Pete, Have you had a chance to look at this? I know you have been busy, so hopefully the timing is better now. Is there any way we can resolve this before next week (or at least some of the outstanding issues if not all)?
Thanks! On Tue, Oct 7, 2014 at 2:11 AM, Mike Jones <[email protected]> wrote: >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Jim Schaad [mailto:[email protected]] >> Sent: Monday, October 06, 2014 5:35 AM >> To: Mike Jones; 'Pete Resnick'; 'The IESG' >> Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; draft-ietf-jose-json-web- >> [email protected] >> Subject: RE: [jose] Pete Resnick's Discuss on >> draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature- >> 33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) >> >> > -----Original Message----- >> > From: jose [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Mike Jones >> > Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2014 6:58 PM >> > To: Pete Resnick; The IESG >> > Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]; >> > draft-ietf-jose-json-web- [email protected] >> > Subject: Re: [jose] Pete Resnick's Discuss on >> > draft-ietf-jose-json-web- >> > signature-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) >> > >> > Thanks for your review, Pete. I've added the working group to the thread. >> > Replies are inline below... >> > >> > > -----Original Message----- >> > > From: Pete Resnick [mailto:[email protected]] >> > > Sent: Wednesday, October 01, 2014 9:14 PM >> > > To: The IESG >> > > Cc: [email protected]; draft-ietf-jose-json-web- >> > > [email protected] >> > > Subject: Pete Resnick's Discuss on >> > > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-33: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT) >> > > >> > > Pete Resnick has entered the following ballot position for >> > > draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature-33: Discuss >> > > >> > > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to >> > > all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to >> > > cut this introductory paragraph, however.) >> > > >> > > >> > > Please refer to >> > > http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html >> > > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. >> > > >> > > >> > > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: >> > > http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature/ >> > > >> > > >> > > >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > -- >> > > DISCUSS: >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > -- >> > > >> > > 3.1: Why can't I use an unprotected header when I'm using the >> > > Compact Serialization? This seems like a real problem, since I can't >> > > convert (in a round- trippable way) between a JWS with an >> > > unprotected header in the JSON Serialization to a Compact Serialization. >> Why the limitation? >> > >> > As Richard explained during the telechat, this was a deliberate choice >> > on the part of the working group to keep the compact form as simple as >> > possible by removing some options. Do I remember correctly that you >> > said on the telechat that you would be willing to withdraw this DISCUSS on >> that basis? >> > >> >> There was an explicit decision by the group that the JWT case did not >> require a >> multiple signature capability. Thus when the JSON form was developed it was >> determined that this would not be back ported into that format. I think that >> until we have a case that wants the compact format and needs multiple signers >> this is a reasonable decision. > > Agreed. It's understood by at least some in the working group how we could > do a compact serialization representation enabling multiple signatures, but > this could easily be addressed in a subsequent specification, if an actual > need for it arises. (BTW, the design thinking didn't apply to just the JWT > use case - it applied to any simple JWS use case.) > >> > > 5.2: >> > > >> > > Strike the last sentence of the second paragraph. There's no >> > > requirement here. If none of them validate, I can do what I want >> > > with the JWS. I needn't "reject" it. I might just mark it as "invalid". >> > > >> > > [Get rid of all talk of "rejecting" throughout this document. Again, >> > > I will note that the signatures are not valid, but rejecting is a >> > > local implementation detail.] >> > >> > As discussed during the telechat and on subsequent threads, the terms >> > "accept" and "reject" are commonly used in this way, for instance, in >> > RFC 5820. As Kathleen wrote after the call, "For the "reject" >> > language, Pete said on the call that he would go through each one to >> > see where it might be application specific and will suggest changes. >> > Thanks in >> advance, Pete.". >> > >> > > This section would be greatly simplified if step 1 was: "If the >> > > Compact Serialization is being used, convert it to the JSON >> > > Serialization." >> > >> > This would be doing a disservice to some implementers, since some >> > implementations (for instance those designed to support JWTs) will >> > only implement the Compact Serialization. I therefore request that >> > you withdraw this DISCUSS on that basis. >> >> Mike, I have a higher opinion of most implementers than you apparently do. I >> don't think this would really be an issue to change from that perspective. >> >> Pete, If I had proposed this to the group while things were in progress. >> I would >> have ended up declaring myself in the weeds. For better or worse, the main >> focus of the WG was on the compact serialization and not on the JSON >> serialization. This means that, IMHO, the JSON serialization was always a >> second class item in the document. I will admit that when I did a fast and >> dirty >> implementation I did exactly what you suggested in terms of doing the >> conversion before (and then after) everything else was done. >> >> If this change was done, then it would also require that the first paragraph >> be re- >> written so that the algorithm becomes something other than normative. That >> is >> it would need to say that any algorithm that produced an equivalent result >> would be acceptable. > > It's not that I have a low opinion of implementers (quite the contrary!) or > that I think they wouldn't understand the specification if it were revised in > the way that Pete suggests. The disservice would be to write the > prescriptive steps to validate a JWS in a way that said that it was necessary > to convert any JWSs using the compact serialization to the JSON serialization > in order to validate them. This demonstrably isn't a necessary step. > > Only semantically necessary steps should be in the list. Since this step > isn't necessary, I therefore request that you withdraw this DISCUSS on that > basis, Pete. > >> > > Some of these steps are not steps. I could not follow this to figure >> > > out what to do. This section could use a serious rewrite. I'm glad >> > > to work with you on that, but did not have time to provide a rewrite >> > > during >> > my review. >> > >> > This section has been heavily wordsmithed already by numerous reviewers. >> > That said, I'd be glad to receive suggestion for specific proposed changes. >> > >> > > 8: This section needs to be removed. There is no need for TLS in a >> > > whole host of applications that could implement this protocol. >> > >> > As discussed in threads that immediately followed your review, I >> > propose to clarify to which specific features ("jku" and "x5u") this >> > section >> applies. >> > >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > -- >> > > COMMENT: >> > > -------------------------------------------------------------------- >> > > -- >> > > >> > > 3.2: >> > > >> > > In the JWS JSON Serialization, a JWS object is represented as the >> > > combination of these four values, >> > > BASE64URL(UTF8(JWS Protected Header)), >> > > JWS Unprotected Header, >> > > BASE64URL(JWS Payload), and >> > > BASE64URL(JWS Signature) >> > > >> > > Why is the Payload (a) part of the serialization and (b) base64ed? >> > > Are you saying that the only way I can use JWS is to include the >> > > payload as part of the JOSE object? Why can't it be a separate >> > > thing? Also, why does >> > it have to be base64ed? >> > > It could be a UTF-8 string, or it could be a large binary object >> > > that I'm using in a non-JSON context, neither of which I want to >> > > bloat by base64ing it. This seems bogus. >> > >> > It is base64url encoded because JSON has no way of representing >> > arbitrary octet sequences. This enables the "binary object" case that >> > you're describing to work. Also note that this was extensively >> > discussed by the working group in the context of issue #26 >> http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/26. >> >> Pete, I tried to strongly argue that this change should be made and in the >> end >> had to declare myself in the weeds as far as the working group was >> considered. >> The reasons that were given by people in the group did not have to do with >> security, i.e. that one or the other was more or less secure, and had more >> to do >> with "We have already deployed code that uses the base64 as the input rather >> than the raw data and don't feel it would be reasonable to change at this >> time." >> The initial impetus for doing and use the base64 was the compact >> serialization. >> The strings that were parsed directly from the serialization could be hashed >> and >> thus those strings are kept rather than the base64 decoded strings. >> >> The working group would not be happy with this change. > > Yes, that's an understatement. This was vigorously discussed on the thread > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg02645.html "[jose] #26: > Allow for signature payload to not be base64 encoded" (33 messages) in the > context of http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/26, following a > preceding discussion that also covered the much of the same ground of issue > http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/jose/trac/ticket/23 on the thread > http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/jose/current/msg02493.html "[jose] #23: > Make crypto independent of binary encoding (base64)" (39 messages). Working > group discussion of #23 and #26 is also recorded in the minutes of IETF 87 at > http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/87/minutes/minutes-87-jose. > >> > > I'll get back to in Section 5. Finally: >> > > >> > > Concatenating these values... >> > > >> > > This section is not about the compact serialization. If you want to >> > > give both example serializations in this section, fine, but if you >> > > are giving a general "Example JWS" as the title of the section >> > > states, don't just >> > give the compact. >> > >> > The point is to give a simple example to familiarize readers with the >> > idea of a JWS - not for the example section to be a complete tutorial >> > on the possibilities. Note, however than an example using the JSON >> > Serialization >> > *is* present in Appendix A.6 and many are present in >> > http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-jose-cookbook-03. >> >> At a minimum I think that there should be a sentence that points to the >> appendix >> for an example of a compact serialization. I would be good if the example >> was >> the same as this one, but that may be stretching the issue too far. I >> don’t think >> that Pete is to far out of line in requesting that there be a paragraph at >> the end >> that says "The equivalent to this example using the JSON serialization would >> be: >> ...." > > I'm OK adding a forward reference to the JSON serialization example in A.6. > >> > > 4.1.1/4.2: Why even bother mentioning that the alg could be a >> > > "Collision- Resistant Name" (what a term!)? The alg should be registered. >> > > If it's not, you're in private agreement space anyway, so it needn't >> > > be specified in the spec. Same thing for Public Header Parameter >> > > Names: If you're going to do this interoperably, you're going to >> > > have to know what the thing means; otherwise, it's out of band >> > > anyway. I say get rid of the whole concept of using non-registered names. >> > >> > Per the response to a similar comment in Stephen Kent's secdir review: >> > >> > This specification will be used both in open environments, in which >> > multiple organizations will need to have a common understanding of any >> > extensions used, and closed environments, which the producing and >> > consuming organization will always be the same and private values could be >> safely used. >> > IANA registration is definitely the right thing to do for open >> > environments. It s probably unnecessary for deployments in closed >> environments. >> > >> >> I have a small agreement here with Pete. If this is really a closed >> environment >> then the uses would not care if they violated this type of statement. There >> is no >> 2119 language regarding this feature. I am a bit more sympathetic to keep >> the >> collision resistant naming as this means that we won't get people saying we >> are >> going to use FOOBAR for algorithm foo and never get it registered so we end >> up >> with FOOBAR and foo as two different names for the same algorithm. It would >> be clear that one was assigned by a specific entity and did not go through >> IANA. >> What happens if they then ask for OID:1.2.3.4.5 to be the assigned name in >> the >> IANA table does become an interesting question. > > Yes, the point of the collision-resistant name language is that Example org > could use the algorithm name > https://schemas.example.com/algorithms/2014/10/super-duper without having to > register it, because no naming collisions would result. > >> > Thanks again, >> > -- Mike >> > >> > _______________________________________________ >> > jose mailing list >> > [email protected] >> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose > -- Best regards, Kathleen _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
