>subject: Iran Iraq Turkey. Kurdish people worldwide
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
>please note item 2, Thanks
>Thu, 06
> Apr 2000 16:59:41 -0400
>
>1. INDICT Campaign: Closing in on Torturers? (The Guardian) 4/6
>2. Iran Halts Iraq Oil Tanker as US Watches (Stratfor) 4/6
>3. Turkey Uneasy About US Cluster Bomb Use on Iraq (Turkish Daily
>News) 4/4
>4. US Responds to Cluster Bomb Allegations (Turkish Daily News) 4/5
>5. Retrial of Iraqi Opposition MD (Public Counsel Law Center) 4/4
>6. Cairo Paper Views Move to Boost Iraq Oil Industry (al-Ahram al-
>Masa'i) 4/3
>7. UAE Confirms Support for Lifting Sanctions (al-Ittihad - Abu
>Dhabi) 4/2
>8. Writer Urges non-US Opposition to Attend Meeting (Al-Sharq Al-
>Awsat) 4/3
>---------------------------------------------------------------------
>The Guardian
>Closing in on Iraqi torturers by Ewen MacAskill April 6, 2000
>
>An organisation set up to hunt down the Iraqi leadership for alleged
>human rights abuses claimed yesterday it was poised to indict the
>first member of the regime. The British-based organisation Indict,
>which was awarded $2m in funding by US Congress, said it had
>accumulated enough evidence to make a case stick against an Iraqi
>accused of torture.
>
>Fearful of the Iraqi intelligence service, Indict operates from a
>secret location in London and carefully guards the identity of its
>staff.
>
>The Labour MP Ann Clwyd, who is president of the organisation and has
>long campaigned on behalf of the Iraqi Kurds and other victims of the
>regime, said yesterday: "We are excited at the quality of evidence we
>are getting which we hope will enable us to indict."
>
>To prevent a recurrence of an episode last August in which a senior
>member of the Iraqi government, Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, fled from
>Vienna 24 hours before legal action was initiated, secrecy is
>paramount and even Ms Clwyd does not know the identity of the Iraqi
>being targeted or in which country the indictment will take place.
>But she said the indictment would be "soon, within the next few weeks
>or months".
>
>Staff at Indict's office were more secretive, uneasy that Ms Clwyd
>had gone too far. Indict, which was set up in 1996, aims to mount an
>operation similar to that which led to the arrest of General Augusto
>Pinochet in Britain but hopes to secure a successful prosecution.
>
>On a wider front, Indict is lobbying, alongside the US, for the UN
>security council to set up a war crimes tribunal for Iraq similar to
>the ones for Rwanda and the Balkans.
>
>Ms Clwyd said: "We want to send a signal to the Iraqi government that
>there are no safe hiding places anywhere in the world for those
>charged with the horrendous crimes of Saddam Hussein and those round
>him." She said she found it extraordinary, given the scale of the
>accusations against them, that members of the regime could travel
>freely round the world.
>
>Although the US state department agreed to provide $2m two years ago,
>the first tranche of that money - $600,385 - only came through last
>July. Since that time, Indict's eight-strong team has gathered
>evidence from around the world and made clandestine trips to Iraq.
>
>Indict insisted it had not been ready for Mr al-Douri as it had
>only received the funding from the US the previous month and had not
>accumulated the evidence necessary to make a convincing case.
>
>The top 12 on Indict's wanted list are: President Saddam Hussein; two
>former heads of the intelligence service, Barzan al-Tikriti and
>Sab'awi Ibrahim al-Hassan; Saddam's two sons, Uday and Qusay; Ali
>Hassan al-Majid, the former Iraqi commander in Iraqi Kurdistan and
>first governor of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait; Mohammed al-Zubaydi, who
>took part in the coup that brought Saddam to power; Aziz Salih al-
>Noman, Saddam's former special adviser; Tariq Aziz, the deputy prime
>minister; Mr al-Douri, the former interior minister; Watban al-
>Tikriti, a former interior minister; and Ta Ha Yassin Ramadan, the
>vice-president.
