Luis, is the security_kernel_post_read_file LSM hook in firmware_loading_store() still needed after this patch? Should it be calling security_kernel_load_data() instead?
--- With an IMA policy requiring signed firmware, this patch prevents the sysfs fallback method of loading firmware. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <[email protected]> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <[email protected]> Cc: David Howells <[email protected]> Cc: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]> --- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index a565d46084c2..4a87f78098c8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -475,8 +475,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, if (!file && read_id == READING_FIRMWARE) { if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } return 0; } @@ -520,6 +522,12 @@ int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id) pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ } + break; + case LOADING_FIRMWARE: + if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) { + pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n"); + return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ + } default: break; } -- 2.7.5 _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list [email protected] http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
