** Tags removed: verification-done-trusty
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linux: MokSBState is ignored
Status in linux package in Ubuntu:
Status in linux source package in Trusty:
Status in linux source package in Vivid:
Status in linux source package in Wily:
Status in linux source package in Xenial:
Ubuntu-4.4.0-20.36 was released with signed module enforcement
enabled, but contained no way of disabling secure boot for DKMS.
Without these kernel patches it is possible to get your machine in an
unbootable state, especially if you don't have a fallback kernel.
This patch set implements the ability to disable secure boot on demand
from user space (with some password shennaigans). If one boots in
secure boot mode and then installs a third party module (such as
DKMS), then a dialog is displayed giving the user an option to disable
secure boot, thereby also disabling module signature verification.
Patch 1/2 is a scaffold patch of which only the GUID macros are
actually used. The rest of the code is fenced by
CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_UEFI which will not be enabled until a later series.
Patch 2/2 is where MOKSBState is read and implemented. Patch 3/3
simply prints a bit more informative state information.
Information regarding secure boot and signed module enforcement will
appear in the kernel log thusly:
'Secure boot enabled' - normal secure boot operation with signed module
'Secure boot MOKSBState disabled' - UEFI Secure boot state has been
over-ridden by MOKSBState. No signed module enforcement.
In the absense of a 'Secure boot' string assume that secure boot is
disabled or does not exist.
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