created
{{cluster-io-thread-3}}. The probe recorded that this worker's current Subject
was the fresh Subject while its login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject remained
{{1333938290}}. Because the JM-local receiver adds credentials to
{{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, a receiver invocation on that worker
would target the fresh Subject rather than the UGI captured by the long-lived
client. This probe covers the JobManager receiver path; TaskManagers have their
own receiver repository and receive token updates through the ResourceManager.
This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a global mutation of
{{UserGroupInformation}} or the process login user.
h2. YARN status and scope
In a controlled YARN application-mode probe, the provider also ran on a Pekko
default-dispatcher worker. Its provider window stayed at {{poolSize=3}} /
{{active=2}} with no {{tryCompensate}} or {{createWorker}}, so no new
dispatcher worker was created while the provider's fresh Subject was active.
YARN did show ForkJoinPool expansion during the separate JobGraph-generation
startup path, so this is not evidence that YARN is immune.
This is one YARN sample; the provider's {{CompletableFuture}} state was not
instrumented, so the YARN trigger is not established. YARN is not listed as a
confirmed reproduction, but it is not claimed to be exempt.
h2. Proposed change
This issue addresses the case where a token is obtained successfully but the
refreshed credentials do not reach long-lived Hadoop clients, primarily
checkpoint storage.
* Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
* In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, add refreshed credentials to the UGI held
by HadoopSecurityContext, the current UGI, and the login UGI. Deduplicate the
target UGI references by object identity; this prevents duplicate
{{addCredentials}} calls for the same wrapper, but does not merge distinct UGI
wrappers that reference the same Subject. The UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext
is the primary target; the other two preserve non-secured deployments and
previous behavior.
* Add tests covering (a) a refresh thread whose current user differs from the
login user, and (b) a UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext distinct from the
current/login user; verify that all applicable targets receive the credentials.
Out of scope for this issue:
* Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring inside
{{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool worker.
* Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh
Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
* SecurityUtils.install idempotency.
The proposed receiver change does not rely solely on the refresh thread's
inherited Subject. It does not by itself guarantee that a client already
created under a different Subject is rebound. That remains a separate lifecycle
concern.
h2. Testing
* A controlled Kubernetes application-mode probe recorded the chain from
{{fs.addDelegationTokens()}} through Hadoop ipc {{Client.getRpcResponse()}},
{{CompletableFuture.get()}}, {{ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()}},
{{tryCompensate()}}, and Pekko {{ThreadFactory.newThread()}}. The creator and
the new dispatcher workers had the same fresh Subject identity.
* The same probe recorded {{cluster-io-thread-3}} created by
{{default-dispatcher-15}} with {{subjectId=817147333}}, while the
login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject remained {{1333938290}}.
* Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and
verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool workers are
created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
* Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's
{{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized in "YARN
status and scope".
* A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and
continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the
checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token, and verify the
job-result-store client separately because it can capture a different UGI.
h2. Acceptance criteria
* A token refresh updates the UGI used by checkpoint storage and other
long-lived Hadoop clients.
* Refresh delivers credentials to the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext
regardless of which Subject a pooled dispatcher or cluster-io worker inherited.
* A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.
> Hadoop delegation token refresh can target a different UGI than Hadoop clients
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: FLINK-41435
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-41435
> Project: Flink
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: Runtime / Configuration
> Affects Versions: 2.0.0, 1.19.0, 1.20.0, 2.1.0, 2.2.0, 2.3.0, 2.4.0
> Environment: Flink 1.19.0 and later (1.19.x, 1.20.x, 2.0 through
> 2.4), plus master (2.5-SNAPSHOT); Kubernetes and standalone application mode
> with Kerberos and HDFS delegation tokens. The mismatch is more likely when
> FileSystemJobResultStore and the token manager share the cluster-io executor
> (FLINK-27204).
> Reporter: LuChengxiang
> Priority: Major
>
> h2. Summary
> Flink periodically obtains HDFS delegation tokens and distributes them
> through HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver. The receiver currently adds new
> credentials to UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser() on the thread that
> performs the refresh. Long-lived Hadoop clients, especially checkpoint
> storage, can capture a UGI/Subject when their DFSClient is created and use
> that captured identity for later RPC connections.
> If the refresh path resolves to a different current UGI from the one captured
> by a long-lived client, the client can continue using its startup token even
> though a new token was obtained successfully. The failure appears at the 24h
> HDFS token deadline as SecretManager$InvalidToken.
