Richard, I am close to be done with a final check on comments for this draft and see that one of your comments was not addressed and maybe should be.
The comment left in the datatracker is as follows: Section 9.1. It might help here to note that technologies like PKIX and JWT can allow relying parties to verify the provenance of a key and binding of attributes to it. This is a slightly edited version from earlier discussions, which leads me to think you may not have been happy with the 'discussion' http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg04627.html Can you take a look at this and if you have text to propose, that would be appreciated. On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 12:33 AM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> wrote: > +1 > > > > From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Monday, November 03, 2014 8:02 PM > To: Richard Barnes > Cc: Mike Jones; [email protected]; > [email protected]; The IESG; [email protected] > > > Subject: Re: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > > > Thank you, Richard. > > Sent from my iPhone > > > On Nov 3, 2014, at 10:14 PM, Richard Barnes <[email protected]> wrote: > > Thanks a lot! I cleared. > > > > On Sat, Oct 25, 2014 at 2:34 AM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Hi Richard, > > In -36 I added that if both "use" and "key_ops" are used, then the > information they convey MUST be consistent, per your suggestion. I also > replaced the [TBD]@ietf.org with the actual list name. Hopefully this will > enable you to clear your DISCUSSes on this draft. > > Thanks again, > -- Mike > > -----Original Message----- > From: Mike Jones [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Monday, October 20, 2014 9:19 AM > To: Richard Barnes > Cc: The IESG; [email protected]; > [email protected]; [email protected] > > Subject: RE: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) > > Thanks for your responses, Richard. Replies are inline below... > >> From: Richard Barnes [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: Saturday, October 18, 2014 11:38 AM >> To: Mike Jones >> Cc: The IESG; [email protected]; >> [email protected]; [email protected] >> Subject: Re: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on >> draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) >> >> On Tue, Oct 14, 2014 at 5:53 AM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> Thanks for your review. The -34 draft contains the following resolutions. >> I hope that you can clear your DISCUSSes on that basis. >> >> -- Mike >> >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: jose [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Richard >> > Barnes >> > Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 7:34 PM >> > To: The IESG >> > Cc: [email protected]; >> > [email protected]; >> > [email protected] >> > Subject: [jose] Richard Barnes' Discuss on >> > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) >> > >> > Richard Barnes has entered the following ballot position for >> > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key-33: Discuss >> > >> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to >> > all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to >> > cut this introductory paragraph, however.) >> > >> > >> > Please refer to >> > http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html >> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >> > >> > >> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: >> > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key/ >> > >> > >> > >> > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > -- >> > DISCUSS: >> > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > -- >> > >> > Section 4.3. >> > "The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together." >> > Did the WG discuss how these could combine? What was the outcome of >> > that discussion? This could be an important point for >> > interoperability. For example, WebCrypto enforces them both, so it >> > will break if it gets a key with "use" and "key_ops" set to inconsistent >> > values. >> > https://dvcs.w3.org/hg/webcrypto-api/raw-file/tip/spec/Overview.html >> > #rsa- >> > pss-operations >> >> I believe that the working group discussion is accurately reflected in >> this text from the spec: >> The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together. >> Applications should specify which of these members they use, if >> either is to be used by the application. >> >> To keep things simple, applications should choose one or the other, based >> on their needs. Note that this is a "SHOULD NOT" - not a "MUST NOT", so if >> WebCrypto believes they have a good reason to allow either or both, they're >> not violating the spec. But specifying which combinations are legal and >> which aren't in the JWK spec seems very high on the complexity to usefulness >> ratio. I hope that you will choose to withdraw this DISCUSS on that basis. >> >> How about if we require that they be consistent if used together, but punt >> the definition of consistency to WebCrypto? >> >> """ >> The "use" and "key_ops" JWK members SHOULD NOT be used together. >> Applications should specify which of these members they use, if >> either is to be used by the application. If both "use" and "key_ops" >> members >> are present, then they MUST be consistent (see [WebCrypto]). >> """ > > I suspect some reviewers wouldn't agree with the "(see [WebCrypto])" part, > but I can add the rest of your suggested sentence, if that will do it for > you. > >> > Section 8. >> > "[TBD]@ietf.org" >> > This needs to be populated before approval. I don't know what's >> > customary here, but "[email protected]" is an obvious candidate. >> >> Per the spec, [email protected] is already the recommended name. >> Yes, we would create this list before final approval, just as >> [email protected] was created before RFC 6749 was