_______________________________ > > ANTIFA INFO-BULLETIN > News * Analysis * Research * Action > _______________________________ > > SPECIAL EDITION > - June 14, 2000 - > > * * * > ____________________________________________________________________ > > CIA ADMITS TOLERATING CONTRA-COCAINE TRAFFICKING IN 1980s > ____________________________________________________________________ > > THE CONSORTIUM > http://www.consortiumnews.com/060800a.html > Thursday, June 8, 2000 > By Robert Parry > > In secret congressional testimony, senior CIA officials admitted that the > spy agency turned a blind eye to evidence of cocaine trafficking by > U.S.-backed Nicaraguan contra rebels in the 1980s and generally did not > treat drug smuggling through Central America as a high priority during the > Reagan administration. > > "In the end the objective of unseating the Sandinistas appears to have > taken precedence over dealing properly with potentially serious allegations > against those with whom the agency was working," CIA Inspector General > Britt Snider said in classified testimony on May 25, 1999. He conceded that > the CIA did not treat the drug allegations in "a consistent, reasoned or > justifiable manner." > > Still, Snider and other officials sought to minimize the seriousness of the > CIA's misconduct - a position echoed by a House Intelligence Committee > report released in May and by press coverage it received. In particular, > CIA officials insisted that CIA personnel did not order the contras to > engage in drug trafficking and did not directly join in the smuggling. > > But the CIA testimony to the House Intelligence Committee and the body of > the House report confirmed long-standing allegations - dating back to the > mid-1980s - that drug traffickers pervaded the contra operation and used it > as a cover for smuggling substantial volumes of cocaine into the United > States. > > Deep in the report, the House committee noted that in some cases, "CIA > employees did nothing to verify or disprove drug trafficking information, > even when they had the opportunity to do so. In some of these, receipt of a > drug allegation appeared to provoke no specific response, and business went > on as usual." > > Former CIA officer Duane Clarridge, who oversaw covert CIA support for the > contras in the early years of their war against Nicaragua's leftist > Sandinista government, said "counter-narcotics programs in Central America > were not a priority of CIA personnel in the early 1980s," according to the > House report. > > The House committee also reported new details about how a major Nicaraguan > drug lord, Norwin Meneses, recruited one of his principal lieutenants, > Oscar Danilo Blandon, with promises that much of their drug money would go > to the contras. Meneses and Blandon were key figures in a controversial > 1996 series in the San Jose Mercury News that alleged a "dark alliance" > between the CIA and contra traffickers. > > That series touched off renewed interest in contra-drug trafficking and its > connection to the flood of cocaine that swept through U.S. cities in the > 1980s, devastating many communities with addiction and violence. In > reaction to the articles by reporter Gary Webb, U.S. government agencies > and leading American newspapers rallied to the CIA's defense. > > Like those responses, the House Intelligence Committee report attacked > Webb's series. It highlighted exculpatory information about the CIA and > buried admissions of wrongdoing deep in the text where only a careful > reading would find them. The report's seven "findings" - accepted by the > majority Republicans as well as the minority Democrats - absolved the CIA > of any serious offenses, sometimes using convoluted phrasing that obscured > the facts. > > For instance, one key finding stated that "the CIA as an institution did > not approve of connections between contras and drug traffickers, and, > indeed, contras were discouraged from involvement with traffickers." The > phrasing is tricky, however. The use of the phrase "as an institution" > obscures the report's clear evidence that many CIA officials ignored the > contra-cocaine smuggling and continued doing business with suspected drug > traffickers. > > The finding's second sentence said, "CIA officials, on occasion, notified > law enforcement entities when they became aware of allegations concerning > the identities or activities of drug traffickers." Stressing that CIA > officials "on occasion" alerted law enforcement about contra drug > traffickers glossed over the reality that many CIA officials withheld > evidence of illegal drug smuggling and undermined investigations of those > crimes. > > Normally in investigations, it is the wrongdoing that is noteworthy, not > the fact that some did not participate in the wrongdoing. > > A close reading of the House report reveals a different story from the > "findings." On page 38, for instance, the House committee observed that the > second volume of the CIA's inspector general's study of the contra-drug > controversy disclosed numerous instances of contra-drug operations and CIA > knowledge of the problem. > > "The first question is what CIA knew," the House report