---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: John Ashworth <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 10 Jun 2011 08:48:41 +0300
Subject: [sudan-john-ashworth] Fwd: South Kordofan situation
"deteriorating very fast"
To: Group <[email protected]>
More and more voices on the ground are now describing this as "ethnic
cleansing" and comparing it to the genocide which took place in the
Nuba Mountains in the early 1990s. Clearly it needs an urgent
international response.
John
BEGIN
1. From the ECS Bishop of Kadugli:
To The Most Rt. Rev Daneil Deing Bul
The Archbishop of Episcopal Church of the Sudan
All Bishops and Friends
8th June 2011
Greetings
I would like to give brief report on distraction, burning looting of
the churches properties in the diocese of Kadugli episcopal Church of
the Sudan.
The Conflict and fighting broke out on 5th June 2011 in Umdurain
Villages (Nuba Mountains) between the troops of (SAF) Sudan Army
Forces) the ruling party and Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) as
result of of NCP ruling party forging the recent election.
On 7th June serious fighting started in Kadugli Many Militia brought
to town plus SAF troops killing innocent civilians.Many people fled
from town and some stayed as there is no where to hide in town there
is no food or water only troops all over the streets.
The churches and pastors were directly targeted the quest house in
Kadugli where my staff live the Militias and SAF broke into the House
taking all properties sound system (deynacord) projector, beds, chairs
and two motor bikes one of the bishop's they were looking for pastors
and the bishop whom were put shortly , they continued to the
Headquarters building of the Diocese offices they burned bishop's
office all files and papers were burned they continued th other staff
offices all were burned, the internet cafe with VSAT all 8 computers,
new photocopier, big TV, Tents, refrigerator, Solar System, most of
property were burned and some were looted in the headquarters Offices.
The Church of Christ in in Kadugli was burn down.
My staff they scattered we still trying to find them.
We need UN to arrest the situation, and international community
condiment and stop the blood shed of the innocent people.
We need prayers and support
Rt. Rev . Andudu Adam Elnail
Bishop of Diocese of Kadugli
END1
2. Information from various sources on the ground, 9th June 2011:
* Shelling was heard in Kauda coming from Al Azrag (?)
* Antonov was sighted flying over Kauda this morning.
* Antonov was used to bomb Um Dorain
* Um Serdiba also experienced fighting. SPLA repelled SAF
* UNMIS in Kauda totally lost credibility with locals who also
feel they collaborating with north (partly due to policy to only
evacuate via north). Locals mistrust extends to not giving UNMIS
credible information. This adds to unreliability of UN information.
UNMIS peace keepers in Kauda accused of staying in compound, late with
patrols, have poor communication facilities (computers infected) and
often rely on news of unrest in their vicinity to come from Kadugli
section leader. Egyptian peacekeepers fear for their lives. Official
position of UNMIS is to stay calm and threat will pass but personal
advice shared is to get out and sooner the better.
* Some reports of Bashir accusing Juba for SPLA incursions.
Others, that he is accusing militia forces. Bashir says no political
solution. More rational SAF voices who resisted instructions to attack
AA/SPLA now being punished. (Seems Bashir trying to pull south into
the conflict. South’s silence is clear indication that “nothing must
derail independence”. Is this international position too? What happens
after 9th??? Nuba is sacrificial lamb - a pawn between the two??)
* Schools have been closed since Tuesday 7th
* Most women and children have moved to the mountains with their livestock
* Men are continuing regular activities - many now donning their
old SPLA uniforms.
* Now heard from 2 different sources that local black people
perceived to support SPLM/A being pulled out of UNMIS compound in
Kadugli and executed in presence of peacekeepers. No protection from
them
* Just heard that MIGS flew over Kauda about 2 hrs ago. Fear that
bombs which fell few km away may have resulted in more casualties.
* General plea being communicated - advocate for SKS to be
declared NO FLY ZONE otherwise killings will be at an unprecedented
scale; the world must be told or the innocent will not have a chance!
END2
3. A phone call from Sudan to an international church leader, 9th June 2011
"Half an hour [a Sudanese church leader] called and what he had to say
confirms that the situation is deteriorating very fast indeed. As we
talked he had someone by his side who had just come back from South
Kordofan so had very fresh information. Killings continue unabated and
indiscriminate shooting, including civilians, is taking place.
