I can appreciate Heikki's attempt to be objective and avoid the typical
"frothing-at-the-mouth" mentality that often takes hold on this topic.
There are things I disagree with in what the comrade wrote, but I will try
to answer them in a similar spirit.
> The thirties in the SU was a traumatic era for world communism. What
> really happened... quite obviously we will never know about significant
> processes.
Perhaps. But I hope that a new October Revolution, after which the old KGB
archives will be opened, will shed light on all the intricacies of that
period.
> One thing is sure. After the October Revolution the "whites" revenged
their
> defeat in "red" uniforms. Many NKVD units may very well have been "white"
> in all secrecy. There were killing everywhere. Actually the civil war
> continued up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Finding the real
> guilty persons for all bad in the thirties in SU is even much more
> difficult than it is now in Yugoslavia.
Though the formulations are somewhat cryptic, IMO, I find this passage most
interesting. It is certainly true that many "White" elements migrated into
the Communist Party following the Revolution and Civil War (1918-1920). I
think the one thing that is missing from comrade Heikki's statement,
however, is that these "Whites" not only found themselves in the security
apparatus, but also in the party apparatus and the state apparatus.
"Former" Mensheviks like Martynov and Vyshinsky had relatively illustrious
careers during the 1930s. The latter person, of course, made his name in
prosecuting hundreds of Bolsheviks during the four Trials.
> In these circumstances, in order to keep the Soviet Union in one piece
> also mistakes were made. I know that for instance members of the Central
> Committee of the Communist Party of Finland were excuted in the SU.
> However, we will never know if they were guilty for something or not. And
> after all, is it quite right to put everyhting on Stalin�s account? He
> used hard methods, but did he have much choice in his efforts to govern
> such a huge country in those circumstances?
Last question first: No, but not for the reasons of which you are thinking.
He had no choice because the apparatus he had come to serve (and lead)
demanded it. (BTW, this apparatus was for the most part staffed with mid-
and low-level "Whites" like you described above.)
Second question: I have never seen this as the issue of one man (Stalin),
any more than I have seen the political struggle in the 1920s as a
"personality conflict" (Stalin vs. Trotsky). It's not "Stalin's account"
alone that should be taken to task, but the "account" of the bureaucracy as
a whole, which demanded that Stalin, Kaganovich, Ordzhonikidze, Beria,
Yezhov, Yagoda, etc., etc., etc., do what they did.
> I have personally known Stalin�s secretary, prof. Fyodor Burlatsky. He
> worked in the Kremlin in the early fifties together with Stalin and with
> his Finnish colleague, comrade O.W. Kuusinen.
>
> Fyodor Burlatsky lectured in Helsinki University in the seventies.
>
> According to Fyodor and according to those Finnish bourgeois politicians
> who dealt with Stalin he was a civilized man with an excellent sense of
> humour. This characterization is in sharp contradiction with the
generally
> given picture.
For me, it has never been a question of "good" or "evil", but of politics.
My criticisms of Stalin and what he represented are political, and always
have been. I'll leave cheap emotions to the "state capitalist" left -- like
the Sosialistliitto in your country.
> L. Trotsky and J.V. Stalin were both clever men, but in a difficult
> situation their opinions differed as sharply as we know.
This is a longer issue to deal with, and I'll save it for later.
> I think both LT and JVS would hope all of us to fight and work in good
> co-operation against today�s enemies, capitalists, imperialists and
> "leftist" traitors.
I would genuinely like to think that. But something tells me that both
would disagree on what is meant by "'leftist' traitors" once they got beyond
the bourgeois politicians.
> Attitude in using violence seems to be connected on the Stalin-Trotsky
> topic. Let us try to be realistic.
>
> I find it self-evident that we need concentrated power, even organized
> military power. On the other hand, it is also self-evident that we hope
not
> be forced to use violent methods. All unnecessary violence must be
> carefully avoided. A person who admires violence is never a communist.
I agree that Marxists should not be bloodthirsty or enjoy violence. Our
goal is a peacful world, free from wars of political, economic and social
types. And, yes, that requires world communism.
I guess the main thing here that I would take issue with is what is meant by
"organized military power". For example, we support the building of
workers' self-defense guards, workers' militia and -- in defense of the
revolution -- a Red Army. But I do think this is fundamentally different
from some of the examples you provide below (I'll get to those shortly).
