1 ish. Representing the nonce/IV separately should not preclude using a crypto library generated nonce/IV , as may be done in some libraries implementing draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2.
So I am in favour of the current serialization while wanting to support the crypto from draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 if not the particular serialization which is optimized for a different use-case. The current draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2 conflates crypto and serialization. I am hoping we can resolve that so the crypto can be supported. John B. On 2013-04-11, at 8:58 PM, Karen O'Donoghue <[email protected]> wrote: > Issue #11 http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/11 proposes > restructuring the JWE representation to remove the JWE Integrity Value field > and instead use the RFC 5116 (AEAD) binary serialization to represent the > Ciphertext, Initialization Vector, and Integrity Value values. If this > proposal is adopted, JWEs would then have three fields – the header, the > encrypted key, and the RFC 5116 combination of the Ciphertext, Initialization > Vector, and Integrity Value values. > This issue is also related to issue #3. Note that the updated McGrew draft > described there could be used whether or not we switched to using RFC 5116. > > > Which of these best describes your preferences on this issue? > > 1. Continue having separate Ciphertext, Initialization Vector, and Integrity > Value values in the JWE representation. > > 2. Switch to using the RFC 5116 (AEAD) serialization to represent the > combination of these three values. > > 3. Another resolution (please specify in detail). > > 0. I need more information to decide. > > > > Your reply is requested by Friday, April 19th or earlier. > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
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