Churches buildings have been targeted and many have been torched. It's
all very disturbing.
[He] said even as we talked, which means even as I am writing,
killings were going on. The UN Peace Keepers are standing idly by and
civilians have been killed right in front of their eyes and there
hasn't been any intervention on their part. They are there to protect
civilians but they give no protection to the people. And they are not
Zambians who were blamed also for not protecting the people. They are
Egyptians!!
The reports being received from various quarters point to a deliberate
process of Ethnic Cleansing; unfolding before us is yet another human
tragedy in Sudan. This is one massacre too many! The cry of the people
to the international community, to the church, to anybody who cares to
listen, is please tell the world what is going on; appeal to the UN to
protect the people; appeal to the AU to do their part etc etc.
What all this reminds me of is the book on Rwanda genocide in which a
woman asked someone to tell the UN Peace Keepers that, 'Tonight we
are going to be killed with all our families'. Nobody heeded the
warning and indeed that family, and many more besides, were killed.
Can the conscience of the international community be at ease with yet
another mass slaughtering of innocent people so soon after Darfure
genocide, and immadiately following Abyei??"
END3
4. North Sudan army carries out air attacks in Unity state, South Sudan says
June 9, 2011 (JUBA) – North Sudan army today carried out intensive air
attacks in South Sudan’s Unity state, a state minister has told Sudan
Tribune.
The attacks, which occurred from 7-8AM in the morning, was reported by
the minister of Information in Unity state, Gideon Gatpan Thoar.
Thoar told Sudan Tribune on Thursday that two Antonov’s airplanes
belonging to the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), north Sudan army, carried
out the dawn attacks in a place called Jau in Pariang County of the
state near the North-South borders.
Thoar further said that SAF’s Antinov airplanes, which he said were
targeting the positions of division nine of the South Sudan army, the
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), instead hit the settlements of
civilian populations in the area. The number of casualties was not
immediately confirmed.
(ST)
END4
5. "Khartoum Dramatically Escalates War in Sudan"
Violence, including ethnically-targeted destruction, has accelerated
in South Kordofan over the past few days. Aerial attacks are reported
throughout South Kordofan, especially in the Nuba Mountains; one
report is of bombing attacks against the major base of the Sudan
People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Jau (Pariang County in oil-rich
Unity State). A precipitous embargo on fuel and other goods moving
from North to South Sudan is designed to create economic instability
prior to the South's independence in one month (July 9, 2011). Those
in South Kordofan believed loyal to the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) or opposed to the Khartoum regime are being hunted
down in retribution; the destruction of churches and the targeting of
Christians in and around Kadugli give an ominous sense of what is to
come.
Eric Reeves
June 9, 2011
Highlights of reports, as of 7pm June 9:
•As in Abyei, the military actions by Khartoum in South Kordofan were
clearly premeditated. The potential for precisely the conflict we are
seeing now has been repeatedly noted by several observers. And yet the
international community has again been caught flat-footed, wholly
reliant on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS); this force has performed
poorly, especially in Kadugli where it is widely perceived to have
sided with Khartoum. Reports continue to stream in of more tanks
moving south from el-Obeid, the main Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) military
base outside Khartoum. Military air assets have been rapidly deployed
in the conflict, for the Nuba Mountains---where the war will be
concentrated---are within range of the jet fighter aircraft based in
el-Obeid. Khartoum's most brutal leaders, including President Omar
al-Bashir and his chief advisor Nafi'e Ali Nafi'e, have publicly
declared that the SAF has been given a "free hand" throughout South
Kordofan, and that any southern troops in the North after June 1 would
be "legitimate targets"—this despite the fact that tens of thousands
of these troops consider South Kordofan and southern Blue Nile their
home. Reprisals against civilians thought to be sympathetic to the
SPLM/A have been brutal.
Khartoum has explicitly declared its intention to "spread its forces
throughout [South Kordofan] state after in gained military control in
Kadugli" (Sudan News Agency [SUNA/Khartoum], June 8, 2011). Given the
central location of the Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan, this is a
declaration of all-out war. UNMIS has already reported that the SAF
is "shelling SPLA positions in the mountains of South Kordofan." UNMIS
also reports (June 9) that "fighting was ongoing and had spread across
the state."
