>Date: Mon, 17 Jan 2000 08:01:52 -0500 >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Status: > >STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update >January 17, 1999 > > >The Putin Doctrine: Nuclear Threats and Russia's Place in the World > > >Summary > >Russia's acting president, Vladimir Putin, last week reversed his >country's vow never to use nuclear weapons first. The announcement >sent shock waves around the world. And it should have. Russian >nuclear warheads are not about to rain down on the United States >but Putin is doing more than rattling sabers. A new Russian >national security doctrine has emerged over the last few months and >Putin's announcement is intended to round out that doctrine, >affecting the war in Chechnya, and re-ordering relations both with >Russia's neighbors and the United States. > > >Analysis > >Until a few months ago, Russia had no clear-cut national security >policy. Since the end of the Cold War, Russian security doctrine >had devolved into Russian economic policy. Russian economic policy >consisted of intensifying relations with the advanced industrial, >capitalist world in order to create the financial structures and >relationships needed to jump-start the economy. Russian national >security doctrine consisted primarily of doing nothing to disrupt >those economic relationships while, within the framework of the >first imperative, maintaining the territorial and institutional >integrity of the Russian Federation. > >Thus, the most important aspect of the new Russian national >security doctrine is that it exists at all. Putin's announcement on >first strike has as its primary purpose the elevation of national >security issues to the same level as national economic issues. In >other words, Putin's announcement on nuclear weapons represents the >death of the preceding national strategy, which relegated national >security issues to a distant second place behind national economic >concerns. It was intended to stun a number of audiences into >realizing that the post-Cold War world is gone. > >The choice of the nuclear issue served a number of purposes and >spoke to a number of audiences. The first audience was the United >States and its allies. As our readers know, it has been our view >that the West's decision to bomb Iraq in December of 1998 - >followed by the war in Kosovo, both in direct opposition to Russian >wishes - generated a revolution in Russian policy. Those two >actions convinced the Russians that the United States intended to >reduce Russia to the status of a tertiary power. Washington's >systematic indifference to Russian wishes convinced the Russian >national security community that without leverage against the >United States, Russia would have no traction whatsoever. Economic >relations with the West had effectively collapsed in the financial >crisis of August 1998, so the Russians felt they had little to >lose. > >Putin's announcement is perfectly designed to drive home the price >and risks of U.S. economic and strategic policy. It systematically >accomplishes what Yeltsin tried spasmodically when he reminded >Washington that Russia had nuclear weapons and was prepared to use >them. First, the Putin doctrine reminds the United States that >Russia is the only nation in the world with sufficient nuclear >weapons of sufficient range to conduct an annihilating attack on >the United States. To put it bluntly, Russia could choose to kill a >large percentage of the American public if it is prepared to endure >the same. > >Second, Moscow's new stance poses a practical problem for the >United States, which must now at least consider Russian responses. >No matter how unlikely a Russian first strike is, there is a huge >difference between a negligible threat and a non-existent one, >particularly at the orders of magnitude involved. During the Cold >War, the threat of a Soviet nuclear response was in the back of >every policy maker's mind when dealing with issues from Nicaragua >to Angola to India. That threat disappeared with Glasnost. Putin >intends to resurrect it. > >Third, this is a meaningful threat because of the relative weakness >of Russia's conventional forces. Consider Western nuclear strategy, >particularly during the Cold War. The United States and NATO never >renounced a possible first strike; indeed, it was explicitly >understood that a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe would >trigger the use of tactical nuclear weapons and, if necessary, >higher levels of nuclear response. Russia, on the other hand, had >long called for a no-first-strike commitment by the West and in >fact adopted that stance in 1997. Russia, with a conventional >weapons advantage, was always more interested in exploiting that >advantage and saw the use of nuclear weapons as undermining it. >Nuclear weapons were the critical equalizer to the superior numbers >of Russian conventional forces. > >But to create strategic parity beyond the battlefield, doctrine had >to be married to unpredictability. It was never clear to anyone >that the United States would in fact launch a first strike against >the Soviet Union upon the invasion of Germany. No one knew what the >U.S. president would order at the critical moment. That was >precisely the advantage. The very uncertainty of the American >response limited the Soviets' room for maneuver