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From: Eric Reeves <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 09 Jun 2011 19:20:28 -0400
Subject: "Khartoum Dramatically Escalates War in Sudan"
To: [email protected]
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Section1; }"KhartoumDramatically Escalates War in Sudan"
Violence, including ethnically-targeteddestruction, has accelerated in
South Kordofan over the past few days. Aerialattacks are reported
throughout South Kordofan, especially in the Nuba Mountains;one report
is of bombing attacks against the major base of the Sudan People's
Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jau (Pariang Countyin oil-rich Unity State).
A precipitous embargo on fuel and other goodsmoving from North to South
Sudan is designed to create economic instabilityprior to the South's
independence in onemonth (July 9, 2011). Those in South Kordofan
believed loyal to the SudanPeople's Liberation Movement (SPLM) oropposed
to the Khartoum regime are being hunted down in retribution; the
destructionof churches and the targeting of Christians in and around
Kadugli give anominous sense of what is to come.
Eric Reeves
June 9, 2011
Highlightsof reports, as of 7pm June 9:
•Asin Abyei, the military actions by Khartoum in South Kordofan were
clearlypremeditated. The potential for precisely the conflict we are
seeingnow has been repeatedlynoted by several observers. And yet the
international community has againbeen caught flat-footed, wholly reliant
on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS);this force has performed poorly,
especially in Kadugli where it is widelyperceived to have sided with
Khartoum. Reports continue to stream in ofmore tanks moving south from
el-Obeid, the main Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)military base outside
Khartoum. Military air assets have been rapidly deployedin the conflict,
for the Nuba Mountains---where the war will beconcentrated---are within
range of the jet fighter aircraft based in el-Obeid. Khartoum's most
brutal leaders, includingPresident Omar al-Bashir and his chief advisor
Nafi'eAli Nafi'e, have publicly declared that the SAF has been given a
"freehand" throughout South Kordofan, and that any southern troops in
the Northafter June 1 would be "legitimate targets"—this despite the
fact that tens ofthousands of these troops consider South Kordofan and
southern Blue Nile theirhome. Reprisals against civilians thought to be
sympathetic to the SPLM/Ahave been brutal.
Khartoum has explicitly declared its intention to "spread its forces
throughout [SouthKordofan] state after in gained military control in
Kadugli" (Sudan News Agency [SUNA/Khartoum], June 8,2011). Given the
central location of the Nuba Mountains in SouthKordofan, this is a
declaration of all-out war. UNMIShas already reported that the SAF is
"shellingSPLA positions in the mountains of South Kordofan."UNMISalso
reports (June 9) that "fightingwas ongoing and had spread across the
state."
•As was true following the invasion ofAbyei, Khartoum's decision to
resume war inSouth Kordofan has very quickly produced tensof thousands
of displaced civilians, even as humanitarian organizationshave halted
operations or withdrawn. Thehumanitarian situation for the Nuba and
non-Arab populations of South Kordofanhas immediately become critical.
The 10,000civilians who have sought security at the UNMIS base in
Kadugli aredesperately short of water and facing growing security risks.
Many havealready left Kadugli, and the town of Dilling to the north is
reportedlydeserted. One estimate from a Nuba source is that 75,000
people havealready been displaced.
•OnSunday, June 5 senior leaders of the SPLM flew to Kadugli to arrange
a cease-firewith Khartoum officials, and signed an agreement to this
effect. In asignature move of bad faith, an hour after Yasir Arman
(head of the SPLM inNorth Sudan) and Malik Agar (governor of Blue Nile
and senior member of theSPLM) flew ou
t of Kadugli, Khartoum's SAFbeganan assault on the home of Abdel Aziz
el-Hilu, SPLM candidate for
governorof South Kordofan during the rigged elections of May and a true
son of theNuba. El-Hilu is widely popular among the people of the Nuba
and a superbmilitary leader. If he had in fact been killed in the SAF
attack, theconsequences would have been enormous; as one Nuba put it,
"If Aziz goes down the entire Nuba Mountainswill erupt." El-Hilu is
nowreported to be “fully in military uniform." That Khartoum was willing
to takethis risk indicates that the regime has already determined on a
course of war.
