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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15965?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=17493338#comment-17493338
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Mike Drob commented on SOLR-15965:
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> Should we release 8.11.2 first?
This might be helpful, but not required. I can volunteer to RM 8.11.2 after
this change is merged in, will send out an emailI suppose. That would
potentially delay 9.0 by about two weeks if you were planning on starting the
vote soon.
> Perhaps you can clarify those steps?
I've been struggling a little bit on how to explain the process. Maybe it would
be simpler for users (but more complex for us) if 9.0.z defaulted to
{{acceptVersions=v1,v2}} like 8.11.2 is proposed to do. Then the upgrade path
would become:
8.x -> 8.11.2 -> 9.0 -> 9.y
If they want to go straight from 8.x to 9.0 or from 8.11.2 to some later 9.y
release, then they can do the dance with system properties specifying
compatible send/accept versions. I'd rewrite the documentation to call out what
the defaults for each version are, and tell users that they need to ensure that
the send version and accept version match for whatever rolling upgrade
permutation they are doing, but leave them to figure out the specifics
themselves.
> PKIAuthenticationPlugin uses encryption instead of signatures
> -------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Key: SOLR-15965
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SOLR-15965
> Project: Solr
> Issue Type: Bug
> Security Level: Public(Default Security Level. Issues are Public)
> Components: Authentication
> Reporter: Mike Drob
> Assignee: Mike Drob
> Priority: Blocker
> Fix For: 9.0, 8.11.2
>
> Time Spent: 1h 40m
> Remaining Estimate: 0h
>
> Our PKIAuthenticationPlugin uses a very weak cipher when sending SolrAuth
> header information. There are several factors involved here:
> * The Java cipher suite represented by {{RSA/ECB/NoPadding}} is completely
> deterministic.
> * The only way to rotate a server's public key is via restart because we
> have no way to reload the PublicKeyHandler.
> An older example of why ECB is a poor choice for data integrity is [the ECB
> Penguin|https://words.filippo.io/the-ecb-penguin/]
> A mitigation to the associated risk here is that all transport should already
> be occurring over a secure channel (i.e. HTTPS), so the risk of a
> man-in-the-middle attack is low. However, there are other concerns.
> RSA/ECB/NoPadding does not include a MAC, so is susceptible to false parsing.
> If the encryption key has rotated then we are susceptible to issues like
> SOLR-15961
> Further, in cases where the parsing fails, we can end up [logging the
> plaintext and cipher text of the authentication
> header|https://github.com/apache/solr/blob/main/solr/core/src/java/org/apache/solr/security/PKIAuthenticationPlugin.java#L191].
> Even without the plaintext, and having only the cipher text, it would not be
> too challenging for an attacker to extract a key given that they know the
> format of the header to be {{SolrAuth <nodeName> base64(enc(<user>
> <timestamp>))}} and user is often the literal {{$}} string and timestamp is a
> recent long in millis.
> There are other, better, more modern cipher algorithms that can be used, and
> I am still researching which ones would work for us, what key initialization
> would look like, etc. Additionally, changing this on upgrade would not permit
> a rolling restart. At a minimum, we would need a "bridge" 8.11.2 release so
> that users can upgrade from 8.x -> 8.11.2 -> 9.0. In this scenario, we would
> need the following behavior:
> || ||encryption||decryption||
> |8.x|RSA/ECB/NoPadding|RSA/ECB/NoPadding|
> |8.11.2|RSA/ECB/NoPadding|RSA/ECB/NoPadding
> *OR* New Alg|
> |9.x|New Alg|New Alg|
> Alternative options are to discard rolling restart capability going from
> 8->9, ask users to disable PKI Authentication for their clusters, or require
> users to bridge via 9.0 before upgrading to further 9.x releases. None of
> those alternatives sound palatable to me, but the community may disagree.
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