said. "Volume II of > the CIA IG report explains in detail the knowledge the CIA had that some > contras had been, were alleged to be or were in fact involved or somehow > associated with drug trafficking or drug traffickers. The reporting of > possible connections between drug trafficking and the Southern Front contra > organizations is particularly extensive. > > "The second question is what the CIA reported to DOJ [Department of > Justice]. The Committee was concerned about the CIA's record in reporting > and following up on allegations of drug activity during this period. ... In > many cases, it is clear the information was reported from the field, but it > is less clear what happened to the information after it arrived at CIA > headquarters." > > In other words, the internal government investigations found that CIA > officers in Central America were informing CIA headquarters at Langley, > Va., about the contra-drug problem, but the evidence went no farther. It > was kept from law enforcement agencies, from Congress and from the American > public. Beyond withholding the evidence, the Reagan administration mounted > public relations attacks on members of Congress, journalists and witnesses > who were exposing the crimes in the 1980s. > > In a sense, those attacks continue to this day, with reporter Gary Webb > excoriated for alleged overstatements in the Mercury News stories. As a > result of those attacks, Webb was forced to resign from the Mercury News > and leave daily journalism. No member of the Reagan administration has > received any punishment or even public rebuke for concealing evidence of > contra-cocaine trafficking. [For details on the CIA's internal report, see > Robert Parry's Lost History.] > > Besides confirming the CIA's internal admissions about contra-drug > trafficking and the CIA's spotty record of taking action to stop it, the > House committee included in its report the Reagan administration's > rationale for blacking out the contra-cocaine evidence in the 1980s. > > "The committee interviewed several individuals who served in Latin America > as [CIA] chiefs of station during the 1980s," the report said. "They all > personally deplored the use and trafficking of drugs, but indicated that in > the 1980s the counter-narcotics mission did not have as high a priority as > the missions of reporting on and fighting against communist insurrections > and supporting struggling democratic movements. > > "Indeed, most of those interviewed indicated that they were, effectively > speaking, operating in a war zone and were totally engaged in keeping U.S. > allies from being overwhelmed. In this environment, what reporting the CIA > did do on narcotics was often based on one of two considerations: either a > general understanding that the CIA should report on criminal activities so > that law enforcement agencies could follow up on them, or, in case of the > contras, an effort to monitor allegations of trafficking that, if true, > could undermine the legitimacy of the contras cause." > > In other words, the CIA station chiefs admitted to the House committee that > they gave the contras a walk on drug trafficking. "In case of the contras," > only monitoring was in order, as the CIA worried that disclosure of > contra-drug smuggling would be a public relations problem that "could > undermine the legitimacy of the contra cause." > > The House report followed this CIA admission with a jarring - and seemingly > contradictory - conclusion. "The committee found no evidence of an attempt > to 'cover up' such information," the report said. > > Yet, that "no cover-up" conclusion flew in the face of both the CIA > inspector general's report and the report by the Justice Department's > inspector general. Both detailed case after case in which CIA and senior > Reagan administration officials intervened to frustrate investigations on > contra-connected drug trafficking, either by blocking the work of > investigators or by withholding timely evidence. > > In one case, a CIA lawyer persuaded a federal prosecutor in San Francisco > to forego a 1984 trip to Costa Rica because the CIA feared the > investigation might expose a contra-cocaine tie-in. In others, Drug > Enforcement Administration investigators in Central America complained > about obstacles put in their path by CIA officers and U.S. embassy > officials. [For more details, see Lost History.] > > In classified testimony to the House committee, CIA Inspector General > Snider acknowledged that the CIA's handling of the contra-cocaine evidence > was "mixed" and "inconsistent." He said, "While we found no evidence that > any CIA employees involved in the contra program had participated in > drug-related activities or had conspired with others in such activities, we > found that the agency did not deal with contra-related drug trafficking > allegations and information in a consistent, reasoned or justifiable > manner." > > Even in this limited admission, Snider's words conflicted with evidence > published in the CIA inspector general's report in October 1998. That > report, prepared by Snider's predecessor Frederick Hitz, showed that some > CIA personnel working with the contras indeed were