>From: "Macdonald Stainsby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Status: > >STRATFOR.COM Weekly Global Intelligence Update >20 March 2000 > >Balkan Futures > >Summary > >Nearing the anniversary of the Kosovo war, it is time to consider >winners and losers. Things are not as clear as they were a year >ago. President Slobodan Milosevic has survived his defeat and the >territorial integrity of the rest of Belgrade's domain appears >intact. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is eager to establish an >Albanian state in Kosovo but is blocked by NATO. And the alliance - >unable to suppress the guerrillas, unable to withdraw and unwilling >to negotiate with Milosevic - is devoid of options. A year later, >Milosevic seems both secure and hopeful that events are moving his >way. In an odd parallel to Saddam Hussein's experience, being >defeated by the West may open doors rather than close them. > >Analysis > >It's been almost a year since the beginning of the Kosovo war and >it is time to take stock. In many ways, it is easier to understand >what has happened than what is going to happen, not only because >the future is inherently unknowable, but because the future of the >Balkans is particularly opaque. It is made opaque by three facts. >First, NATO has enabled the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to come >close to its goal of creating an Albanian state in Kosovo. Second, >NATO has failed to break the Serbian nation and to deprive it of >the means to influence events in Kosovo. Third, NATO does not want >to see an Albanian state in Kosovo nor does it want to see Serbian >power re-emerge. > >In short, the two national competitors, Serbs and Albanians, remain >in place while NATO stands opposed to both of their national >aspirations. To further complicate matters, since it lacks the >necessary military power NATO is neither in a position to impose >its will, should it actually redefine its policy, nor is NATO in a >position to withdraw. Thus, we are in a three-player game in Kosovo >in which none of the parties will or wishes to abandon the field >and none can prevail. NATO has maneuvered itself into a position >where it threatens the national aspirations of both Serbs and >Albanians simultaneously, yet lacks the force to govern directly. >This is a prescription for chaos. > >To fully appreciate the danger of the situation, we need to >understand that both the Albanians and Serbs find themselves in >very similar strategic positions. Both sides have achieved the >underlying preconditions necessary to move from a defensive to >offensive position. Each side is probing the others' (and NATO's) >weaknesses. Thus, each side is daily becoming more aggressive. > >A year ago, the Albanians as a whole and the KLA took advantage of >what Serbia was providing, an image of an ethnic population >undergoing massive violations of human rights. The goal of this >campaign was to trigger a NATO intervention against Yugoslavia. The >Albanians had a fairly sophisticated understanding of the >consequences of NATO intervention. NATO's actions would expel >Serbian armed forces from Kosovo, which in turn would force at >least a partial withdrawal of the Serbian population, who would >make one of two assumptions: > >1. That NATO was in favor of a Kosovo cleansed of Serbs and that it >was, in effect, a full ally of Albanian national aspirations. >2. That NATO, whatever its intentions, was ineffective in defending >the Serbian population from KLA attacks. > >The KLA took advantage of Serbian actions, Western perceptions and >political realities within NATO capitals. NATO intervention allowed >the KLA to lay the foundation for an effective strategy toward some >clear goals. > >Let's consider the KLA's strategic goals: > >1. Becoming the preeminent political force among Albanians in >Kosovo. >2. The creation of a KLA-dominated government in Kosovo. >3. The unification of Kosovo with Albania proper under a government >dominated by the KLA and its allies. >4. The extension of Albania to all areas populated by Albanians. >5. The creation of an Albanian entity that is secure, regionally >dominant and that controls the primary trade routes from Turkey to >central Europe. > >The KLA achieved its first goal when the United States and NATO >were forced to rely on it to enable ground operations in Kosovo. >NATO depended on the KLA for intelligence, to pin Serb ground >forces down during the bombing operation and to enable NATO's >special forces to carry out operations in the region. This >dependency gave the KLA three advantages. First, as