•As was true following the invasion of Abyei, Khartoum's decision to
resume war in South Kordofan has very quickly produced tens of
thousands of displaced civilians, even as humanitarian organizations
have halted operations or withdrawn. The humanitarian situation for
the Nuba and non-Arab populations of South Kordofan has immediately
become critical. The 10,000 civilians who have sought security at the
UNMIS base in Kadugli are desperately short of water and facing
growing security risks. Many have already left Kadugli, and the town
of Dilling to the north is reportedly deserted. One estimate from a
Nuba source is that 75,000 people have already been displaced.
•On Sunday, June 5 senior leaders of the SPLM flew to Kadugli to
arrange a cease-fire with Khartoum officials, and signed an agreement
to this effect. In a signature move of bad faith, an hour after Yasir
Arman (head of the SPLM in North Sudan) and Malik Agar (governor of
Blue Nile and senior member of the SPLM) flew out of Kadugli,
Khartoum's SAF began an assault on the home of Abdel Aziz el-Hilu,
SPLM candidate for governor of South Kordofan during the rigged
elections of May and a true son of the Nuba. El-Hilu is widely
popular among the people of the Nuba and a superb military leader. If
he had in fact been killed in the SAF attack, the consequences would
have been enormous; as one Nuba put it, "If Aziz goes down the entire
Nuba Mountains will erupt." El-Hilu is now reported to be “fully in
military uniform." That Khartoum was willing to take this risk
indicates that the regime has already determined on a course of war.
Here, the consequences of the Carter Center's poorly informed
ratification of the South Kordofan gubernatorial election---in which
indicted war criminal Ahmed Haroun defeated el-Hilu following a
fraudulent vote count---continues to make themselves felt, and
contribute to the climate of deep hostility and mistrust.
•The Sudan Tribune reports (June 9) that Antonov bombers attacked Jau
in South Sudan (oil-rich Unity State); this attack on a major SPLA
base of operations in the South represents a radical escalation in the
war that is rapidly unfolding. Predictably, the long-range,
high-altitude Antonovs (not "bombers," but cargo planes from which
crude barrel bombs are rolled without sighting mechanisms) dropped
their bombs wide of the SPLA headquarters and hit civilian targets
instead (see my report on Khartoum’s history of bombing civilian and
humanitarian targets over the past twelve years:
www.sudanbombing.org/). Three were reported killed, including a
child.
The threat of much greater military incursion into South Sudan has
been dismissed by many observers, but this seems unwise. Indeed, a
SPLA spokesman Philip Aguer notes today, "The borders have not been
demarcated and SAF plans to take some of these areas now. We have said
this is part of a plan by SAF." And indeed, any inspection of a map
of the oil concession areas reveals just how much is concentrated
along the 1956 North/South border. In a January 2011 report for Pax
Christi, researcher Julie Flint writes in "The Nuba Mountains: Central
to Sudan’s Security":
"Today senior SPLA officers in Southern Kordofan claim that SAF is
'preparing for war all the way along the border.' They claim SAF
divisions recast as brigades in 2009 remain at division strength; four
separate brigades that arrived in 2008-09 constitute another,
unacknowledged division; and 40-barrel Katyusha rocket launchers, B-10
anti-tank guns and 120 mm mortars have been moved to the border area.
Deputy governor al-Hilu says that despite agreement that SAF would
move into 15 assembly points, it now has 55,000 troops in more than
100 garrisons---'more than needed to control Southern Kordofan; more
even than at the height of the jihad.'"
•In South Kordofan SAF military aircraft and artillery reportedly
attacked five villages south of Kadugli as well as Talodi, Heiban,
Kauda, Abdel Aziz el-Hilu's compound on the outskirts of Kadugli, and
many other towns. Civilians are reportedly fleeing from many
locations: Kadugli, Talodi, Dilling, Umm Dorein (again, Dilling is
reportedly nearly deserted). The SAF spokesman, al-Swarmi Kahled, has
refused to take calls from journalists. One source on the ground
reports that there have been 100 casualties in Heiban (Nuba
Mountains). Khartoum shows no interest in the SPLM offer [June 8] of
an immediate cease-fire.
