>Via NY Transfer News * All the News That Doesn't Fit > >DIRECT FROM CUBA >PRENSA LATINA WEEK-END FEATURE SERVICE > >May 13, 2000 >HAPPY MOTHERS' DAY > >THE GHOST OF ECUADORIAN INSTABILITY > >by Jose Gonzales Tosca, Prensa Latina >Prensa Latina's English translation edited by NY Transfer News > >Quito -- Three months after the overthrow of President Jamil Mahuad, Ecuador >is traveling a difficult road to control and promote, at least for the short >term, the stability necessary to overcome its grave economic, political and >social crises. > >The lack of a settled institutional structure since the mid-nineties, which >led to these events, is the framework that surrounds the former vice >president and present head of state, Gustavo Noboa, installed in power after >a civilian and military uprising on the 21st of January. > >Ecuador, steeped in the deepest economic and social crisis since the last >century, seems to have fallen off a cliff of uncertainty and >ungovernability, which leaves everything uncertain, even the possibility >that the head of state can complete the 32 months left to his mandate. > >Although 90 days are not enough time for the government to find its way >in this country which, in just four years, has gone through five presidents >and two short-lived government juntas, national impatience may soon overflow. > >The accumulation of problems, the lack of faith in its leadership and the >urgency of needs in a country that, all agree, has reached bottom, is the >rough river that the regime must sail -- a regime apparently determined to >continue past methods unchanged. > >The logic applied by Noboa may be different in form from Mahuad's, but it is >identical in substance. This is generally understood ever since Noboa >strongly upheld the model of dollarization announced by his predecessor only >12 days before being overthrown -- a scheme that has taken up most of his >time in office. > >The country, already in a chaotic state economically, was entangled in an >unstable process that upset the structural framework and accentuated >existing inequality, dragging everything towards skepticism and an uncertain >future for its promoters. > >An enormous rise in the cost of living and the adoption of adjustment >measures required by the new monetary system are in sharp contrast to the >social plans that Noboa claimed he would adopt, and that are still expected. > >Resistance to dollarization, rejection of the neoliberal model, its >privatization plans and the requirements of the International Monetary Fund >(IMF), demands for concrete social programs and the construction of a >nationalist policy, are the forces moving national public opinion against >Noboa's government, just as they did during Mahuad's presidency. Noboa's >only "achievement" thus far has been a contingency agreement with the IMF >for 304 million dollars, which the president considers a lifesaver in his >efforts to overcome the crisis, but which is viewed by wide national sectors >as just another set of headaches for the country. > >The IMF agreement has provoked the most contradictory reactions and >stimulated doubts about the very future of this nation, where the last three >governments have left the country nothing more to surrender to the >international monetary system. Not even Ecuadoran officials doubt that the >agreement by the IMF to deliver 2.45 billion dollars over the next three >years will require the government to institute severe adjustment measures >and will demand huge sacrifices from a bankrupt country where more than 80 >percent of the population exists in poverty and misery. > >The document signed to support the government stipulates harsh measures >including increases in the price of fuel, electricity and all basic >services, and the elimination of subsidies. These are potential political >and social timebombs in a country that has been on the point of explosion >for a long time. In order to inject resources to solve balance of payments >problems and save the broken national banks, this agreement is in truth a >crucifixion, a new nightmare that demands further social sacrifices that >are not possible to bear. > >For the workers, unions and social sectors, the president's dollarization >plan has placed the country at the point of a new social upheaval because >the government, they say, has given in too much and will obviously continue >to accept the demands of the IMF. > >The warning should be heeded. In former days, after months of claims and >protests, the country was shaken by a student and popular uprising against a >drastic increase in transportation costs. Almost four months of strikes by >workers of the Social Security Institution and their rejection of a >privatization plan for their organization, led eventually to an indefinite >strike by government workers. > >Preparations for new demonstrations and national strikes by these sectors of >the popular front and social movements, and the government's decision to >break off talks with them and with the Indian movement, have set the stage >for new confrontations that can lead to incalculable consequences. > >For the analysts, the IMF-required adjustment in July -- when the price of >fuel and various essential services will increase -- will be the crucial >test here, where the instability and desperation of the mass majority is >already felt. > >Another effect of this agreement, according to observers, is the substantial >increase in the foreign debt of close to 17 billion dollars, which Ecuador >has already declared it is unable to pay. > >A comparison of some indicators of the Mahuad government before its fall, >and that of Noboa in the last three months, offers clear proof of serious >deterioration in the country's situation. An economic decrease of 0.4 >percent, loss of the International Monetary Reserve of almost half a million >dollars, an increase in unemployment of more than seven percent unemployment >(officially 17 percent at present), with under-employment bordering on 50 >percent and increasing by 1.1 percent in March alone, confirm the worsening >economy. > >That Noboa has been able to impose such conditions on his government is >testimony to the public's perception that he is an energetic and honest >leader. For many, the analyst Alberto Acosta among them, the impression is >that Noboa has not sold out, but that he is willing to give his all in the >interest of the country. > >Others, however, associate Noboa with the plot to overthrow Mahuad and >believe he is beholden to the generals who installed him in the presidential >palace in what they see as an underhanded coup. > >The Ecuadorian leader, however, has demonstrated his honesty and willingness >to confront corruption -- in which Ecuador occupies an unenviable ninth >place in the world -- although without concrete results yet. His efforts, >moreover, have required the kind of support for some government officials >and political and business sectors that according to some, has meant taking >two steps back for every one step forward. > >The saying that you cannot be with God and the Devil fully hit Naboa when he >asked Congress - so often accused by Mahuad of obstructionism - to approve >an amnesty for the military and civilian participants of the January >rebellion, a demand that according to surveys is supported by 60 percent of >the population. His request, generally considered a necessity for >reconciliation and national stability, was answered with a vociferous >refusal by congress, including the right-wing who enthusiastically supported >and pushed him to set up the dollarization and pursue negotiations with the >IMF. > >Parliament, which has developed an increasingly dubious image in the past >three months, also quashed a ballot question Naboa proposed for the May >elections, that would have allowed for a public voice on issues of >provincial autonomy and the political and administrative modernization of >the State. Among Noboa's own cabinet members, as well as the military cartel >that placed him in power, there is a keen awareness of the fragility of his >government, threatened by popular actions that overthrew two presidents in >the past two years and that are now aiming at his head. > >(c) 2000 Prensa Latina, S.A. (PL). 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