approved. I hope >> that you'll choose to withdraw this DISCUSS on that basis. >> >> That sounds fine to me. Who has the action to get that list set up? > > Kathleen is doing this, per earlier comments on the thread. > >> > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > -- >> > COMMENT: >> > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > -- >> > >> > Section 1.1. >> > The pointer for BASE64URL should be to JWS. One level of >> > indirection, please :) >> >> Agreed >> >> > Section 4. >> > It might be worth being explicit (here or elsewhere): >> > "A JWK MUST NOT contain algorithm-specific members for key type >> > other the one specified in its "kty" attribute." >> >> I agree with the sentiment, but this actually contradicts the statement >> that member names that are not understood MUST be ignored. >> >> Good point. Perhaps we could phrase this as a requirement on creators, >> leaving consumers free to be more liberal? >> >> """ >> The creator of a JWK MUST NOT include algorithm-specific members for key >> type other the one specified in its "kty" attribute. Consumers of JWKs >> SHOULD NOT reject JWKs with such members, however, in the interest of >> extensibility. >> """ > > In another thread, Carsten Bormann had explicitly objected to situations in > which there are different requirements on producers and consumers, unless > absolutely necessary. I don't think the situation you're describing (for > instance, including an extraneous "x" value in an RSA key value) rises to > the level of severity that it warrants placing different requirements on > producers and consumers. Rather, my intuition at this point (which could, > of course, be wrong), is that doing so would be likely to itself generate > DISCUSS positions. I think we're better off leaving this as-is. > >> > Section 4.1. >> > "cryptographic algorithm family used with the key" >> > "... such as "RSA" or "EC"." >> >> Agreed >> >> > Section 4.7. >> > "base64 encoded ([RFC4648] Section 4 -- not base64url encoded) DER" >> > It seems unpleasant for implementations to have to support two >> > flavors of base64, especially since this doesn't use PEM directly. >> > Did the WG discuss just using BASE64URL? >> >> Not much, although each certificate value is actually a PEM-encoded value, >> including allowing newlines, etc. People agreed with that goal when we did >> discuss it. >> >> > Section 9.1. >> > It might help here to note that technologies like PKIX and JWT can >> > allow relying parties to verify the provenance of a key and binding of >> > attributes to it. >> >> Can you propose specific language for this? What I have in mind is >> delivering a JWK or JWK Set on a TLS channel using a URL that is >> cryptographically bound to the use of the key - possibly using the URL as >> the issuer of a JWT signed with the key, but you may have something else in >> mind. >> >> I had in mind more the traditional, "use a certificate to bind attributes >> to a key" sense. How about this? >> >> """ >> In most applications today, there are trusted authorities that vouch for >> the provenance of a key and bind attributes to it. For example, in >> PKIX-based applications, participants use certificates to verify that a >> certificate authority has bound certain attributes to a key, such as a name >> or key usage. JWK supports this style of provenance through the "x5u", >> "x5c", "x5t", and "x5t#S256" attributes, all of which reference a >> certificate that a relying party can use to associate attributes to the JWK. >> Other assertions systems, such as JWT, can likewise be used to assert >> bindings of attributes to keys. >> In some applications, it may also be convenient to use TLS as an ersatz >> assertion mechanism. For example, an application could require JWKs to be >> downloaded with associated attributes over HTTPS as a way of having the >> HTTPS server assert a binding of the JWK to its attributes. This is similar >> to the way that the XMPP POSH mechanism uses HTTPS to assert delegations >> from one way to another. In such applications, however, care needs to be >> taken to ensure that secure transports are always used, and to avoid >> confusion with other uses of the TLS server in question. The former >> situation would allow an attacker to create bogus assertions, and the latter >> would let an attacker trick the server into issuing bogus assertions. >> """ > > It may be just me, but the whole notion of binding attributes to keys seems > to be a bit off topic - at least in a section on "Key Provenance and Trust". > The point of this section is that applications will make trust decisions > about keys based on the trustworthiness of the way they got the key. > Whether or not there may also be attributes bundled with the key is > independent of this, so I'm not prone to talk about it here. If you think > it needs to be talked about elsewhere, can you motivate the reason for doing > so? > > Other comments on your proposed text above follow... > > In what specific way are you thinking that "Other assertions systems, such > as JWT, can likewise be used to assert bindings of attributes to keys"? > While I agree that this is true, I suspect that most implementers wouldn't > find that particular wording actionable. > > In your second proposed paragraph, while you're talking about "binding of > the JWK to its attributes", I think the core of the message here is that TLS > URLs can be used to provide clear provenance for sets of keys. I'm fine > with saying that in some way. > > I agree with your comments about secure transports being used and ensuring > that keys are only retrieved from locations advertised by the application as > being their key locations. > >> >> Thanks again, >> -- Mike > > -- Mike > > > > _______________________________________________ > jose mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose -- Best regards, Kathleen _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
