From: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>

The kexec_load() syscall permits the loading and execution of arbitrary
code in ring 0, which is something that lock-down is meant to prevent. It
makes sense to disable kexec_load() in this situation.

This does not affect kexec_file_load() syscall which can check for a
signature on the image to be booted.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Dave Young <[email protected]>
cc: [email protected]
---
 kernel/kexec.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 68559808fdfa..57047acc9a36 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -207,6 +207,14 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long 
nr_segments,
        if (result < 0)
                return result;
 
+       /*
+        * kexec can be used to circumvent module loading restrictions, so
+        * prevent loading in that case
+        */
+       if (kernel_is_locked_down("kexec of unsigned images",
+                                 LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY))
+               return -EPERM;
+
        /*
         * Verify we have a legal set of flags
         * This leaves us room for future extensions.
-- 
2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog


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