Here, the consequences of the Carter Center's poorlyinformed
ratification of the South Kordofan gubernatorial election---inwhich
indicted war criminal Ahmed Haroun defeated el-Hilu following
afraudulent vote count---continues to make themselves felt, and
contribute tothe climate of deep hostility and mistrust.
•TheSudan Tribune reports (June 9) that Antonovbombers attacked Jau in
South Sudan (oil-rich Unity State); this attack on a major SPLA base of
operationsin the South represents a radical escalation in the war that
is rapidlyunfolding. Predictably, the long-range, high-altitude
Antonovs (not "bombers,"but cargo planes from which crude barrel bombs
are rolled without sightingmechanisms) dropped their bombs wide of the
SPLA headquarters and hit civiliantargets instead (see my report on
Khartoum’s history of bombing civilian and humanitariantargets over the
past twelve years: www.sudanbombing.org/). Three were reported killed,
including a child.
Thethreat of much greater military incursion into South Sudan has
beendismissed by many observers, but this seems unwise. Indeed, a
SPLAspokesman Philip Aguer notes today, "Theborders have not been
demarcated and SAF plans to take some of these areas now.We have said
this is part of a plan by SAF." And indeed, any inspection of a map of
the oil concession areas reveals justhow much is concentrated along the
1956 North/South border. In a January 2011report for Pax Christi,
researcher Julie Flint writes in "The Nuba Mountains:Central to Sudan’s
Security":
"Todaysenior SPLA officers in Southern Kordofan claim that SAF is
'preparing for war all the way along the border.' They claim SAF
divisions recast as brigades in2009 remain at division strength; four
separate brigades that arrived in2008-09 constitute another,
unacknowledged division; and 40-barrel Katyusharocket launchers, B-10
anti-tank guns and 120 mm mortars have been moved to theborder area.
Deputy governor al-Hilu says that despite agreement that SAF wouldmove
into 15 assembly points, it now has 55,000 troops in more than
100garrisons---'more than needed to controlSouthern Kordofan; more even
than at the height of the jihad.'"
•InSouth Kordofan SAF military aircraft and artillery reportedly
attacked fivevillages south of Kadugli as well as Talodi, Heiban, Kauda,
Abdel Aziz el-Hilu's compound on the outskirts of Kadugli, and manyother
towns. Civilians are reportedly fleeing from many locations:Kadugli,
Talodi, Dilling, Umm Dorein (again, Dilling is reportedly
nearlydeserted). The SAF spokesman, al-Swarmi Kahled, has refused to
take callsfrom journalists. One source on the ground reports that there
have been100 casualties in Heiban (Nuba Mountains). Khartoum shows no
interest inthe SPLMoffer [June 8] of an immediate cease-fire.
•Civilianswho fled from Khartoum’s brutal military seizure of Abyei are
struggling,as humanitarian organizations increasingly find themselves
short of supplies,most critically fuel by which to maintain mobility.
The outlook isincreasingly grim, according to a newsdispatch from
Turelei, South Sudan. These Dinka Ngok people arestruggling simply to
survive. At the same time it is clear that theoriginal UN report on the
Abyei invasion found sufficient evidence to claimthat Khartoum’s
"'attackand occupation’ of the disputed town of Abyei 'istantamount to
ethnic cleansing.'" But in the final report—le
aked to Associated Press
on June 3---the language hasbeen changed substantially by the UN
bureaucracy: now the report claims onlythat "the 'occupation' of Abyei
could lead to ethnic cleansing…." This revision was made
withtransparently political motives, as UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon
and seniorUN officials sought to mollify Khartoum. The spineless
Bandeclared flatly that it is "far tooearly to claim that ethnic
cleansing is taking place."
