https://bugs.koha-community.org/bugzilla3/show_bug.cgi?id=42719
--- Comment #8 from David Cook <[email protected]> --- (In reply to David Cook from comment #5) > I was probably thinking that a phisher could cause someone to do a GET to > http://localhost:8080/api/v1/public/oauth/login/test/opac which would then > yield a state change (ie a login) if they were already authenticated with > the IdP. At that point then, they could try to exploit an XSS attack or > further CSRF... > > I'm not sure how viable that it, but I think that's probably what my thought > process was. The more I think about it... it shouldn't be doable under most circumstances. Browsers should prevent that type of cross origin request, although there are ways of allowing it... I notice things like outlook.com will redirect you to https://www.microsoft.com/en-gb/microsoft-365/outlook/email-and-calendar-software-microsoft-outlook?deeplink=%2Fmail%2F&sdf=0 You have to click the "Sign in" button before it'll take you to the IdP SSO signin. -- You are receiving this mail because: You are watching all bug changes. _______________________________________________ Koha-bugs mailing list [email protected] https://lists.koha-community.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/koha-bugs website : http://www.koha-community.org/ git : http://git.koha-community.org/ bugs : http://bugs.koha-community.org/
