> -----Original Message-----
> From: Paul Hammant [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Goverments need to stop mis-understanding the issue and the hatred of
> this thing. They need to compel multiple orgs to do something about it.
>
This, I think, is getting to the nub of the matter, we aren't (by and large)
exposed to the same amount of phone abuse largely through legislation
governing cold-calling.
What we need includes a hefty dose of _intelligent_ EU (or US) legislation.
> It could be that I am off-base with a theory that SMTP2 is part of the
> answer and that what you folks talk of as E-SMTP or closed-loop remove
> all the loop-holes for bulk spoofing
"E" provides a small set of optional extensions to SMTP, and a framework for
adding new optional extensions, one of the former "ETRN", provides recipient
SMTP hosts with the opportunity to close a session, call the sender back and
kick them into delivering queued mail to the domain supplied as the
argument. This (IMO) provides the recipient with an opportunity to do time
consuming off-line vetting of sending hosts.
>
> My feeling is/was that too-much is left to human action or inaction.
That was certainly my suprised reaction when I first uncovered the secrets
of email.
> Any that any fool could write a Java class that listens on port 25 or
> other and could ruin the system by injecting mail traffic into otherwise
> well closed parts of the system.
In fact I see this simplicity of access as one of the major "selling points"
of SMTP, its easy adoption by bespoke applications adds to its universal
appeal, when coupled with MIME's capacity to encode and transmit *any*
digital content by mail it makes email a pretty compelling addition to many
applications, you only have to look at M$'s "Net folders" to see how fairly
impressive effects can be achieved using these simple protocols.
d.
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