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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15965?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=17493183#comment-17493183
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Jan Høydahl commented on SOLR-15965:
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Trying to grasp the instructions in
[https://github.com/apache/solr/commit/16760a7#diff-469f7b0e2e6843ecf2eb42ca9e5b867386fe140a061f0043af6838b7853414ebR61-R65]
but the [bullet
list|https://github.com/apache/solr/blob/16760a7cf1ee99211fac5add5482f4ee00a6fac0/solr/solr-ref-guide/modules/upgrade-notes/pages/major-changes-in-solr-9.adoc#rolling-upgrades]
is structured in a strange way, so there is three level-1 bullets and two
sub-bullets under the "Either" bullet.
Perhaps you can clarify those steps?
Also, it feels strange to ask people to upgrade to an unlreleased 8.11.2
version. Should we release 8.11.2 first? Perhaps it is cleaner to *only*
discuss the alternative which works from 8.11.1. Then in 9.1 we can add the
other (simpler?) alternative involving 8.11.2.
> PKIAuthenticationPlugin uses encryption instead of signatures
> -------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: SOLR-15965
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15965
> Project: Solr
> Issue Type: Bug
> Security Level: Public(Default Security Level. Issues are Public)
> Components: Authentication
> Reporter: Mike Drob
> Assignee: Mike Drob
> Priority: Blocker
> Fix For: 9.0, 8.11.2
>
> Time Spent: 1.5h
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> Our PKIAuthenticationPlugin uses a very weak cipher when sending SolrAuth
> header information. There are several factors involved here:
> * The Java cipher suite represented by {{RSA/ECB/NoPadding}} is completely
> deterministic.
> * The only way to rotate a server's public key is via restart because we
> have no way to reload the PublicKeyHandler.
> An older example of why ECB is a poor choice for data integrity is [the ECB
> Penguin|https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/]
> A mitigation to the associated risk here is that all transport should already
> be occurring over a secure channel (i.e. HTTPS), so the risk of a
> man-in-the-middle attack is low. However, there are other concerns.
> RSA/ECB/NoPadding does not include a MAC, so is susceptible to false parsing.
> If the encryption key has rotated then we are susceptible to issues like
> SOLR-15961
> Further, in cases where the parsing fails, we can end up [logging the
> plaintext and cipher text of the authentication
> header|https://github.com/apache/solr/blob/main/solr/core/src/java/org/apache/solr/security/PKIAuthenticationPlugin.java#L191].
> Even without the plaintext, and having only the cipher text, it would not be
> too challenging for an attacker to extract a key given that they know the
> format of the header to be {{SolrAuth <nodeName> base64(enc(<user>
> <timestamp>))}} and user is often the literal {{$}} string and timestamp is a
> recent long in millis.
> There are other, better, more modern cipher algorithms that can be used, and
> I am still researching which ones would work for us, what key initialization
> would look like, etc. Additionally, changing this on upgrade would not permit
> a rolling restart. At a minimum, we would need a "bridge" 8.11.2 release so
> that users can upgrade from 8.x -> 8.11.2 -> 9.0. In this scenario, we would
> need the following behavior:
> || ||encryption||decryption||
> |8.x|RSA/ECB/NoPadding|RSA/ECB/NoPadding|
> |8.11.2|RSA/ECB/NoPadding|RSA/ECB/NoPadding
> *OR* New Alg|
> |9.x|New Alg|New Alg|
> Alternative options are to discard rolling restart capability going from
> 8->9, ask users to disable PKI Authentication for their clusters, or require
> users to bridge via 9.0 before upgrading to further 9.x releases. None of
> those alternatives sound palatable to me, but the community may disagree.
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