a primary >intelligence source for NATO, the KLA was able to shape NATO's >understanding of what was happening on the ground. This, in turn, >shaped NATO operations in favor of the KLA not only in relation to >the Serbs, but also in relation to other, non-KLA Albanian >political forces. Second, by supplying and supporting KLA forces >during the conflict, NATO strengthened the KLA in relation to other >Albanian factions, while providing the KLA with a political >imprimatur as NATO's anointed. Finally, in relying on the KLA for >civil administration after the war, NATO made the KLA the de facto >government of Kosovo. > >Having achieved its first goal, the KLA is now engaged in pursuing >its second: the creation of a KLA-dominated government in Kosovo. >This has led to an interesting reversal. NATO, the KLA's enabler >in its first phase, is now the KLA's primary block in achieving its >second goal. NATO cannot tolerate the KLA achieving its second >strategic goal for domestic political and geopolitical reasons. >Domestically, an Albanian state in Kosovo, with the inevitable >ethnic cleansing of Serbs, would provide armed political opponents >of NATO governments. Some of these countries, like the United >States, are currently in the midst of elections that are devoid of >international content. The triumph of the KLA would give George >Bush a weapon that Clinton must deny him. > >There is also a deeper geopolitical reason. The creation of an >Albanian Kosovo would inevitably lead to its integration with >Albania proper. It would create the demand for border >rectifications with countries like Macedonia that have Albanian >populations, making Albania a dominant regional power. Although >Albania is one of the most impoverished areas of Europe it must be >remembered that there is a massive throughput of narcotics that >could provide resources for improving Albanian military capability, >if not standards of living. This is not something that other >countries in the region want to see. In particular, Greece and >Italy, both NATO members with important national interests in the >Balkans, would be upset with this evolution. Therefore, NATO, >having helped the KLA achieve its first strategic goal, must now >act to block its second strategic goal. > >Complicating the situation dramatically is the fact that the Serbs >themselves now find themselves in a much more favorable strategic >position than they were just a few months ago. Consider Milosevic's >strategic interests: > >1. Stay in power in Belgrade. >2. Prevent the further disintegration of the Yugoslavian >Federation. >3. Reclaim lost territories and integrate areas that are >predominantly Serbian. >4. Make Serbia the preeminent power in the Balkans. > >It seems clear, a year after the war began, that like Saddam >Hussein, Milosevic is not going to fall. The facile assumptions >made after the war that he could not survive his humiliation by >NATO have proven false. Milosevic was certainly despised by many >factions for leading his country into war and being outmaneuvered >by NATO, but he retained substantial support. NATO's persistent >anti-Serbian policy had persuaded many Serbs that NATO, for some >uncertain reason, meant to obliterate the Serbian nation. Milosevic >was seen as a champion of Serbia and as NATO's victim. He presented >himself as a man who had thwarted NATO's true ambitions by >confining Serbia's defeat to Kosovo. > >At the same time, the democratic opposition that NATO had >fantasized about was neither as democratic as NATO believed, nor as >united. Certainly, it was not as powerful as NATO believed. >Whatever bitterness there was toward Milosevic's mishandling of the >war, the opposition was perceived as being opportunists, or worse, >as tools of NATO. His opponents were made to look like traitors. >Therefore, in spite of intense efforts by NATO to topple Milosevic >after the war, all that it achieved was to flush Milosevic's >opposition out into the open, and force it to display its >impotence. This substantially strengthened Milosevic's hand. As >with Saddam, the mere fact that Milosevic survived helped restore >his credibility. > >Milosevic then was able to block the further disintegration of >Serbia by outmaneuvering Montenegrin separatists until even NATO no >longer had any confidence in them. Milosevic's ability to sustain >the presence of Federal forces in Montenegro was the first step. >When Montenegro's political evolution led to its remaining inside >the Yugoslav federation, the logic of disintegration was aborted. >Vague discussions of Vojvodina's seceding to Hungary, the