----- Original Message ----- From: Peter Bein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Friday, April 21, 2000 2:41 AM Subject: [STOPNATO] B-2 STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.HOME-PAGE.ORG B-2 dropped JDAM satellite-guided bombs on the Chinese Embassy May 7/8, 1999. "Block 30" is enemy radar jamming capability. Venik says Itar-Tass reported that 50 aircraft must accompany a B-2, not "over a dozen" stated in the article. Pictures at http://www.defenselink.mil:80/photos/Apr1999/990406-F-4406B-500.html http://members.xoom.com/082499/aviation/nws001/b2down001.htm ============================================== Weekly Defence Monitor, June 24, 1999 Lessons of Kosovo: More B-2 Bombers? Chris Hellman, Senior Analyst, [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1999/issue24.html#1 Now that the B-2 is a combat veteran, having seen repeated action in the skies over Kosovo, supporters of the much maligned bomber are once again pushing the Air Force to buy additional B-2s. The first B-2 was delivered to the Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri, the aircraft's only operational base, in December, 1993. The twentieth B-2 was christened there in May of this year. Of the twenty bombers currently in the fleet, only six are "Block 30" models, the most capable of the aircraft, although all 21 will eventually be upgraded to "Block 30" status. B-2s first saw action on March 24 -- Day 1 of the air campaign against Yugoslavia -- when 2 B-2s each dropped 16 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS). Over the course of the air campaign six B-2s flew an estimated 50 combat missions, or roughly one percent of all NATO sorties flown. They delivered 1.4 million pounds of bombs, about 11 percent of the total used during the air war. On several occasions individual B-2s were reported to have attacked sixteen separate targets during a single mission. Yet despite the positive reviews that the aircraft has received from Pentagon officials and the raves from its Congressional supporters, several questions remain about the B-2s actual performance and whether purchasing additional aircraft makes sense. Stealth technology did not bring about the anticipated reduction in support aircraft needed for combat operations. After the March 27 crash of an F-117A "Stealth" fighter, both the F-117As and B-2s begin flying with escorts of Navy EA-6B radar jamming aircraft. The Air Force decided to retire its fleet of radar-jamming EF-111 "Ravens" in 1991 primarily because it envisioned a fleet of stealthy F-117As, B-2s and F-22 fighters operating without the jamming support needed by conventional aircraft. The Pentagon's reversal on the need for radar-jammers left the Navy's fleet of fleet of 91 EA-6B "Prowlers," -- 30 of which were used to support air operations in Kosovo -- overburdened by the unexpected new requirements to escort F-117As and B-2s. As a result, the Navy has stated it will need at least 50 additional jammer aircraft. Maj. Gen. Dennis G. Haines, Air Combat Command's director of combat operations, acknowledged the significance of the Air Force's lack of a jamming capability. At a conference on June 24, the General said, "stealth reduces the signature of an aircraft but it does not make it invisible. We have really neglected [electronic warfare]." The ability to operate autonomously has long been a big selling point used by B-2 supporters. Repeatedly the Air Force stated how the B-2 dramatically cut operational costs by reducing support requirements. In a now famous chart, two B-2s with a combined crew of four armed with smart munitions were shown to be capable of performing the same mission that would normally require 55 aircraft of all types and over 100 aircrew. Yet in practice, the B-2 did not operate alone during Operation Allied Force. Flying out of Whiteman AFB in pairs, B-2s required mid-air refuelings for each leg of the 30 hour round trip mission. Over the target area, B-2s were escorted by F-15s which provided air cover, F-16s to provide fire suppression against enemy anti-aircraft systems, as well as support from airborne air traffic controllers and systems which monitored enemy communications, as well as their "Prowler" escort. In all, often more than a dozen aircraft supported B-2 missions. The B-2's grueling, 30 hour missions during Operation Allied Force were the result of the aircraft's inability to operate from airfields not equipped to meet their unique maintenance needs. The radar-absorbing materials that give the aircraft its stealthy characteristics require special maintenance and storage facilities, currently only available at Whiteman AFB. Ironically, these long flights increased the wear and tear on the B-2's vulnerable skin, exacerbating existing maintenance problems. Maintenance of the B-2 has long been an issue of concern. A report by the General Accounting Office released on June 10 found that the B-2 required an average of 24.6 maintenance hours for each hour of flying. While this is a significant improvement over earlier maintenance requirements, the Air Force acknowledges that it does not expect to meet upcoming deadlines for achieving the target of 17.7 hours. This is the sixth GAO report in five years that has been critical of the B-2's performance. For more from the latest GAO report on the B-2, see "Defense Acquisitions: Achieving B-2A Bomber Operational Requirements." NSIAD-99-97, June 10, 1999. ______________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb
