After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. One impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object. However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some problems.
Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start work on a new I-D that documents our musings. Thoughts? - m&m Matt Miller < [email protected] > Cisco Systems, Inc. On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <[email protected]> wrote: > I could also see it like the following: > > { > "kty":"RSA", > "kid":"[email protected]", > "n":".....", > "e":"AQAB", > "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"; > // and/or "x5c":[....] > } > > Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in > XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above. > > Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds. > > > - m&m > > Matt Miller < [email protected] > > Cisco Systems, Inc. > > On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of X509 >> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as many >> days. >> >> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems like >> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to >> overcome such pity objections? >> >> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has in >> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just a >> formality. >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list. >>> >>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk. >>> >>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing. >>> >>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is a >>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy way to >>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key. >>> >>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single >>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats. >>> >>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent >>> in band. >>> >>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same thing. >>> >>> John B. >>> >>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and >>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would be >>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? Which >>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might be >>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now. >>>>> >>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question but >>> I >>>>> digress... >>>> >>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions. >>>> >>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be >>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key? >>>> >>>> { >>>> "kty":"X509", >>>> "x5c": [....] >>>> } >>>> >>>> >>>> - m&m >>>> >>>> Matt Miller < [email protected] > >>>> Cisco Systems, Inc. >>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts >>> with a >>>>>> secret. I would expect a kid in the header. >>>>>> >>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to >>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a >>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its >>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort. >>>>>> >>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to >>>>>> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to >>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate." >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Thanks Brian >>>>>> >>>>>> John B. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected] >>>> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that >>> struck >>>>>> me as maybe not right. >>>>>> >>>>>> From >>>>>> >>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4.1.9 >>>>>> >>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted >>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key >>> of >>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity >>> that >>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity. >>>>>> >>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] >>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm >>> missing >>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate >>> chain? >>>>>> >>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B< >>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B>of >>> [ >>>>>> JWS< >>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS >>>> ] >>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is >>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest. >>>>>> >>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to >>> just >>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously, >>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, >>> there's >>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient >>> identify its >>>>>> own key. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> jose mailing list >>>>>> [email protected] >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>> jose mailing list >>>>> [email protected] >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >>>> >>> >>> > > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
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