>From: "Macdonald Stainsby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > >Israel, Lebanon and the Geopolitics of Maturity > >Summary > >Israel's abrupt withdrawal from Lebanon is not merely a major event >in Israeli history, but a turning point. The Israelis have >withdrawn from occupied territory in the past. But this time the >Israeli military withdrew because of exhaustion and the realization >that there may be non-military solutions to its problems. For a >country that - since its founding - regarded the military solution >to be the surest and most secure, this represents more than a >change of policy. It is a change in a nation's psychology. > >Analysis > >Israel has withdrawn from occupied territory before, either because >of foreign pressure, treaty or military necessity. Israeli forces >withdrew from their over-extended lines in the Beirut area after >Operation Peace for Galilee. But last week's withdrawal was >different. Like all dominant powers, Israel has encountered the >limits of its military power and is searching for more subtle >stratagems. For a country that has from its founding regarded the >military solution as the safest and most secure course, this >represents a fundamental change not only of policy, but also of >national psychology. > >Since its founding, Israel has lived in a perpetual state of >national emergency. The country has wrestled with a deep-seated - >and very real - fear of sudden, simultaneous attack by all of its >neighbors, overwhelming Jerusalem's military and annihilating the >nation. The threat was real. In 1973, Egypt and Syria coordinated a >surprise attack that, even if it never truly threatened Israel's >existence, did in fact justify Israel's worst fears: > >1. All front-line states - Syria, Jordan and Egypt - would fully >commit themselves to a coordinated attack. > >2. Other Arab states and even Iran would forward deploy their >forces into the front-line states. > >3. All of these armies would acquire state-of-the-art weaponry and >fully integrated command. > >4. Israel's foreign political support, particularly from the United >States, would evaporate - taking with it re-supply of weapons. > >5. Israeli intelligence would be unable to clearly understand Arab >intentions and planning, leaving the country blind. > >________________________________________________________________ >Would you like to see full text and accompanying articles? >http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/052900.ASP >___________________________________________________________________ > >This was Israel's nightmare. For a people to whom something truly >unimaginable had just happened, believing in nightmares was not >irrational. All nations have their nightmares. Following Pearl >Harbor the United States was transfixed by the possibility of an >attack at a completely unanticipated time and place. American >nuclear planning revolved around the dread of a nuclear Pearl >Harbor. This also meant that planning for contingencies that >actually occurred - Korea and Vietnam - was haphazard and >insufficient. > >Israel's nightmare scenario has not come to pass. Indeed, for >nearly half of Israel's existence, the scenario has been >impractical. Israel has been stronger than it liked to admit, even >to itself. And its enemies have been comparatively weaker and >suspicious of one another. For nearly a quarter century, Israel has >had a peace treaty with Egypt. It is far from a warm relationship, >but between the treaty and a Sinai buffer zone, the nightmare is >impossible. Obviously, reversal is possible, but it would be >presaged by the deployment of Egyptian forces into the Sinai and >the withdrawal of the American buffer force. There would be a >warning. > >But the nightmare has shaped strategies and responses. First, >Jerusalem placed an emphasis on military responses. Second, Israeli >forces needed buffer zones for room to maneuver; they could not do >so properly within the 1948 borders because they would leave >population centers exposed. Third, Israeli forces focused on a pre- >emptive strategy designed to disrupt the enemy and keep him off >balance. > >This was the strategy that led Israel into Lebanon. Israel had >created effective buffers in the Sinai, the West Bank and the >Golan. The only point at which Israel proper had a frontier without >a buffer was in the north, its border with Lebanon. Two perceived >threats existed. First there was the fear that Syria, defeated in >the Golan in 1973, might flank around Mt. Hermon and strike from >the north; the ability of the Syrians to carry out such a complex >maneuver was doubtful. > >The second threat was more serious. Following the expulsion of the >Palestine Liberation Organization and Yasser Arafat's Al Fatah from >Jordan in 1970, they transferred operations to Lebanon. Indeed, >southern Lebanon became known as Fatahland. Fatah and other >Palestinian factions could not actually threaten the fundamental >security of northern Israel, but they could and did launch sporadic >attacks. > >Israel's response derived from its general strategy: when >confronted by a threat, define it in military terms and define a >military response. The military response must involve creating a >buffer zone. It should also include pre-emptive attacks against >threats to the security of the buffer zone. The Israeli entry into >Lebanon in the 1970s derived, therefore, from Israel's essential >strategic principle. That principle continued to govern operations >in Lebanon until the withdrawal. >__________________________________________________________________ >For more on Israel, see: >http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/countries/Israel/default.htm > >For more on Lebanon, see: >http://www.stratfor.com/meaf/countries/Lebanon/default.htm >___________________________________________________________________ > >But the intervention was much more complex than that. Lebanon had >been torn apart. The arrival of the Palestinians had changed >Lebanon from the Christian enclave that the French had created into >an unstable and fragmented society. The Syrians, who had long >regarded Lebanon as a part of Syria carved off by French >imperialism, had always wanted to retake it. When chaos broke out >in Lebanon, it was not only the Israelis that intervened. The >Syrians intervened as well - against the Palestinians and on behalf >of a Maronite Christian faction that had a longstanding >relationship with the Assad family. Israel's own intervention, >while formally condemned by the Syrians, was actually not >unwelcome. It weakened the Palestinians and strengthened the >Syrians. > >As early as the 1970s, Israel's nightmare scenario and the >political reality of the region diverged. On one hand, Israel >sought a military solution. On the other hand, the reality was that >military opponents were unofficial allies. Israel wound up with a >schizophrenic policy. The Israel decision to annihilate the >Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon in 1982 derived >from its core strategy. It failed because the core strategy was >superb in managing the national nightmare but had nothing to do >with reality. > >With the passage of time, the problem only deepened. The Golan >Heights and Sinai were generally uninhabited; Lebanon, like the >West Bank, was very much inhabited. Creating a buffer zone in the >latter meant grappling with the complex problems of administering >and controlling a hostile population. In Lebanon, Israel tried to >solve the problem by creating a buffer state of Christian Lebanese >and an allied militia, the South Lebanese Army. But as the Israelis >pushed further north they found that they had to rely on >themselves. The buffer zone had to be managed and protected against >attacks. Israeli forces became bogged down in constant, low- >intensity conflict. > >Some have argued that the operation in Lebanon was successful >because if the Israelis had not been defending the buffer against >threats, they would have been defending northern Israel. The >counterargument was that operations exacted a large toll in Israeli >lives. Contemporary threats like Hezbollah would be destroyed more >easily without the buffer zone. Finally, and most importantly, the >argument went, the essential problem with Hezbollah was political >and not military. Hezbollah's interests were in Lebanon and not in >Israel. By removing Israel from the equation, domestic Lebanese >forces, plus the Syrians, would be forced to deal with Hezbollah. > >In the end, this line of reasoning prevailed. The view of Hezbollah >as a minor irritant to be managed by Lebanon's domestic politics >and by the Syrians, rather than as an apocalyptic threat represents >a massive shift in Israeli psychology. > >What Prime Minister Ehud Barak is doing is de-escalating the >psychological terror posed by Hezbollah. Rather than seeing the >militants as part of the nightmare scenario, Barak has assigned >them a much more minor place, as an irritating group with minimal >power. The withdrawal means that Israel can now deal with threats >outside the context of the nightmare scenario. Israel has done a >cost-benefit analysis on occupying part of Lebanon and has decided >that it just wasn't worth it - even if some attacks on Israel >proper might now take place. > >This is an earthshaking event in Israel's history. The emergence of >a class of enemies representing tolerable threats, which might be >dealt with in venues other than the battlefield, redefines Israel's >fundamental vision of its security. There are now large parts of >its environment not linked to the nightmare scenario. Similarly, >Syria is not going to attack Israel from Lebanon for the time >being. It just isn't worth the trouble. > >The garrison state of a generation ago has yielded to a technically >advanced, capitalist society in which dreams of glory on the >battlefield have given way to dreams of IPOs. The best and >brightest used to go into the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) or the >defense research establishment. They now go into computers and the >Internet. Indeed, the expertise accumulated in the Israeli defense >research community is pouring into the commercial markets. > >The nightmare scenario is not impossible. It is, however, distant. >Like many democratic societies, Israel's tolerance for extended >military engagement without a clear exit strategy is limited. The >most astounding fact, though, is that there is near consensus; the >military itself concluded that occupation was not worth the effort. >The Israeli military has arrived at a different appreciation of the >country's strategic reality. > >Israel is becoming a normal country in the sense that, while it has >enemies, these enemies can be managed without extreme measures. >Israel is coming to rely more on political arrangements than >military solutions, reaching subtle understandings with formal >enemies who share interests. In short, it is changing its view of >the world. To be sure, there will be political costs, particularly >when this new vision is extended to the West Bank, as it ultimately >will be. >__________________________________________________________________ > >_______ >Macdonald Stainsby >----- >Check out the Tao ten point program: http://new.tao.ca > >"The only truly humanitarian war would be one against >underdevelopment, hunger and disease." >- Fidel Castro > > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