entry of >NATO forces into Serbia proper and other territorial fantasies >petered out over the year. The breaking point came recently. When >the KLA tried to generate anti-Serb actions among Albanians still >living inside Serbia, NATO itself was forced to protect the Serb >frontier. During raids carried out last week, it actually struck at >KLA bases along the border. NATO is now protecting the territorial >integrity of the rest of Serbia. The main threat to Serbia's >territorial integrity, NATO's covert and overt operations, has >dissolved. What is left of Belgrade's domain will survive. > >That leaves Milosevic with his third goal: reclaiming lost >territories, beginning with Kosovo. Milosevic now sees time on his >side. Milosevic never understood the alliance between NATO and the >KLA. He never understood that there was no deep, geopolitical >community of interest between the two, but that what bound them was >NATO's domestic political situation and the KLA's ambitions. He >did not expect NATO and the KLA to split because he never >understood how shallow the ties were. Milosevic is undoubtedly >delighted by his new understanding of the situation. As the KLA >pressed forward with its second strategic mission, it forced a >split with NATO that directly benefited Serbia. > >NATO's entire mission is now based on a rapidly dissolving >foundation. Unless NATO can convince the KLA to abandon any further >strategic ambitions-which is unlikely-it is going to find itself >trapped between the absolutely unforgivable Milosevic and the >utterly ungrateful KLA. NATO cannot withdraw without being made to >look imbecilic and it can't stay without great danger. > >>From where Milosevic sits, this is an ideal situation. If NATO >leaves, the Serbs still enjoy military superiority over the >Albanians and will be in a situation to intervene. On the other >hand, the longer NATO remains, the less sympathy in the West for >the Albanians. If NATO stays, it will inevitably become dependent, >at least covertly, on Serbs in Kosovo, and perhaps on the other >side of the border as well. > >The KLA cannot hold back. They have their own intense credibility >problem. NATO is now clearly going to try to create a non-KLA >political alternative among the Albanians. More important, NATO >has a strategic card to play against the KLA. We give substantial >credence to reports that not only is KLA a critical part of the >global narcotics traffic system, but that it is using Kosovo as a >transshipment point. NATO does not have sufficient forces in >Kosovo to bring peace, but it has sufficient capability to >interrupt parts of the drug trade. If the KLA hangs back it risks >the emergence of new political forces under NATO sponsorship. If >it strikes at NATO, NATO can strike back at a fundamental interest >of the KLA. In either case, the KLA cannot pursue its other >strategic interests while NATO is still there. > >The KLA always wanted NATO out, but expected it to destroy the Serb >Army for them. That hasn't happened and that has created a >tremendous dilemma for the KLA. It cannot tolerate NATO in Kosovo >and it is not yet in a position to defend against Serbia. It can no >longer expect NATO to finish off the Serbs and it can no longer >expect NATO to ignore KLA operations. The KLA has been trying to >get NATO to strike across the border, but instead NATO struck at >the KLA. > >NATO is desperately signaling the KLA to rein itself in. But if >the KLA complies then its dream of a KLA-dominated Kosovo must be >abandoned and the narcotics trade that finances it will be >vulnerable to NATO pressure. It can't make the deal that NATO has >offered: temporary control over part of Kosovo at the discretion of >NATO. It just isn't enough. > >The winner, at this rate, is going to be Milosevic. If NATO and >the KLA come to blows, then time is entirely on his side. Either >NATO will increase its presence in Kosovo in order to crush or cow >the KLA - unlikely - or NATO will have to open lines of >communication or coordination with the Serbs. Alternatively, NATO >can withdraw, in which case the correlation of forces will favor >the Serbs against the Albanians. > >A year after the war began, Milosevic remains in power in Belgrade >and time appears to be on his side. > > >(c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/ > > > >_______ >Macdonald Stainsby >----- >Check out the Tao ten point program: http://new.tao.ca > >"The only truly humanitarian war would be one against >underdevelopment, hunger and disease." >- Fidel Castro > > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