> The observed Kubernetes reproduction is in the initial token acquisition
> path. The receiver mismatch is not limited to that path: it applies whenever
> a refresh task resolves to a different current UGI. In this issue, "UGI"
> means the Hadoop UserGroupInformation wrapper, while "Subject" means the
> identity carried by that UGI; identity comparisons between wrappers use
> Subject identity.
> h2. Observed failure
> This was observed in a Flink 1.20.5 Kubernetes application-mode job using
> ZooKeeper-based high availability and HDFS-backed checkpoint storage. The
> primary failure was in the checkpoint storage path:
> {noformat}
> CheckpointCoordinator.initializeCheckpointLocation
> -> FsCheckpointStorageAccess.initializeLocationForCheckpoint
> -> HadoopFileSystem.mkdirs
> -> DFSClient.mkdirs
> {noformat}
> The checkpoint storage client reported InvalidToken for the startup token
> after the refresh had created a new HDFS token and the receiver reported
> success. The same JVM also showed a FileSystemJobResultStore stack using the
> expired token during cleanup. The job-result store is a secondary long-lived
> client with the same failure mode, not the primary trigger.
> Not every Kubernetes application-mode job is affected. The failure is
> timing-dependent: it requires a long-lived Hadoop client to have captured one
> Subject/UGI lifecycle while the refresh path later resolves to a different
> one.
> Installation idempotency is out of scope. A diagnostic build that skipped the
> second security installation still failed at the 24h HDFS token deadline.
> h2. Root cause
> HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver targets UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()
> of the thread executing the refresh. That current UGI is resolved from the
> thread's effective AccessControlContext and is not guaranteed to be the UGI
> held by HadoopSecurityContext or the UGI captured by a long-lived
> checkpoint-storage or job-result-store DFSClient.
> The controlled Kubernetes probe observed the initial token acquisition path
> ({{ResourceManager.onStart}} -> {{DefaultDelegationTokenManager.start()}} ->
> {{startTokensUpdate()}}), not a later scheduled refresh; the later scheduled
> refresh is submitted through the cluster-io executor. The startup FJP
> expansion is observed; the same mechanism is possible for any provider
> {{doAs}} on a ForkJoinWorkerThread with a blocking HDFS RPC, but that later
> path has not been directly reproduced in this probe.
> {noformat}
> provider thread = default-dispatcher-12
> freshUGI Subject = 817147333
> login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
> current Subject before doAs = 1333938290
> current Subject inside doAs = 817147333
> current Subject after doAs = 1333938290
> FJP workers created during the provider's blocked RPC:
> default-dispatcher-13 / 14 / 15, creator=default-dispatcher-12
> later cluster-io worker:
> cluster-io-thread-3, creator=default-dispatcher-15
> current Subject = 817147333
> login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject = 1333938290
> JM-local receiver target (getCurrentUser()) = 817147333
> {noformat}
> Here {{HadoopSecurityContext Subject}} means the Subject of the UGI held by
> the installed {{HadoopSecurityContext}}. In this probe it is the same Subject
> identity as the login user; that is not guaranteed in general.
> The fresh Subject is not created by HadoopSecurityContext or by the
> dispatcher. It belongs to the UGI returned by
> {{KerberosLoginProvider.doLoginAndReturnUGI()}}, which calls
> {{UserGroupInformation.loginUserFromKeytabAndReturnUGI(principal, keytab)}}.
> That call performs a Kerberos login and returns a newly constructed UGI for
> the same principal; it does not replace the process login user.
> During {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}}, {{fs.addDelegationTokens(...)}} performed an
> HDFS delegation-token RPC and blocked in {{CompletableFuture.get()}}. Because
> the caller was a ForkJoinWorkerThread, ForkJoinPool entered its managed-block
> compensation path and created new dispatcher workers while the fresh Subject
> was active. The Thread constructor captures the {{AccessControlContext}}
> snapshot returned by {{AccessController.getContext()}}. That snapshot
> reflects the current thread's effective, stack-derived context, including the
> active {{Subject.doAs(...)}} Subject; it is not the entire live Java stack
> and not merely a reference to one stack frame. The new thread stores this
> snapshot in its {{inheritedAccessControlContext}}. After {{doAs}} returned,
> current on the creator resolved to the login Subject again, but the new
> workers retained the inherited fresh Subject.