•Theorigin of the fighting will be disputed in the absence of any
neutralreporting presence; in this sense, it is like the military
invasion of Abyei,which was precipitated by the disputed events of May
19---events thatnonetheless served as a casus bellifor Khartoum. One
highly informed source reports that the initialshooting occurred at Umm
Dorain when Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) attempted todisarm SPLA troops at
the border stations that delineated the military boundarybetween the two
sides during the civil war; this has been confirmed by aWestern official
who closely follows regional events. But Khartoum wasclearly planning
for this war in the Nuba and many tanks quickly appeared inKadugli,
along with a rapid deployment of other offensive military resources.
•Civilianreprisals are increasing, and are like to accelerate rapidly
going forward. A reliable source reports that Khartoum’s fearsome
Military Intelligence forcedits way into UNMIS headquarters in Kadugli
and took many suspected SPLMsympathizers. This source also reports that
a "disabledman in a wheelchair was found killed outside the UNMIS
compound after he soughtprotection [there]." This has hadan
understandably chilling effect on those looking to UNMIS for protection,
andmany who had originally gathered at the UNMIS base are melting away.
Anumber of those caught and labeled "SPLMsympathizers" have almost
certainlybeen executed.
Many within the SAF ranks are forcedrecruits from the South or the Nuba;
many wish to join the SPLM and havestarted defecting. It is ironically
appropriate that Khartoum yesterday[June 8] describedthe situation as a
"mutiny":
"TheNational Congress Party [National Islamic Front] today declared that
situationin South Kordofan is an 'armed mutiny' and a breach of the law
by the SPLM supported byforeign powers and some internal opposition
movements who are working tofurther ambitions of some SPLM
figures."(Sudan Tribune translation of theArabic)
Thistrend of defections from the SAF is likely to increase quickly,
although forthe moment it has created a highly dangerous situation in
Kadugli. One report from the ground, confirmed by a US government
source, puts thematter this way (lightly edited for clarity):
"Thereare many Nuba in the SAF and Kadugli police who are defecting to
the SPLM/A,and at times unwittingly [complicating] the situation. For
SAF troops andPopular Defense Forces have no qualms about killing and
destroying the Nubapeople or their homes and businesses, whereas the
Nuba must show such restraintbecause it is their own people in the
crossfire. This gives the SAF and PDF anadvantage as well as 'plausible
deniability' by deflecting responsibility to SPLA. Inshort, SAF
soldiers may not only kill such 'traitors,' but easily accuse the SPLM/A
of the attacks." (email received June 7, 2011)
•Economicwarfare has begun in earnest, as Khartoum has virtually shut
down the movement of all commercialand other goods to the South. This
means that the South has runextremely short of fuel, and this is putting
humanitarian organizations in ahighly dangerous situation, one in which
they have insufficient fuel toevacuate. Prices have skyrocketed,
especially for fuel. Earlierthis week Juba accused Khartoum of
deliberately closing all commercial routesto the south. In the wordsof
Stephen Dhieu Dau, minister of trade and industry in the Government
ofSouth Sudan:
"Thegovernment in Khartoum is not happy to see people of south Sudan
living inpeace. It says one thing and does another. It is not sleeping.
It
is workingday and night to sabotage peace and development in the
area. It has adopteddetrUNIRIN today reported on the threats felt by
Southerners living in the
Northfollowing the secession of South Sudan in a month. The have good
reasonto fear, and this extends to the people of the Nuba:
"'If south Sudan secedes, we willchange the constitution, and at that
time there will be no time to speak ofdiversity of culture and ethnicity
... shari'aand Islam will be the main source for the constitution, Islam
the officialreligion and Arabic the official language,'[al-Bashir
said]." (TheGuardian, January 8, 2011)
Asone prescient military observer has put it,
"'TheNorth will get away with horrors in Nuba again,'a western military
observer warned in Tchalian'stime [Karen Tchalian was first UNMIS head
of security in Kadugli]. 'The UN would probably be able to do little.
Butright now it knows too little.'"
This was many months ago, and very little has changed.
