On Tue, Jun 09, 2026 at 11:40:39AM -0700, David Matlack wrote: > On Tue, Jun 9, 2026 at 10:20 AM Pranjal Shrivastava <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Mon, Jun 08, 2026 at 09:56:41PM +0000, David Matlack wrote: > > > On 2026-06-07 08:37 PM, Pranjal Shrivastava wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 22, 2026 at 08:24:06PM +0000, David Matlack wrote: > > > > > Inherit Access Control Services (ACS) flags on all incoming preserved > > > > > devices (endpoints and upstream bridges) during a Live Update. > > > > > > > > > > Inheriting ACS flags avoids changing routing rules while memory > > > > > transactions are in flight from preserved devices. This is also > > > > > strictly > > > > > necessary to ensure that IOMMU group assignments do not change across > > > > > a Live Update for preserved devices, as changing ACS configurations > > > > > can > > > > > split or merge IOMMU groups. > > > > > > > > > > Cache the inherited ACS controls established by the previous kernel in > > > > > struct pci_dev so that ACS controls do not change after a reset > > > > > (pci_restore_state() calls pci_enable_acs()). > > > > > > > > > > To simplify ACS inheritance, reject preserving any devices that > > > > > require > > > > > quirks to enable ACS as those quirks would also have to take Live > > > > > Update > > > > > into account. > > > > > > > > > > Signed-off-by: David Matlack <[email protected]> > > > > > --- > > > > > drivers/pci/liveupdate.c | 68 > > > > > ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > > > > drivers/pci/liveupdate.h | 11 ++++++ > > > > > drivers/pci/pci.c | 5 +++ > > > > > drivers/pci/pci.h | 5 +++ > > > > > drivers/pci/quirks.c | 7 ++++ > > > > > include/linux/pci_liveupdate.h | 6 +++ > > > > > 6 files changed, 102 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > > > > > > [...] > > > > > > > > > > > > > > +void pci_liveupdate_init_acs(struct pci_dev *dev) > > > > > +{ > > > > > + guard(rwsem_read)(&pci_liveupdate.rwsem); > > > > > + > > > > > + if (!dev->acs_cap || !dev->liveupdate.incoming) > > > > > + return; > > > > > + > > > > > + pci_read_config_word(dev, dev->acs_cap + PCI_ACS_CTRL, > > > > > &dev->liveupdate.acs_ctrl); > > > > > > > > I might be thinking out loud here, but as an attacker, this motivates me > > > > to somehow hack the EP FW to mis-report the PCI_ACS_CTRL register across > > > > a liveupdate to fool the incoming kernel. If the FW feeds a 0, it > > > > silently > > > > strips ACS protections. > > > > > > > > Should we also serialize ACS state in ser somehow to ensure we aren't > > > > fooled by something like this? > > > > > > What does "EP FW" mean? > > > > I was referring to the Endpoint Firmware (basically any SW running on > > a downstream device) > > > > > > > > Does such an attacker even need Live Update to attack the system? It > > > seems like such an attacker could route TLPs in whatever malicious way > > > they want regardless of Live Update. > > > > > > > I agree that compromised PCIe devices are a menace anyway. But I was > > talking about the potential window opened up by Live Update here, > > suppose we have Device A & B assigned to 2 different VMs (implying they > > are in separate IOMMU groups because the switch set ACS_RR = 1). > > > > Now, the attacker has an opportunity with Liveupdate, since the devices > > are already assigned, if *somehow* it flips a bit like ACS_RR, the > > incoming kernel might see both the devices in the same IOMMU group. > > Who detects this case and what happens if this happens if the devices > > are kept assigned to these VMs? > > I suspect that would be caught during the restore of the iommufds to > which those devices are attached. > > The kernel would attempt to restore each device into a separate domain > (since that's how they were preserved before the Live Update) but that > will fail because they are in the same group now. Even if one of the > devices was not preserved, that will still cause a failure when a user > tries to start using that device (e.g. to try to attach it to a > different VM).
Yes, IOMMU would eventually catch-up but what about the DMAs that were done already? Say to an NVMe disk? We'll have to wipe the entire disk in such a case? Also, we wouldn't know the offending device.. If such situations aren't a problem, then I guess it's fine. Thanks, Praan