implicated in drug > trafficking. The tricky word in Snider's testimony was "employees," that > is, regular full-time CIA officers. > > Both the CIA report and the House report acknowledged that a CIA > "contractor" known by the pseudonym Ivan Gomez was involved in drug > trafficking. In the early 1980s, the CIA sent Gomez to Costa Rica to > oversee the contra operation. Later, Gomez admitted in a CIA polygraph that > he participated in his brother's drug business in Florida. > > In separate testimony, Nicaraguan drug smuggler Carlos Cabezas fingered > Gomez as the CIA's man in Costa Rica who made sure that drug money went > into the contra coffers. > > Despite the seeming corroboration of Cabezas's allegation about Ivan > Gomez's role in drug smuggling, the House committee split hairs again. It > attacked Cabezas's credibility and argued that the Gomez drug money could > not be connected definitively to the contras. "No evidence suggests that > the drug trafficking and money laundering operations in which Gomez claimed > involvement were in any way related to CIA or the contra movement," the > House report said. > > What the report leaves out is that one reason for this lack of proof was > that the CIA prevented a thorough investigation of Ivan Gomez's drug > activities by withholding the polygraph admission from the Justice > Department and the U.S. Congress in the late 1980s. In effect, the House > committee now is rewarding the CIA for torpedoing those investigations. > > In one surprise disclosure, the House committee uncovered new details about > the involvement of Nicaraguan drug smuggler Oscar Danilo Blandon in > trafficking intended to support the contras financially. Blandon, a central > figure in the Mercury News series, said he was drawn into the drug business > because he understood profits were going to the contra war. > > In a deposition to the House committee, Blandon described a meeting with > Nicaraguan drug kingpin Norwin Meneses at the Los Angeles airport in 1981. > "It was during this encounter, according to Blandon, that Meneses > encouraged Blandon to become involved with the drug business in order to > assist the contras," the House report stated. > > "We spoke a lot of things about the contra revolution, about the movement, > because then he took me to the drug business, speaking to me about the drug > business that we had to raise money with drugs," said Blandon. "And he > explained to me, you don't know, but I am going to teach you. And, you > know, I am going to tell you how you will do it. You see, you keep some of > the profit for you, and some of the profit we will help the contra > revolution, you see. ... Meneses was trying to convince me with the contra > revolution to get me involved in drugs. Give a piece of the apple to the > contras and a piece of the apple to him." > > Blandon accepted Meneses's proposal and "assumed the money he had given > Meneses was being sent by Meneses to the contra movement. However, Blandon > stated that he had no firsthand knowledge that this was actually > occurring," the House report said. > > Though Blandon claimed ignorance about the regular delivery of cocaine cash > to the contras, other witnesses confirmed that substantial sums went from > Meneses and other drug rings to the contras. A Justice Department > investigation discovered several informants who corroborated the flow of > money. > > One confidential informant, identified in the Justice report only as "DEA > CI-1," said Meneses, Blandon and another cohort, Ivan Torres, contributed > drug profits to the contras. > > Renato Pena, a money-and-drug courier for Meneses, also described sharing > drug profits with the contras, while acting as their northern California > representative. Pena quoted a Colombian contact called "Carlos" as saying > "We're helping your cause with this drug thing. ... We're helping your > organization a lot." > > The Justice report noted, too, that Meneses's nephew, Jairo, told the DEA > in the 1980s that he had asked Pena to help transport drug money to the > contras and that his uncle, Norwin Meneses, dealt directly with contra > military commander Enrique Bermudez. > > The Justice report found that Julio Zavala and Carlos Cabezas ran a > parallel contra-drug network. Cabezas said cocaine from Peru was packed > into hollow reeds which were woven into tourist baskets and smuggled to the > United States. After arriving in San Francisco, the baskets went to Zavala > who arranged sale of the cocaine for contra operatives, Horacio Pereira and > Troilo Sanchez. Cabezas estimated that he gave them between $1 million and > $1.5 million between December 1981 and December 1982. > > Another U.S. informant, designated "FBI Source 1," backed up much of > Cabezas's story. Source 1 said Cabezas and Zavala were helping the contras > with proceeds from two drug-trafficking operations, one smuggling Colombian > cocaine and the other shipping cocaine through Honduras. Source 1 said the > traffickers had to agree to give 50 percent of their profits to the contras. > > The House report made no note of this corroborating evidence published in > the DOJ report. > > The broader contra-cocaine picture was ignored, too. The