>
>The accusations range from actions against the Iraqi Kurds in the
>1980s to those against the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s. The organisation
>said indictment was possible under various international laws, such
>as the genocide, Geneva and torture conventions.
>
>Indict, whose board includes the former US ambassador Peter Galbraith
>and the former British ambassador Sir John Morgan as well as leaders
>of the Iraqi opposition, has had a short but turbulent history.
>
>It has had a torrid time in the last year trying to establish
>credibility: questions have been raised about why the US should fund
>an organisation headed by a leftwing Labour backbencher and there
>have been rows over money. Legal action is being taken by Ms Clwyd
>over articles in Punch and Private Eye.
>
>US state department officials visited the office yesterday to check
>on progress. Ms Clwyd said of the internal rows: "Of course, in any
>multicultural organisation there are going to be different norms of
>behaviour and it is sometimes difficult to balance people's
>expectations and desire to indict."
>
>But she said the arrival last year of the money from the US and the
>employment of Tony Cunningham, a former Labour Euro MP, as chief of
>staff - the only member of staff prepared to be named publicly - had
>helped create a tightly run organisation. In addition to the
>$600,385 from the US, Indict has received $600,000 from an anonymous
>backer, whom Ms Clwyd is prepared to disclose privately but not
>publicly.
>
>Indict claimed the necessary majority for the establishment of a war
>crimes tribunal existed on the UN security council but the danger was
>of one of the permanent members exercising its veto. As part of its
>lobbying campaign, a conference has been organised in Paris next
>Friday.
>
>---
>STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update
>06 April 2000 -Iran Captures Iraqi Oil and U.S. Attention
>
>Summary
>
>The recent Iranian seizure of an Iraqi oil tanker and the Iranian
>government's subsequent comments indicate a significant shift in
>its policy toward the United States. Tehran appears to be cooperating
>with Washington to strangle Baghdad. Iran would do this for two
>reasons - to keep the price of oil stable in the short term and to
>help solidify what is now a fluid U.S. policy in the region.
>Iran's first goal is slightly at odds with short-term U.S. policy -
>lowering oil prices - but Washington will be willing to accept that
>price in order to lock down a long-term goal, a positive
>relationship with Iran and contain Iraq.
>
>Analysis
>
>The marine patrol of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) seized
>an Iraqi oil tanker on April 1, according to the Islamic Republic
>News Agency. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi
>told Agence France Presse that the ship was seized because "it is
>our policy to forbid and prevent all smuggling." Asefi added, "it
>is also a sign of Iran's respect for the resolutions of the United
>Nations."
>
>The vessel, registered under a Honduran flag, was smuggling 2,500
>tons of Iraqi crude oil when it was intercepted and impounded.
>Honduras is a common flag of convenience for older and smaller
>vessels, because the country has one of the most liberal open Ship
>Registries in the world.
>
>According to the Energy Information Administration, Iraq smuggles
>about 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil via several
>routes. One common smuggling route out of the Persian Gulf follows
>the Iranian coast until entering international waters near the
>Strait of Hormuz. By utilizing Iranian waters, ships illegally
>carrying Iraqi crude can avoid detection by the U.S. and British
>Maritime Interception Force (MIF), which enforces U.N. sanctions
>against Iraq.
>
>Iran is certainly not known for policing smugglers of Iraqi oil,
>and the tanker seizure could simply have been an isolated incident
>involving money. According to the BBC, the Iranian navy reportedly
>charges a toll of $50 per ton of smuggled Iraqi oil, a sum that
>secures right of passage and buys smugglers false papers hiding the
>origin of their cargo. This is the least plausible explanation,
>though, since the Iranian Foreign Ministry used the incident to
>publicly state its policy of being anti-smuggling and pro-United
>Nations.
