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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-13993?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=16987533#comment-16987533
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Robert Muir commented on SOLR-13993:
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I think I can nuke the TODOs if we figure out how to plugin to velocity
classloading mechanism (i think its resourceloader api), sorry i dont know it,
i have to study their docs first. current patch doesn't try to do that, its
just a brute approach: so there is no separation of "what the engine can do" vs
"what the user template can do", hence bogus permissions we don't want.
> sandbox velocity template render
> --------------------------------
>
> Key: SOLR-13993
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-13993
> Project: Solr
> Issue Type: Improvement
> Security Level: Public(Default Security Level. Issues are Public)
> Reporter: Robert Muir
> Priority: Major
> Attachments: SOLR-13993.patch, SOLR-13993.patch, SOLR-13993.patch
>
>
> This thing seems dangerous :)
> Making the whole solr secure is a whole nother thing: (see e.g. SOLR-13991
> and we haven't even gotten started). Its pretty difficult to convert whole
> large app to work securely. It is going to take time.
> In the meantime, if we have things that might do something dangerous, and
> security manager is enabled, we can put them into a special little sandbox
> and throw away the key: for example we can intentionally discard permissions
> we don't need so they can't launch stuff, if we really don't trust them, we
> can start filtering what classes classloader will load.
> This isn't that crazy at all to do, e.g. your web browser does similar tricks
> to try to sandbox specific parts that might do something unexpected and cause
> security issue.
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