On Thu, Jul 26, 2018 at 02:40:49PM +0100, James Morse wrote: > Hi Akashi, > > On 24/07/18 07:57, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: > > Adding "kaslr-seed" to dtb enables triggering kaslr, or kernel virtual > > address randomization, at secondary kernel boot. > > Hmm, there are three things that get moved by CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE. The > kernel > physical placement when booted via the EFIstub, the kernel-text VAs and the > location of memory in the linear-map region. Adding the kaslr-seed only does > the > last two.
Yes, but I think that I and Mark has agreed that "kaslr" meant "virtual" randomisation, not including "physical" randomisation. > This means the physical placement of the new kernel is predictable from > /proc/iomem ... but this also tells you the physical placement of the current > kernel, so I don't think this is a problem. > > > > We always do this as it will have no harm on kaslr-incapable kernel. > > > We don't have any "switch" to turn off this feature directly, but still > > can suppress it by passing "nokaslr" as a kernel boot argument. > > > > diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > > b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > > index 7356da5a53d5..47a4fbd0dc34 100644 > > --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > > +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/machine_kexec_file.c > > @@ -158,6 +160,12 @@ static int setup_dtb(struct kimage *image, > > Don't you need to reserve some space in the area you vmalloc()d for the DT? No, I don't think so. All the data to be loaded are temporarily saved in kexec buffers, which will eventually be copied to target locations in machine_kexec (arm64_relocate_new_kernel, which, unlike its name, will handle not only kernel but also other data as well). > > > + /* add kaslr-seed */ > > + get_random_bytes(&value, sizeof(value)); > > What happens if the crng isn't ready? > > It looks like this will print a warning that these random-bytes aren't really > up > to standard, but the new kernel doesn't know this happened. > > crng_ready() isn't exposed, all we could do now is > wait_for_random_bytes(), but that may wait forever because we do this > unconditionally. > > I'd prefer to leave this feature until we can check crng_ready(), and skip > adding a dodgy-seed if its not-ready. This avoids polluting the next-kernel's > entropy pool. OK. I would try to follow the same way as Bhupesh's userspace patch does for kaslr-seed: http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/kexec/2018-April/020564.html if (not found kaslr-seed in 1st kernel's dtb) don't care; go ahead else if (current kaslr-seed != 0) error if (crng_ready()) ; FIXME, it's a local macro get_random_bytes(non-blocking) set new kaslr-seed else error > > > + ret = fdt_setprop(buf, nodeoffset, "kaslr-seed", &value, sizeof(value)); > > Nit: It would be nice if this string were in a header file somewhere, to void > future refactoring typos. OK. (but in this file for now as I mentioned in my previous reply) Thanks, -Takahiro AKASHI > > Thanks, > > James _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec
