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From: Brian Campbell [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: Friday, February 08, 2013 2:44 PM To: John Bradley Cc: [email protected]; Matt Miller (mamille2) Subject: Re: [jose] Adding a X509/PKIX JWK type? [WAS: issues with x5c in JWE] I also support it (though I guess that's kind of obvious huh?). On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:56 AM, John Bradley <[email protected]> wrote: I agree that being able to include a x5c or reference a x5u form a JWK allows for more consistency around key references and key use. I support developing an ID to discuss this. John B. On 2013-02-08, at 11:47 AM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <[email protected]> wrote: > After some off-list discussions, a couple of us believe it would be worthwhile to somehow wrap a PKIX certificate chain in a JSON Web Key. A couple of us are leaning toward a new JWK type to do this. One impact, I think, is that anywhere we currently have "x5c" (and potentially "x5t" and "x5u") are effectively replaced by an actual JWK object. However, a few of us have other use cases where a PKIX certificate JWK would solve some problems. > > Unless there's strong objection, Brian Campbell and I are likely to start work on a new I-D that documents our musings. > > > Thoughts? > > - m&m > > Matt Miller < [email protected] > > Cisco Systems, Inc. > > On Jan 31, 2013, at 3:15 PM, Matt Miller (mamille2) <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I could also see it like the following: >> >> { >> "kty":"RSA", >> "kid":"[email protected]", >> "n":".....", >> "e":"AQAB", >> "x5u":"https://capulet.lit/juliet.crt"; >> // and/or "x5c":[....] >> } >> >> Having a "X509" JWK type might solve one problem I can see having in XMPP-E2E, but it that same problem could be solved with the above. >> >> Then again, I could be completely off in the weeds. >> >> >> - m&m >> >> Matt Miller < [email protected] > >> Cisco Systems, Inc. >> >> On Jan 31, 2013, at 2:45 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >>> John and Mike beat me to it but yeah, the general idea of some kind of X509 >>> support in JWK has now independently come up in my world twice in as many >>> days. >>> >>> I must say that, from a general design of things perspective, it seems like >>> a total abomination. But maybe, just maybe, it'd be useful enough to >>> overcome such pity objections? >>> >>> Though, to be fair, Matt's idea is pretty different than what John has in >>> mind. Getting to some level of agreement would likely be more than just a >>> formality. >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 9:54 AM, John Bradley <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> Brian and I were discussing a couple of options off the list. >>>> >>>> One possible thing might be to add x5c and/or x5u elements to jwk. >>>> >>>> In Connect we are looking at how to deal with key rollover for signing. >>>> >>>> The problem with specifying a x5u is that while it is a vert chain it is a >>>> single cert chain, so you need to have multiple and there is no easy way to >>>> have the same keyid for a jwk key and a x5u key. >>>> >>>> My idea was to allow x5u elements in a jwk so that you can have a single >>>> keyid and key use that apples to both formats. >>>> >>>> I can see a use for x5c in jwk as well especially where it is being sent >>>> in band. >>>> >>>> So while it may sound crazy a number of us may be thinking the same thing. >>>> >>>> John B. >>>> >>>> On 2013-01-31, at 1:42 PM, "Matt Miller (mamille2)" <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Jan 31, 2013, at 9:20 AM, Brian Campbell <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Seems to me that something like x5c would be a lot more meaningful and >>>>>> useful for a possible future ECDH-SS algorithm for JWE. But it would be >>>>>> about the encrypting party or sender's certs in that case, right? Which >>>>>> would be different than how it's currently being used. And that might be >>>>>> another argument for not having it in JWE right now. >>>>>> >>>>>> Of course that starts to beg the "must understand headers" question but >>>> I >>>>>> digress... >>>>> >>>>> I was starting to come to similar conclusions. >>>>> >>>>> This probably sounds crazy, but maybe we can pretend x.509 certs can be >>>> wrapped into a JSON Web Key? >>>>> >>>>> { >>>>> "kty":"X509", >>>>> "x5c": [....] >>>>> } >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> - m&m >>>>> >>>>> Matt Miller < [email protected] > >>>>> Cisco Systems, Inc. >>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jan 29, 2013 at 8:04 PM, John Bradley <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes for encryption (Leaving ECDH-SS aside ) the recipoient decrypts >>>> with a >>>>>>> secret. I would expect a kid in the header. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I suppose they if the recipient published a x5c that the sender used to >>>>>>> encrypt with then you could include the x5c as a reference though a >>>>>>> thumbprint would be simpler as the recipient is probably keeping its >>>>>>> private keys in a key-store of some sort. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> In any event we would minimally want to change that to >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that is to >>>>>>> decrypt the JWE MUST be the first certificate." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Thanks Brian >>>>>>> >>>>>>> John B. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On 2013-01-29, at 11:08 PM, Brian Campbell <[email protected] >>>>> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I just noticed a couple of things in the JWE's x5c definition that >>>> struck >>>>>>> me as maybe not right. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> From >>>>>>> >>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#section-4. 1.9 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "The certificate containing the public key of the entity that encrypted >>>>>>> the JWE MUST be the first certificate." - but it's not the public key >>>> of >>>>>>> the entity that encrypted, is it? It's the public key of the entity >>>> that >>>>>>> will decrypt. The other entity. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "The recipient MUST verify the certificate chain according to [RFC5280] >>>>>>> and reject the JWE if any validation failure occurs." - maybe I'm >>>> missing >>>>>>> something but why would the recipient verify it's own certificate >>>> chain? >>>>>>> >>>>>>> And the first hyperlink in "See Appendix B< >>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#appendix-B >of >>>> [ >>>>>>> JWS< >>>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption-08#ref-JWS >>>>> ] >>>>>>> for an example "x5c" value" takes you to Appendix B of JWE, which is >>>>>>> Acknowledgements, rather than JWS as the text would suggest. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So all those little nits could be fixed. But maybe it'd be better to >>>> just >>>>>>> remove x5c from JWE all together? As Richard pointed out previously, >>>>>>> http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg01434.html, >>>> there's >>>>>>> really no point in sending a whole chain to help the recipient >>>> identify its >>>>>>> own key. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>>> jose mailing list >>>>>>> [email protected] >>>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> _______________________________________________ >>>>>> jose mailing list >>>>>> [email protected] >>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose >>>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> jose mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose > > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
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