>
>A more probable explanation is that Iran is pursuing its own multi-
>faceted agenda of keeping oil prices high and pressuring Iraq,
>while giving a nod to the United States. Iran saw that U.S.
>overtures toward Tehran had diminished because the two were at odds
>over short-term oil price concerns. This threatened Iran in two
>ways. First, it risked the United States opening more to Iraq -
>evidenced by the UAE and Bahrain re-opening embassies in Baghdad -
>to the detriment of Iran. Second, a U.S. easing of sanctions on
>Iraq threatened to lower oil prices too much for Iran's long-term
>interests.
>
>Iran's crackdown on Iraqi smuggling cleverly forwarded the
>country's dual agenda. It enforced U.S. imposed sanctions, thus
>undermining U.S. short-term oil policy in favor of U.S. long-term
>Iraq policy. And it aided the attempt to keep oil prices up.
>
>At the recent OPEC meeting, Iran refused to agree with its fellow
>members on how far to raise the production quotas. Iran's oil
>infrastructure is running at near full capacity. Thus, the country
>gains little from an increase in production, which will ultimately
>drive the price of oil downward. By cracking down on Iraqi
>smuggling, Iran can potentially take a reasonable amount of oil off
>the world market - or at least delay it - by forcing Iraq to look
>for new smuggling routes.
>
>At the same time, Iran is giving a political nod toward the United
>States following Washington's recent relaxation of Iranian import
>restrictions and its lenience on Iraqi sanctions. In mid-February,
>the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff "approached" Iran
>about the growing amount of illegal Iraqi oil being smuggled
>through the Gulf. Iran appears to be cooperating, and Washington's
>response is clear. U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin said
>on April 5 that if the reports are true, "we are pleased to see
>that Iran is taking measures against this illegal traffic."
>
>Iran's move also comes amid increased tension between Iran and
>Iraq. Last month, Iraq accused Iran of staging a mortar attack in
>Baghdad that killed four people. Iraq also claimed to have shot
>down two Iranian unmanned reconnaissance aircraft. Baghdad also
>harbors the armed Iranian opposition group, the People's Mujahadeen
>Khalq (MKO), which claimed responsibility for a recent mortar
>attack in Tehran. But, Iran can threaten Iraq's oil smuggling
>routes without an increased Iraqi military threat since Iraq's
>military has been largely kept at bay by U.N. sanctions and
>enforcement of no-fly zones.
>
>The seizure also gains significance in light of the history of
>Iran-Iraq tanker wars during the 1980-88 war. Iran would not have
>made the move if it were not confident that the United States would
>keep the Iraqis from retaliating against its ships. Tehran either
>gambled that the United States would be forced by its own sanctions
>to condone the move, or it had back-channel assurances of U.S.
>cooperation. The first possibility suggests an opening for better
>relations, and the latter would indicate that there has already
>been a major breakthrough in U.S.-Iranian relations.
>
>Either way, Iran just made a major move to shake the United States
>out of its political daze. The real test will be whether or not
>Iran continues its tacit cooperation with the United States. If so,
>it will be a big step forward for U.S.-Iranian relations.
>Strategically, Iran has everything to gain.
>
>--
>
>Turkey uneasy over secret use of cluster bombs against Iraqi forces
>by United States Lale Sariibrahimoglu Ankara - Turkish Daily News
>April 4, 2000
>
>Turkish military intelligence has uncovered U.S. jet fighters
>conducting reconnaissance flights in the no-fly zone north of the
>36th parallel over Iraq and secretly using cluster bombs against
>Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's forces. This has once more caused
>uneasiness between Ankara and Washington concerning the nature of the
>armament which U.S. fighters can carry.