evidence now > available from government investigations over the past 15 years makes clear > that many major cocaine smuggling networks used the contra operation, > either relying on direct contra assistance or exploiting the relationship > to gain protection from U.S. law enforcement. > > Sworn testimony before an investigation by Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass, in the > late 1980s disclosed that the contra-drug link dated back to the origins of > the movement in 1980. Then, Bolivian drug lord Roberto Suarez invested $30 > million in several Argentine-run paramilitary operations, according to > Argentine intelligence officer Leonardo Sanchez-Reisse. > > The Suarez money financed the so-called Cocaine Coup that ousted Bolivia's > elected government in 1980 and then was used by Argentine intelligence to > start the contra war against Nicaragua's leftist government. In 1981, > President Reagan ordered the CIA to work with the Argentines in building up > the contra army. > > According to Volume Two of the CIA report, the spy agency learned about the > contra-cocaine connection almost immediately, secretly reporting that > contra operatives were smuggling cocaine into South Florida. > > By the early 1980s, the Bolivian connection had drawn in the fledgling > Colombian Medellin cartel. Top cartel figures picked up on the value of > interlocking their operations with the contras. Miami-based anti-Castro > Cubans played a key matchmaker role, especially by working with contras > based in Costa Rica. > > U.S. agencies secretly reported on the work of Frank Castro and other > Cuban-American contra supporters who were seen as Medellin operatives. With > the Reagan administration battling Congress to keep CIA money flowing to > the contras, there were no high-profile crackdowns that might embarrass the > contras and undermine public support for their war. > > No evidence was deigned good enough to justify sullying the contras' > reputation. In 1986, for example, Reagan's Justice Department rejected the > eyewitness account of an FBI informant named Wanda Palacio. She testified > that she saw Jorge Ochoa's Colombian organization loading cocaine onto > planes belonging to Southern Air Transport, a former CIA-owned airline that > secretly was flying supplies to the contras. Despite documentary > corroboration, her account was dismissed as not believable. > > Another contra-cocaine connection ran through Panamanian Gen. Manuel > Noriega, who was recruited by the Reagan administration to assist the > contras despite Noriega's drug-trafficking reputation. The CIA worked > closely, too, with corrupt military officers in Honduras and El Salvador > who were known to moonlight as cocaine traffickers and money-launderers. > > In Honduras, the contra operation tied into the huge cocaine-smuggling > network of Juan Ramon Matta Ballesteros. His airline, SETCO, was hired by > the Reagan administration to ferry supplies to the contras. U.S. government > reports also disclosed that contra spokesman Frank Arana worked closely > with lieutenants in the Matta Ballesteros network. > > Though based in Honduras, the Matta Ballesteros network was regarded as a > leading Mexican smuggling ring and was implicated in the torture-murder of > DEA agent Enrique Camarena. > > The CIA knew, too, that the contra-cocaine taint had spread into President > Reagan's National Security Council and into the CIA through Cuban-American > anti-communists who were working for two drug-connected seafood companies, > Ocean Hunter of Miami and Frigorificos de Puntarenas in Costa Rica. One of > these Cuban-Americans, Moises Nunez, worked directly for the NSC. > > In 1987, the CIA asked Nunez about allegations tying him to the drug trade. > "Nunez revealed that since 1985, he had engaged in a clandestine > relationship with the National Security Council," the CIA contra-drug > report said. "Nunez refused to elaborate on the nature of these actions, > but indicated it was difficult to answer questions relating to his > involvement in narcotics trafficking because of the specific tasks he had > performed at the direction of the NSC." > > The CIA had its own link to the Frigorificos/Ocean Hunter operation through > Felipe Vidal, a Cuban-American with a criminal record as a narcotics > trafficker. Despite that record, the CIA hired Vidal as a logistics > coordinator for the contras, the CIA report said. When Sen. Kerry sought > the CIA's file on Vidal, the CIA withheld the data about Vidal's drug > arrest and kept him on the payroll until 1990. > > These specific cases were not mentioned in the House report. They also have > gone unreported in the major news media of the United States. > > Now, with the Democrats on the House Intelligence Committees joining with > their Republican counterparts, the official verdict on the sordid > contra-drug history has been delivered - a near full acquittal of the > Reagan administration and the CIA. The verdict is justified as long as no > one reads what's in the government's own reports. > > Copyright 2000 The Consortium. All rights reserved. > > Consortiumnews.com is a free Web site. 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