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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-5330?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16156652#comment-16156652
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ASF subversion and git services commented on KARAF-5330:
--------------------------------------------------------

Commit 4155feb98c3c9d9ff9705b8cc50c311378250855 in karaf's branch 
refs/heads/master from [~gnt]
[ https://git-wip-us.apache.org/repos/asf?p=karaf.git;h=4155feb ]

[KARAF-5330] Fix broken itests

> Require a specific role to access the SSH console
> -------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: KARAF-5330
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-5330
>             Project: Karaf
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components: karaf-security, karaf-shell
>            Reporter: Tom Quarendon
>            Assignee: Guillaume Nodet
>             Fix For: 4.2.0, 4.0.10, 4.1.3
>
>
> The shell:cat command has no access control list associated with it in the 
> default configuration.
> The same is true of the "shell:ls" command. There may be other shell: 
> commands too that can provide filesystem access. I don't know whether cd, pwd 
> for example should be secured. "tac" most certainly should.
> This means that any user that can access the ssh console can navigate the 
> filesystem, reading and writing files as they like.
> For example, given the default configuration, if I have a "normal" user and 
> can therefore access the console, I can use shell commands to find our or 
> guess the location of the karaf install (shell:pwd will do that), then cat 
> the contents of the etc/users.properties file and find out all users 
> passwords (in the default configuration the passwords are in plain text). I 
> can also cat the etc/host.key file which would seem undesirable. 
> tac clearly would be a very dangerous command to have access to. It seems 
> likely that I could subvert many things by just writing directly to 
> configuration files using tac. I could, for example, change, or at least 
> invalidate the admin password by rewriting the users.properties file.
> All in all this feels like a major issue.



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