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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-5330?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16208082#comment-16208082
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Scott Tustison commented on KARAF-5330:
---------------------------------------
Found this ticket after encountering the same issue within Karaf. We'd like
folks that have access to the command console to not be able to touch the file
system in arbitrary locations.
A comment above says: "If you are really concerned about security, the only
thing you can do is to use a java security manager and permissions." And we
tried this, by using our own security manager as well as the one available via
Equinox by using the properties in the system.properties file. The command line
appears to still behave as if it has the AllPermission and can obviously modify
or read any file on the file system as the user running Karaf. This still seems
like an issue to me even with a role to lock down who can access SSH. How can
you lock down these actions available to users via the command console?
> Require a specific role to access the SSH console
> -------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: KARAF-5330
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/KARAF-5330
> Project: Karaf
> Issue Type: Bug
> Components: karaf-security, karaf-shell
> Reporter: Tom Quarendon
> Assignee: Guillaume Nodet
> Fix For: 4.2.0, 4.0.10, 4.1.3
>
>
> The shell:cat command has no access control list associated with it in the
> default configuration.
> The same is true of the "shell:ls" command. There may be other shell:
> commands too that can provide filesystem access. I don't know whether cd, pwd
> for example should be secured. "tac" most certainly should.
> This means that any user that can access the ssh console can navigate the
> filesystem, reading and writing files as they like.
> For example, given the default configuration, if I have a "normal" user and
> can therefore access the console, I can use shell commands to find our or
> guess the location of the karaf install (shell:pwd will do that), then cat
> the contents of the etc/users.properties file and find out all users
> passwords (in the default configuration the passwords are in plain text). I
> can also cat the etc/host.key file which would seem undesirable.
> tac clearly would be a very dangerous command to have access to. It seems
> likely that I could subvert many things by just writing directly to
> configuration files using tac. I could, for example, change, or at least
> invalidate the admin password by rewriting the users.properties file.
> All in all this feels like a major issue.
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