> A dispatcher worker created during the {{doAs}} window later created
> {{cluster-io-thread-3}}. On {{cluster-io-thread-3}}, current Subject was the
> fresh Subject, while login and HadoopSecurityContext Subjects remained
> {{1333938290}}. The current JM-local receiver writes credentials to
> {{UserGroupInformation.getCurrentUser()}}, so a receiver invocation on this
> worker would target the fresh Subject instead of the UGI held by the
> long-lived client. This is a per-thread inherited security context, not a
> global mutation of {{UserGroupInformation}}. The probe covers only the
> JobManager receiver path; TaskManager receivers receive token updates through
> the ResourceManager.
> h2. YARN status and scope
> In a controlled YARN application-mode probe, the provider also ran on a Pekko
> default-dispatcher worker. Its provider window stayed at {{poolSize=3}} /
> {{active=2}} with no {{tryCompensate}} or {{createWorker}}, so no new
> dispatcher worker was created while the provider's fresh Subject was active.
> YARN did show ForkJoinPool expansion during the separate JobGraph-generation
> startup path, so this is not evidence that YARN is immune.
> This is one YARN sample; the provider's {{CompletableFuture}} state was not
> instrumented, so the YARN trigger is not established. YARN is not listed as a
> confirmed reproduction, but it is not claimed to be exempt.
> h2. Proposed change
> This issue addresses the case where a token is obtained successfully but the
> refreshed credentials do not reach long-lived Hadoop clients, primarily
> checkpoint storage.
> * Add an accessor for the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext.
> * In HadoopDelegationTokenReceiver, add refreshed credentials to the UGI held
> by HadoopSecurityContext, the current UGI, and the login UGI. Deduplicate the
> target UGI references by object identity; this prevents duplicate
> {{addCredentials}} calls for the same wrapper, but does not merge distinct
> UGI wrappers that reference the same Subject. The UGI held by
> HadoopSecurityContext is the primary target; the other two preserve
> non-secured deployments and previous behavior.
> * Add tests covering (a) a refresh thread whose current user differs from the
> login user, and (b) a UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext distinct from the
> current/login user; verify that all applicable targets receive the
> credentials.
> Out of scope for this issue:
> * Preventing HDFS client initialization or blocking RPCs from occurring
> inside {{freshUGI.doAs(...)}} or the provider's ForkJoinPool worker.
> * Closing or rebinding FileSystem instances created under a transient fresh
> Subject; this is a separate client-lifecycle cleanup.
> * SecurityUtils.install idempotency.
> The proposed receiver change does not rely solely on the refresh thread's
> inherited Subject. It does not by itself guarantee that a client already
> created under a different Subject is rebound. That remains a separate
> lifecycle concern.
> h2. Testing
> * A controlled Kubernetes application-mode probe recorded the chain from
> {{fs.addDelegationTokens()}} through Hadoop ipc {{Client.getRpcResponse()}},
> {{CompletableFuture.get()}}, {{ForkJoinPool.managedBlock()}},
> {{tryCompensate()}}, and Pekko {{ThreadFactory.newThread()}}. The creator and
> the new dispatcher workers had the same fresh Subject identity.
> * The same probe recorded {{cluster-io-thread-3}} created by
> {{default-dispatcher-15}} with {{subjectId=817147333}}, while the
> login/HadoopSecurityContext Subject remained {{1333938290}}.
> * Trigger multiple post-startup token refreshes in a long-running job and
> verify which executor runs the provider, whether new ForkJoinPool workers are
> created, and which Subject the receiver's current user resolves to.
> * Repeat the YARN provider-window probe while instrumenting the provider's
> {{CompletableFuture}} state; the current YARN sample is summarized in "YARN
> status and scope".
> * A deployed application-mode job should survive the 24h token deadline and
> continue checkpointing without SecretManager$InvalidToken. Verify that the
> checkpoint-storage DFSClient receives the new token, and verify the
> job-result-store client separately because it can capture a different UGI.
> h2. Acceptance criteria
> * A token refresh updates the UGI used by checkpoint storage and other
> long-lived Hadoop clients.
> * Refresh delivers credentials to the UGI held by HadoopSecurityContext
> regardless of which Subject a pooled dispatcher or cluster-io worker
> inherited.
> * A long-running application-mode job survives the 24h HDFS token deadline.
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