and imposed severe >limits on Moscow's willingness to take risks. Putin is now trying >to reverse the equation. Russia now has a substantial disadvantage >in conventional forces. By renouncing the no-first strike rule, >Putin has placed Russia in the position of the United States during >the Cold War. > >In turn, the threat will force the United States and Europe to >reconsider the risk of adventures like Kosovo. Obviously, the >Russians are unlikely to use nuclear weapons. but the term >"unlikely" does not mean impossible. It means low probability, or >possibility. The mere possibility that another Kosovo could trigger >a nuclear response changes the calculus of Western intervention. >Since the direct benefit to the intervening powers is minimal, the >corollary must be equally low cost and low risk. Since no nation is >entirely predictable, the risk of a nuclear response can easily >shift the decision from "go" to "no-go." > >This is particularly true for European members of NATO and for >Japan, whose proximity to Russia and appetite for risk-taking is >substantially less than that of the United States. At the very >least, the mere threat of a nuclear reaction makes it impossible to >treat Russia with the contemptuous indifference shown during the >Iraq and Kosovo affairs. With this announcement, Putin has bought >himself not only a seat at the table, but, in all likelihood, the >demand by U.S. allies that Russia buy into future military >intervention. > >There is a second audience: the other members of the former Soviet >Union, many of whom are members of the Commonwealth of Independent >States (CIS), which, not coincidentally, is holding a summit one >week from today. One of the outcomes of the collapse of the Soviet >Union was that, with intense U.S. urging, all nations other than >Russia gave up their nuclear weapons. Whatever the wisdom of that >policy, the result was that Russia is the only former Soviet >republic with nuclear weapons. > >Russia has always been first among equals in the CIS, but Putin's >announcement will immediately help Moscow re-order its >relationships closer to home. First, the war in Chechnya will be >affected. With some reason, Russians are convinced that outside >forces - backed by the United States - are supplying Chechen rebels >through neighboring Georgia. The situation in Chechnya reminds many >Russian military men of Afghanistan, where a great power created >logistical support systems and sanctuaries in a neighboring >country, bleeding Moscow's forces. Putin is now reminding the >United States that the survival of the Russian Federation - intact >- is a fundamental national interest. Therefore, any aid to the >Chechens threatens an interest so profound that the use of nuclear >weapons might be rational. This must trigger a re-evaluation of >U.S. policy. > >Second, the Georgians themselves, who have felt relatively secure >as an American partner, are being reminded that forces are at play >beyond their control. If the Georgians' entire calculus has been >that the war would be one of conventional force on conventional >force, the Georgians should guess again. The willingness of the >Russians to use tactical nuclear weapons to disrupt lines of supply >into Chechnya cannot be discounted. By doing this, the Russians are >transforming the war, putting Georgia's security - instead of >Russia's territorial integrity - in jeopardy. > >Third, the Russians are delivering a message to the Chechens. The >Chechens are seeing this conflict just as they did during the >1994-1996 war. They are fighting on their terrain and are prepared >to take serious losses for national independence. Russian >conventional forces cannot seal off the lines of supply from >Georgia, nor can they occupy the mountainous terrain south of >Grozny. Indeed, given the costs of urban warfare, they cannot >easily take Grozny itself. Therefore, the theory goes, extended >warfare favors the insurgent nationalist group. Time is on the side >of the Chechens. Putin just indicated, however, that he has the >means to sharply increase Chechen casualties without increasing >Russian ones. That is a sobering thought, to say the least. > >This is a matter of general concern for all the countries >surrounding Russia. So long as the security equation is stated in >purely conventional terms, the West can help neighboring nations, >from the Baltic Sea to Central Asia, pose a serious problem to the >Russians. Once nuclear weapons are introduced into the equation, a >very different outcome occurs. First, the conventional supplies >provided become unimportant. Second, the risks involved in >providing or accepting conventional weapons soar. > >The final audience for this announcement is perhaps the most >important: the Russian public. Putin has been enormously popular >for taking vigorous action to end his country's declining world >status. The announcement intrinsically satisfies Russians and helps >boost Putin's popularity on the verge of his campaign for the >presidency. As winter grips Chechnya and large-scale military >operations, particularly air operations, become more difficult, the >emergence of the nuclear threat suggests an end to the war even if >conventional forces fail. > > > --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages to [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