•Civilians who fled from Khartoum’s brutal military seizure of Abyei
are struggling, as humanitarian organizations increasingly find
themselves short of supplies, most critically fuel by which to
maintain mobility. The outlook is increasingly grim, according to a
news dispatch from Turelei, South Sudan. These Dinka Ngok people are
struggling simply to survive. At the same time it is clear that the
original UN report on the Abyei invasion found sufficient evidence to
claim that Khartoum’s "'attack and occupation’ of the disputed town of
Abyei 'is tantamount to ethnic cleansing.'" But in the final
report—leaked to Associated Press on June 3---the language has been
changed substantially by the UN bureaucracy: now the report claims
only that "the 'occupation' of Abyei could lead to ethnic cleansing…."
This revision was made with transparently political motives, as UN
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and senior UN officials sought to
mollify Khartoum. The spineless Ban declared flatly that it is "far
too early to claim that ethnic cleansing is taking place."
•The origin of the fighting will be disputed in the absence of any
neutral reporting presence; in this sense, it is like the military
invasion of Abyei, which was precipitated by the disputed events of
May 19---events that nonetheless served as a casus belli for Khartoum.
One highly informed source reports that the initial shooting occurred
at Umm Dorain when Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) attempted to disarm SPLA
troops at the border stations that delineated the military boundary
between the two sides during the civil war; this has been confirmed by
a Western official who closely follows regional events. But Khartoum
was clearly planning for this war in the Nuba and many tanks quickly
appeared in Kadugli, along with a rapid deployment of other offensive
military resources.
•Civilian reprisals are increasing, and are like to accelerate rapidly
going forward. A reliable source reports that Khartoum’s fearsome
Military Intelligence forced its way into UNMIS headquarters in
Kadugli and took many suspected SPLM sympathizers. This source also
reports that a "disabled man in a wheelchair was found killed outside
the UNMIS compound after he sought protection [there]." This has had
an understandably chilling effect on those looking to UNMIS for
protection, and many who had originally gathered at the UNMIS base are
melting away. A number of those caught and labeled "SPLM
sympathizers" have almost certainly been executed.
Many within the SAF ranks are forced recruits from the South or the
Nuba; many wish to join the SPLM and have started defecting. It is
ironically appropriate that Khartoum yesterday [June 8] described the
situation as a "mutiny":
"The National Congress Party [National Islamic Front] today declared
that situation in South Kordofan is an 'armed mutiny' and a breach of
the law by the SPLM supported by foreign powers and some internal
opposition movements who are working to further ambitions of some SPLM
figures." (Sudan Tribune translation of the Arabic)
This trend of defections from the SAF is likely to increase quickly,
although for the moment it has created a highly dangerous situation in
Kadugli. One report from the ground, confirmed by a US government
source, puts the matter this way (lightly edited for clarity):
"There are many Nuba in the SAF and Kadugli police who are defecting
to the SPLM/A, and at times unwittingly [complicating] the situation.
For SAF troops and Popular Defense Forces have no qualms about killing
and destroying the Nuba people or their homes and businesses, whereas
the Nuba must show such restraint because it is their own people in
the crossfire. This gives the SAF and PDF an advantage as well as
'plausible deniability' by deflecting responsibility to SPLA. In
short, SAF soldiers may not only kill such 'traitors,' but easily
accuse the SPLM/A of the attacks." (email received June 7, 2011)
•Economic warfare has begun in earnest, as Khartoum has virtually shut
down the movement of all commercial and other goods to the South.
This means that the South has run extremely short of fuel, and this is
putting humanitarian organizations in a highly dangerous situation,
one in which they have insufficient fuel to evacuate. Prices have
skyrocketed, especially for fuel. Earlier this week Juba accused
Khartoum of deliberately closing all commercial routes to the south.
In the words of Stephen Dhieu Dau, minister of trade and industry in
the Government of South Sudan:
"The government in Khartoum is not happy to see people of south Sudan
living in peace. It says one thing and does another. It is not
sleeping. It is working day and night to sabotage peace and
development in the area. It has adopted detrimental policies."
UN IRIN today reported on the threats felt by Southerners living in
the North following the secession of South Sudan in a month. The have
good reason to fear, and this extends to the people of the Nuba:
"'If south Sudan secedes, we will change the constitution, and at that
time there will be no time to speak of diversity of culture and
ethnicity ... shari'a and Islam will be the main source for the
constitution, Islam the official religion and Arabic the official
language,' [al-Bashir said]." (The Guardian, January 8, 2011)
As one prescient military observer has put it,
"'The North will get away with horrors in Nuba again,' a western
military observer warned in Tchalian's time [Karen Tchalian was first
UNMIS head of security in Kadugli]. 'The UN would probably be able to
do little. But right now it knows too little.'"