**************************
•The spirit of theNuba: In January 2003, while traveling in the Nuba
Mountains, I was able todispatch these words from Kauda (one of the
sites that UNMIStoday reports has been attacked); my effort was to
reveal both theextraordinary determination I found among the people of
the Nuba, and theirsupremely clear understanding of their own history
since independence in 1956,particularly in light of the Machakos
Protocol that had been signed in July2002, guaranteeing the right of a
self-determination referendum to the South. I concluded at the time, and
can only emphasize again, that these people will not surrender, they
willnot again be forced into "peace camps," and they will fight
ferociously, realizingthat if they should succumb militarily, their
lives are over.
Kauda,Nuba Mountains
January13, 2003
"The Nuba Mountains Region: AnInescapable Issue at Machakos"
The Khartoum regime has delayed, and perhaps ultimately aborted
itsparticipation in the most recent round of the Machakos peace talks.
It has doneso because it refuses to accept a decision by the peace
process mediators thatgeographical issues must have a place on the
agenda if a true and just peace isto be realized. The Machakos mediators
have rightly decided that there can beno meaningful agreement that
ignores the historically marginalized areas of Abyei,Southern Blue Nile,
and the Nuba Mountains. Twenty years of fighting cannot beended by
ignoring the fate of peoples who have allied themselves politicallyand
militarily with South Sudan, and who feel themselves culturally at
riskfrom the tyranny of Khartoum’s Islamicist project.
TheNuba people in particular have recently expressed their determination
to bepart of any peace agreement, and have designated the SPLM/A as
theirrepresentatives at the Machakos talks (as have the people of Abyei
and SouthernBlue Nile). There should be no mistaking the passionate
resolve of these peopleto live in dignity, to see their culture
preserved, and to exercise the rightof self-determination.
Onereason that international optimism about Machakos has seemed
excessive is thatthe difficulties of remaining issues, while recognized
in general terms, havenot been sufficiently appreciated in their
particulars. Nowhere is this morethe case than with the southern part of
Blue Nile Province (Southern BlueNile), as well as Abyei and the Nuba
Mountains region of western and southernKordofan Province. Though these
areas have ended up in what was determined tobe "northern Sudan" at the
time of independence in 1956, thisis little more than perverse
historical accident, and fails utterly to takeaccount of current
political, ethnic, and cultural realities.
In the case of the Nuba Mountains, this history has been especially
perverse.The people of the Nuba were not consulted during the process
that led to Sudan's independence from British and Egyptiancondominium
rule, and have never felt themselves represented by any of
thegovernments that have come and gone since 1956. Though the Nu
ba
people havemade various political efforts to secure just representation,
they have seen nosuccess in these efforts. In the Addis Ababa agreement
of 1972, trepresentation, and that deeply flawedpeace agreement offered them
nothing. War resumed all to predictably in 1983,in part because of Jafer
Nimeiri’s imposition of the infamous "September shari'alaws" throughout
Sudan, including theNuba region (where Muslims and non-Muslims have
historically coexistedpeacefully). The people of the Nuba long ago
decided to resist militarily thetyranny of Khartoum, joining cause with
the SPLA in 1985. This resistance hasonly increased since the current
regime---the National Islamic Front---came topower by military coup in
June 1989.
The recent "All Nuba Conference" (December 2002) marked a consensus
decisionby the people of the Nuba to be represented by the SPLM/A at the
Machakos peacetalks. This sends a clear signal, and must not be ignored
by those whounderstand the suffering that has defined so much of their
recent history.Before the Nuba Mountains cease-fire was secured by the
international communitylast year, the people of the region had been
living under brutal humanitarianembargo for over a decade, denied all
food and medical assistance, even by theUN's Operation Lifeline Sudan.
The mostrecent humanitarian assessment conducted before the cease-fire
was negotiatedrevealed that Khartoum had brought many tens of thousands
of people to thebrink of starvation. This followed years of driving Nuba
people from thefertile valleys to much more difficult and less
productive mountainous areas.