>
>The Turkish and U.S. military have been holding talks on the
>sensitive issue of using cluster bombs against Iraqi forces, which
>were used last September but have gone unnoticed since then by the
>press. Under the rules of engagement agreed upon between Turkey and
>the United States last year, the United States should inform Turkey
>of the nature of the armament warplanes are carrying on each
>flight taking off from Incirlik Air Force Base to monitor the no-fly
>zone north of the 36th parallel over northern Iraq.
>
>But in September of last year, Turkish military intelligence
>uncovered U.S. warplanes using cluster bombs against Iraqi forces on
>grounds of self-defense when Iraqi radars locked onto a U.S. F-16.
>This has prompted the Turkish and U.S. military to find ways in which
>the United States would not use such bombs again.
>
>Operation Northern Watch (ONW) based at Incirlik in southern Turkey
>is composed of Turkish, U.S. and British forces conducting
>surveillance flights in the region to deter Saddam's forces from
>attacking Kurds, Turkmen and other ethnic groups living in northern
>Iraq. Turkish pilots do not take part in the reconnaissance
>flights over northern Iraq in an attempt not to upset Saddam's regime
>and not to give Baghdad the impression that the ONW's existence is
>permanent. But Turkish pilots participate in Airborne Early Warning
>and Control (AEW&C) aircraft flights in the region.
>
>Under the agreement British and U.S. aircraft conduct reconnaissance
>flights over northern Iraq three days per week -- limited to three
>hours each -- and are entitled to conduct reconnaissance flights a
>maximum of 18 days per month. A maximum of 48 aircraft operate under
>ONW.
>
>The nature of arms deployed on a single U.S. F-16 aircraft during
>flights over northern Iraq has always been an issue of discontent
>between the United States and Turkey. Turkey classifies cluster bombs
>(a conventional weapon) as an offensive weapon and is asking the
>United States not use them against Iraqi forces. Turkey
>also questions the rationale behind using cluster bombs when the
>United States denied their transfer to Turkey in 1994 on grounds that
>the bombs would have been used against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
>terrorists.
>
>"The use of cluster bombs against Saddam's forces for self defense is
>not allowed by Turkey due to the United States' refusal a few years
>ago to transfer cluster bombs to Ankara. Turkey sees this U.S. policy
>as a double standard," claimed one Western diplomat. In the meantime,
>Iraq continues to complain to the United Nations about Turkey and the
>coalition forces based at Incirlik saying that ONW poses a threat to
>its security and territorial integrity.
>
>Meanwhile, Turkey is separately negotiating with the United States
>over the long-delayed transfer of cluster bombs to Turkey. Turkey's
>order at the time for approximately 100 cluster bombs has been
>delayed because it was denied by the U.S. Administration when PKK
>terrorism was at its peak. But with the considerable reduction in PKK
>terrorist activities, the United States is said to be preparing
>to transfer the cluster bombs to Turkey.
>
>copyright 2000. reprinted with permission.
> ---
>
>US Embassy: No secrecy in ONW
>Ankara - Turkish Daily News April 5, 2000
>
>The U.S. Embassy in Ankara stated that there was nothing secret about
>the way the United States conducts Operation Northern Watch (ONW). An
>embassy spokesman said, "It is completely transparent." The U.S.
>Embassy statement came as a reaction to a Turkish Daily News article
>published on April 4 under the headline, "Turkey uneasy over secret
>use of cluster bombs against Iraqi forces by United States."
>
>In a written statement yesterday the U.S. Embassy spokesman made the
>following remarks: "There is nothing secret about the way we conduct
>Operation Northern Watch. It is completely transparent. Our coalition
>partners are aware of every move. Turkish pilots fly in our early
>warning aircraft, and Turkish officers sit next to Americans in the
>Combat Air Operations Center. The coalition decides
>which tactics will be most effective in enforcing the no-fly zone.
>This includes deciding which munitions will be most effective in
>protecting ONW air crews. The bottom line is, we will stop bombing as
>soon as Saddam stops threatening our pilots."
>
>However, Turkish military and diplomatic sources speaking to the TDN
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