> Admiring nazi-type military power lives now in NATO and especially in
their
> political background headquarters. The mediocre bourgoisie supports this
> militarims exactly like they did in Germany in the thirties.
If "mediocre bourgeoisie" is meant to be "petty bourgeoisie", then there is
some agreement here. I would not call it "Nazi-type" (I would definitely
call it "imperialism"), but I can agree with the sentiment put forward.
> The anti-imperialist countries Yugoslavia, Cuba, Libya, and DPRK would not
> exist without their strong armies and leaders. It is another question
what
> kind of persons there are and what kind of politics these countries carry
> on. Mentioning these countries means that they are anti-imperialist,
> nothing more in this connection. We need strong leaders. But why to try
> to build links back to the thirties-fourties and to the persons of that
> era...
I tend to believe you are mixing apples, pears and oranges here.
Cuba and the DPRK are workers' states, where the bourgeoisie has been
expropriated. They (like the USSR before 1991, Eastern Europe before 1990
and China before 1992) must be unconditionally defended against imperialist
attack and internal capitalist counterrevolution.
Yugoslavia is a former workers' state, where capitalism has, unfortunately,
been restored. However, much of the history of the workers' state remains
fresh in people's memory. As well, Yugoslavia has become the battleground
for imperialism and their drive for new markets (Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo,
etc.).
Libya is a semicolonial country that has thus far resisted the trend that
most "Third World" countries have followed: open capitulation to imperialism
and the free riegn of imperialist capitalism in their economy.
I disagree with the formulation of "anti-imperialist countries", but
recognize that, at times, countries like Libya and Yugoslavia will come into
conflict with the imperialists and may play an objectively anti-imperialist
role. But this is fundamentally different from calling them
"anti-imperialist countries". (As for Cuba and the DPRK, they would be --
because of their class character -- closer to being "anti-imperialist
countries", although I would still not use that term.)
> Democarcy and strong leadership seem often to be contradictory. It is not
> necessary to be so. I find this problematics in a way like dialectic. On
> the other hand we have theoretically a pyramide of councils based on
> grassroot level and on the other hand we have sharp leadership, which
> should obey the impulses from the bottom of the pyramide of councils.
The relation between democracy and centralism ("strong leadership") is a key
part of the Leninist understanding of organization. While the proletarian
dictatorship will not have the same level of unity as the proletarian party,
the concept is essentially the same. A strong leadership is not possible
without the continuous intervention of the class, through the workers'
councils (in the case of society) and local committees/sections (in the case
of the party), and their ability to change the direction of the party and
the state.
But the concept goes both ways. Full discussion and freedom of criticism
must be allowed in order for a strong and trusted leadership to develop.
And full discussion and freedom of criticism can only develop through the
continuous political education of the membership (in the case of the party)
and the class as a whole (in the case of society). Neither the proletarian
party nor the proletarian dictatorship should be allowed to become a
monolith.
> I know how strong emotional attitudes there are connected with the names
of
> Stalin and Trotsky. So... comrades, do not misunderstand me....
I do not misunderstand you comrade. As I said, I appreciate the
objectivity. Even in spite of what is below:
> The thirties in the SU was a traumatic era.
>
> There where "white" in red uniforms. And Stalin was not "white",
>
> This situation caused hard internal struggle up to the beginning of the
> Great Patriotic War.
>
> But how to explain this this to the Trotskites...?
>
> Their emotions are so far too hard to be overcome.
I'm sure you did not mean for those of us on the list to see these notes.
Oh, well.
Just let me say that those of us you call "Trotskites" -- a term in general
I reject; there is no such thing as "Trotskyism", IMO -- fall into many
categories, and we often sharply disagree. For example, comrade Jordana (of
the FSP) and I (of the IWC) have many fundamental disagreements.
But I don't think it's a question of whether or not our "emotions are so far
too hard to be overcome". As I said above, for me it is a political
question. If we can talk about this issue politically, without the vitriol,
then maybe we can begin the process of resolution.
Comradely;
James Paris, MWG-IWC
http://www.marxistworker.org/us/
Workers of the World, Unite!
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Shut down the OAS/FTAA! June 4-6, 2000!
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