Hi Richard,
In -36 I added that if both "use" and "key_ops" are used, then the information
they convey MUST be consistent, per your suggestion. I also replaced the
[TBD]@ietf.org with the actual list name. Hopefully this will enable you to
clear your DISCUSSes on this draft.
Thanks again,
-- Mike
-----Original Message-----
From: Mike Jones [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 9:19 AM
To: Richard Barnes
Cc: The IESG; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: RE: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33:
(with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
Thanks for your responses, Richard. Replies are inline below...
> From: Richard Barnes [mailto:[email protected]]
> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 11:38 AM
> To: Mike Jones
> Cc: The IESG; [email protected];
> [email protected]; [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on
> draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
>
> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Mike Jones <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> Thanks for your review. The -34 draft contains the following resolutions. I
> hope that you can clear your DISCUSSes on that basis.
>
> -- Mike
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: jose [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Richard
> > Barnes
> > Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:34 PM
> > To: The IESG
> > Cc: [email protected];
> > [email protected];
> > [email protected]
> > Subject: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on
> > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> >
> > Richard Barnes has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: Discuss
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to
> > all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to
> > cut this introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to
> > http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key/
> >
> >
> >
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------
> > --
> > DISCUSS:
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------
> > --
> >
> > Section 4.3.
> > "The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together."
> > Did the WG discuss how these could combine? What was the outcome of
> > that discussion? This could be an important point for
> > interoperability. For example, WebCrypto enforces them both, so it
> > will break if it gets a key with "use" and "key_ops" set to inconsistent
> > values.
> > https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/webcrypto-api/raw-file/tip/spec/Overview.html
> > #rsa-
> > pss-operations
>
> I believe that the working group discussion is accurately reflected in this
> text from the spec:
> The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together.
> Applications should specify which of these members they use, if
> either is to be used by the application.
>
> To keep things simple, applications should choose one or the other, based on
> their needs. Note that this is a "SHOULD NOT" - not a "MUST NOT", so if
> WebCrypto believes they have a good reason to allow either or both, they're
> not violating the spec. But specifying which combinations are legal and
> which aren't in the JWK spec seems very high on the complexity to usefulness
> ratio. I hope that you will choose to withdraw this DISCUSS on that basis.
>
> How about if we require that they be consistent if used together, but punt
> the definition of consistency to WebCrypto?
>
> """
> The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together.
> Applications should specify which of these members they use, if
> either is to be used by the application. If both "use" and "key_ops"
> members
> are present, then they MUST be consistent (see [WebCrypto]).
> """
I suspect some reviewers wouldn't agree with the "(see [WebCrypto])" part, but
I can add the rest of your suggested sentence, if that will do it for you.
> > Section 8.
> > "[TBD]@ietf.org"
> > This needs to be populated before approval. I don't know what's
> > customary here, but "[email protected]" is an obvious candidate.
>
> Per the spec, [email protected] is already the recommended name. Yes,
> we would create this list before final approval, just as
> [email protected] was created before RFC 6749 was approved. I hope
> that you'll choose to withdraw this DISCUSS on that basis.
>
> That sounds fine to me. Who has the action to get that list set up?
Kathleen is doing this, per earlier comments on the thread.
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------
> > --
> > COMMENT:
> > --------------------------------------------------------------------
> > --
> >
> > Section 1.1.
> > The pointer for BASE64URL should be to JWS. One level of
> > indirection, please :)
>
> Agreed
>
> > Section 4.
> > It might be worth being explicit (here or elsewhere):
> > "A JWK MUST NOT contain algorithm-specific members for key type
> > other the one specified in its "kty" attribute."
>
> I agree with the sentiment, but this actually contradicts the statement that
> member names that are not understood MUST be ignored.
>
> Good point. Perhaps we could phrase this as a requirement on creators,
> leaving consumers free to be more liberal?
>
> """
> The creator of a JWK MUST NOT include algorithm-specific members for key type
> other the one specified in its "kty" attribute. Consumers of JWKs SHOULD NOT
> reject JWKs with such members, however, in the interest of extensibility.
> """
In another thread, Carsten Bormann had explicitly objected to situations in
which there are different requirements on producers and consumers, unless
absolutely necessary. I don't think the situation you're describing (for
instance, including an extraneous "x" value in an RSA key value) rises to the
level of severity that it warrants placing different requirements on producers
and consumers. Rather, my intuition at this point (which could, of course, be
wrong), is that doing so would be likely to itself generate DISCUSS positions.
I think we're better off leaving this as-is.
> > Section 4.1.
> > "cryptographic algorithm family used with the key"
> > "... such as "RSA" or "EC"."
>
> Agreed
>
> > Section 4.7.
> > "base64 encoded ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER"
> > It seems unpleasant for implementations to have to support two
> > flavors of base64, especially since this doesn't use PEM directly.
> > Did the WG discuss just using BASE64URL?
>
> Not much, although each certificate value is actually a PEM-encoded value,
> including allowing newlines, etc. People agreed with that goal when we did
> discuss it.
>
> > Section 9.1.
> > It might help here to note that technologies like PKIX and JWT can
> > allow relying parties to verify the provenance of a key and binding of
> > attributes to it.
>
> Can you propose specific language for this? What I have in mind is
> delivering a JWK or JWK Set on a TLS channel using a URL that is
> cryptographically bound to the use of the key - possibly using the URL as the
> issuer of a JWT signed with the key, but you may have something else in mind.
>
> I had in mind more the traditional, "use a certificate to bind attributes to
> a key" sense. How about this?
>
> """
> In most applications today, there are trusted authorities that vouch for the
> provenance of a key and bind attributes to it. For example, in PKIX-based
> applications, participants use certificates to verify that a certificate
> authority has bound certain attributes to a key, such as a name or key usage.
> JWK supports this style of provenance through the "x5u", "x5c", "x5t", and
> "x5t#S256" attributes, all of which reference a certificate that a relying
> party can use to associate attributes to the JWK. Other assertions systems,
> such as JWT, can likewise be used to assert bindings of attributes to keys.
> In some applications, it may also be convenient to use TLS as an ersatz
> assertion mechanism. For example, an application could require JWKs to be
> downloaded with associated attributes over HTTPS as a way of having the HTTPS
> server assert a binding of the JWK to its attributes. This is similar to the
> way that the XMPP POSH mechanism uses HTTPS to assert delegations from one
> way to another. In such applications, however, care needs to be taken to
> ensure that secure transports are always used, and to avoid confusion with
> other uses of the TLS server in question. The former situation would allow
> an attacker to create bogus assertions, and the latter would let an attacker
> trick the server into issuing bogus assertions.
> """
It may be just me, but the whole notion of binding attributes to keys seems to
be a bit off topic - at least in a section on "Key Provenance and Trust". The
point of this section is that applications will make trust decisions about keys
based on the trustworthiness of the way they got the key. Whether or not there
may also be attributes bundled with the key is independent of this, so I'm not
prone to talk about it here. If you think it needs to be talked about
elsewhere, can you motivate the reason for doing so?
Other comments on your proposed text above follow...
In what specific way are you thinking that "Other assertions systems, such as
JWT, can likewise be used to assert bindings of attributes to keys"? While I
agree that this is true, I suspect that most implementers wouldn't find that
particular wording actionable.
In your second proposed paragraph, while you're talking about "binding of the
JWK to its attributes", I think the core of the message here is that TLS URLs
can be used to provide clear provenance for sets of keys. I'm fine with saying
that in some way.
I agree with your comments about secure transports being used and ensuring that
keys are only retrieved from locations advertised by the application as being
their key locations.
>
> Thanks again,
> -- Mike
-- Mike
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