Peace that excludes the voices of the people of the Nuba, and a
recognition oftheir suffering at the hands of successive regimes in
Khartoum, cannot be ajust peace. It is thus difficult to imagine that
the present Nuba Mountainscease-fire will survive in the wake of merely
partial peace, one that leavesthe essential geographical issues
unresolved and ignores the voices of theNuba. I recently had the
privilege of hearing many of these voices during alengthy discussion
with regional leaders at Lwere, near Kauda. I was struckboth by the
passion and unanimity in what I heard---from Commander IsmailKhamis
(acting governor of the SPLM/A-controlled region of the Nuba),
AbaisIbrahim (Food Security Coordinator for the Nuba Relief,
Rehabilitation, andDevelopment Organization [NRRDO]), Mariam Yuhana
(regional chair of the NubaWomen’s Association), Simon Kalo (regional
director of education), Sodi Ibrahim(SPLM/A secretary for Rashad
County), Mosa Abdualbagi (regional director ofhealth care), Tia Tutu
Tutu (assistant coordinator for NRRDO food securityprogram), and Alamin
DaHalla (secretary in the regional political office).
Again and again I heard the same words: to be consigned to a forced
integrationwith Khartoum’s Islamicism and Arabism was death---and that
resistance wouldcontinue if the international community attempted to
foist such a resolutionupon them. "Khartoum does not considerus to be
human beings," was a steadyrefrain amidst the anger and bewilderment
over what is felt to be an all tooobviously intolerable state of
affairs. No Nuba has forgotten the deliberatedenial of humanitarian
access by Khartoum for over a decade, or the steadydenial of
agricultural land---efforts that marked a destruction that has
widelybeen described as genocidal.
"We have no way out," I was told. There is neither a politicalnor a
geographical exit for the people of the Nuba unless it is achieved
atMachakos. For as all those present in our discussion recognized,
Machakos is asingular opportunity---as singular for them as for other
parts of Sudan. Ifthey area abandoned, or made part of an expedient
compromise with Khartoum,they will have no recourse, no choice in their
minds but to fight on for theirown right to self-determination. They can
no more concede this right than canthe people of South Sudan.
"The 1956 boundaries have becomeirrelevant," Commander Ismail told
me.The historical vagaries th
at left this distinctive region of southern
Kordofanas part of "northern Sudan" have long since ceased to have
anyrelevance, culturally or politically. The viciouslytyrannical
Islamicism and Arabism was never far from the
surface in ourdiscussion. Notably, in a comment that suggested to me
that there is finally noparochialism in the Nuba point of view,
Commander Ismail (representing AbdulAziz el-Hilu, Governor of the Nuba
region) said, "peopleshould not talk in terms of geography, but in terms
of politics." By this he meant that it is not geographyper se that is,
or should be, the issue at Machakos; rather, the essentialissue is the
political and cultural realities of the people who aregeographically
located within the Nuba Mountains regions.
"The problem at Machakos is not the problemof Southern Sudan," or the
problem ofthe Nuba or other marginalized areas---"theproblem is Sudan,"
he continued. Bywhich Commander Ismail meant that the essential problem
is the National IslamicFront regime, which rules Sudan without support
from any region of Sudanoutside Khartoum. And of course there is
resistance to the NIF's tyranny even in Khartoum, though it continuesto
be harshly repressed.
The case of the people of the Nuba Mountains may be special in a sense,
but itall too aptly crystallizes the essential challenge of Machakos.
Either Khartoumis confronted forcefully, consistently, and with the
sharpest moral focus, orthe regime will delay, obfuscate, promise and
renege, and delayfurther---continuing negotiations only in bad faith,
calculating merely whatbest serves their survivalist desires. And if
military victory should seemwithin reach---if resistance in the Nuba
Mountains, Southern Sudan and othermarginalized areas comes to be
regarded as militarily vulnerable---then Machakosmay overnight become
irrelevant. The massive redeployments of offensivemilitary power that
have marked Khartoum’s activities since the cease-fire wasagreed to on
October 15, 2002 are a clear sign of this possibility.
But whatever the chances that remain for Machakos, what is represented
by thepeople of the Nuba Mountains cannot be forgotten. To lose sight of
theirsuffering will be an ominous portent of a much greater moral
blindness.
[Toolittle has change in the past eight years---June 9, 2011]
_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
[email protected]
413-585-3326
www.sudanreeves.org
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