This was many months ago, and very little has changed.
**************************
•The spirit of the Nuba: In January 2003, while traveling in the Nuba
Mountains, I was able to dispatch these words from Kauda (one of the
sites that UNMIS today reports has been attacked); my effort was to
reveal both the extraordinary determination I found among the people
of the Nuba, and their supremely clear understanding of their own
history since independence in 1956, particularly in light of the
Machakos Protocol that had been signed in July 2002, guaranteeing the
right of a self-determination referendum to the South. I concluded at
the time, and can only emphasize again, that these people will not
surrender, they will not again be forced into "peace camps," and they
will fight ferociously, realizing that if they should succumb
militarily, their lives are over.
Kauda, Nuba Mountains
January 13, 2003
"The Nuba Mountains Region: An Inescapable Issue at Machakos"
The Khartoum regime has delayed, and perhaps ultimately aborted its
participation in the most recent round of the Machakos peace talks. It
has done so because it refuses to accept a decision by the peace
process mediators that geographical issues must have a place on the
agenda if a true and just peace is to be realized. The Machakos
mediators have rightly decided that there can be no meaningful
agreement that ignores the historically marginalized areas of Abyei,
Southern Blue Nile, and the Nuba Mountains. Twenty years of fighting
cannot be ended by ignoring the fate of peoples who have allied
themselves politically and militarily with South Sudan, and who feel
themselves culturally at risk from the tyranny of Khartoum’s
Islamicist project.
The Nuba people in particular have recently expressed their
determination to be part of any peace agreement, and have designated
the SPLM/A as their representatives at the Machakos talks (as have the
people of Abyei and Southern Blue Nile). There should be no mistaking
the passionate resolve of these people to live in dignity, to see
their culture preserved, and to exercise the right of
self-determination.
One reason that international optimism about Machakos has seemed
excessive is that the difficulties of remaining issues, while
recognized in general terms, have not been sufficiently appreciated in
their particulars. Nowhere is this more the case than with the
southern part of Blue Nile Province (Southern Blue Nile), as well as
Abyei and the Nuba Mountains region of western and southern Kordofan
Province. Though these areas have ended up in what was determined to
be "northern Sudan" at the time of independence in 1956, this is
little more than perverse historical accident, and fails utterly to
take account of current political, ethnic, and cultural realities.
In the case of the Nuba Mountains, this history has been especially
perverse. The people of the Nuba were not consulted during the process
that led to Sudan's independence from British and Egyptian condominium
rule, and have never felt themselves represented by any of the
governments that have come and gone since 1956. Though the Nuba people
have made various political efforts to secure just representation,
they have seen no success in these efforts. In the Addis Ababa
agreement of 1972, the people of the Nuba were again without
meaningful representation, and that deeply flawed peace agreement
offered them nothing. War resumed all to predictably in 1983, in part
because of Jafer Nimeiri’s imposition of the infamous "September
shari'a laws" throughout Sudan, including the Nuba region (where
Muslims and non-Muslims have historically coexisted peacefully). The
people of the Nuba long ago decided to resist militarily the tyranny
of Khartoum, joining cause with the SPLA in 1985. This resistance has
only increased since the current regime---the National Islamic
Front---came to power by military coup in June 1989.
The recent "All Nuba Conference" (December 2002) marked a consensus
decision by the people of the Nuba to be represented by the SPLM/A at
the Machakos peace talks. This sends a clear signal, and must not be
ignored by those who understand the suffering that has defined so much
of their recent history. Before the Nuba Mountains cease-fire was
secured by the international community last year, the people of the
region had been living under brutal humanitarian embargo for over a
decade, denied all food and medical assistance, even by the UN's
Operation Lifeline Sudan. The most recent humanitarian assessment
conducted before the cease-fire was negotiated revealed that Khartoum
had brought many tens of thousands of people to the brink of
starvation. This followed years of driving Nuba people from the
fertile valleys to much more difficult and less productive mountainous
areas.
