On 27 Feb 2019, at 14:36, Nathaniel McCallum <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 27, 2019 at 9:26 AM Neil Madden <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> [snip]
>> That already works just fine. Set the “kid” claim in your public JWK to the >> pkcs11/kmip URI and then make sure the client sends you the same value in >> the “kid” header of the encrypted JWE. This is precisely what the “kid” JWK >> claim and header are for. >> >> Depending on the sensitivity of the information in the URI, you may want to >> either encrypt it or replace it with an opaque identifier that you store in >> a local lookup table. > > The "kid" claim is not a good fit for this. > > First, "kid" may need to be used in conjunction with "p11". For > example, where "p11" replaces key material, the URI only refers to how > to find the key material. But it does not provide credentials to > access that key material. The "kid" may be needed to look up those > credentials. If you need the kid to lookup the credentials, can you not also use it to lookup the PKCS#11 URI? > Second, "p11" needs to have its own well-defined security > considerations. There are security implications of using a PKCS#11 URI > in publicly disclosed fields. These need to be carefully outlined. > This is different than "kid" which is always presumed to be safe to > disclose. Again, this comes back to use cases. If the PKCS#11 URI is not safe to disclose then why do you want to expose it in a JWK? I know that JWK allows private key material to be represented, because this is sometimes useful to allow transmitting that key material. But with a PKCS#11 URI it is not key material, but instead a reference to key material in a locally/network-attached HSM, so presumably you are only sending it to yourself or another party locally connected to the same HSM? I’m struggling to see the interoperability requirement that would need this to be standardised. — Neil _______________________________________________ jose mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/jose