Peace that excludes the voices of the people of the Nuba, and a
recognition of their suffering at the hands of successive regimes in
Khartoum, cannot be a just peace. It is thus difficult to imagine that
the present Nuba Mountains cease-fire will survive in the wake of
merely partial peace, one that leaves the essential geographical
issues unresolved and ignores the voices of the Nuba. I recently had
the privilege of hearing many of these voices during a lengthy
discussion with regional leaders at Lwere, near Kauda. I was struck
both by the passion and unanimity in what I heard---from Commander
Ismail Khamis (acting governor of the SPLM/A-controlled region of the
Nuba), Abais Ibrahim (Food Security Coordinator for the Nuba Relief,
Rehabilitation, and Development Organization [NRRDO]), Mariam Yuhana
(regional chair of the Nuba Women’s Association), Simon Kalo (regional
director of education), Sodi Ibrahim (SPLM/A secretary for Rashad
County), Mosa Abdualbagi (regional director of health care), Tia Tutu
Tutu (assistant coordinator for NRRDO food security program), and
Alamin DaHalla (secretary in the regional political office).
Again and again I heard the same words: to be consigned to a forced
integration with Khartoum’s Islamicism and Arabism was death---and
that resistance would continue if the international community
attempted to foist such a resolution upon them. "Khartoum does not
consider us to be human beings," was a steady refrain amidst the anger
and bewilderment over what is felt to be an all too obviously
intolerable state of affairs. No Nuba has forgotten the deliberate
denial of humanitarian access by Khartoum for over a decade, or the
steady denial of agricultural land---efforts that marked a destruction
that has widely been described as genocidal.
"We have no way out," I was told. There is neither a political nor a
geographical exit for the people of the Nuba unless it is achieved at
Machakos. For as all those present in our discussion recognized,
Machakos is a singular opportunity---as singular for them as for other
parts of Sudan. If they area abandoned, or made part of an expedient
compromise with Khartoum, they will have no recourse, no choice in
their minds but to fight on for their own right to self-determination.
They can no more concede this right than can the people of South
Sudan.
"The 1956 boundaries have become irrelevant," Commander Ismail told
me. The historical vagaries that left this distinctive region of
southern Kordofan as part of "northern Sudan" have long since ceased
to have any relevance, culturally or politically. The deep resentment
of a viciously tyrannical Islamicism and Arabism was never far from
the surface in our discussion. Notably, in a comment that suggested to
me that there is finally no parochialism in the Nuba point of view,
Commander Ismail (representing Abdul Aziz el-Hilu, Governor of the
Nuba region) said, "people should not talk in terms of geography, but
in terms of politics." By this he meant that it is not geography per
se that is, or should be, the issue at Machakos; rather, the essential
issue is the political and cultural realities of the people who are
geographically located within the Nuba Mountains regions.
"The problem at Machakos is not the problem of Southern Sudan," or the
problem of the Nuba or other marginalized areas---"the problem is
Sudan," he continued. By which Commander Ismail meant that the
essential problem is the National Islamic Front regime, which rules
Sudan without support from any region of Sudan outside Khartoum. And
of course there is resistance to the NIF's tyranny even in Khartoum,
though it continues to be harshly repressed.
The case of the people of the Nuba Mountains may be special in a
sense, but it all too aptly crystallizes the essential challenge of
Machakos. Either Khartoum is confronted forcefully, consistently, and
with the sharpest moral focus, or the regime will delay, obfuscate,
promise and renege, and delay further---continuing negotiations only
in bad faith, calculating merely what best serves their survivalist
desires. And if military victory should seem within reach---if
resistance in the Nuba Mountains, Southern Sudan and other
marginalized areas comes to be regarded as militarily
vulnerable---then Machakos may overnight become irrelevant. The
massive redeployments of offensive military power that have marked
Khartoum’s activities since the cease-fire was agreed to on October
15, 2002 are a clear sign of this possibility.
But whatever the chances that remain for Machakos, what is represented
by the people of the Nuba Mountains cannot be forgotten. To lose sight
of their suffering will be an ominous portent of a much greater moral
blindness.
[Too little has change in the past eight years---June 9, 2011]
_____________________________
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
[email protected]
413-585-3326
www.sudanreeves.org
END5
______________________
John Ashworth
Sudan Advisor
Sudan Ecumenical Forum
[email protected]
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