>from: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Indonesia -EastWest Timor
>Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2000
>
>Guardian Weekly . August 10-16, 2000  The Observer
>     "Rebels risk Indonesia's wrath"
>            By Ian Williams
>---------------------------------------------------
>Erson Wenda stands on a ridge above the remote Baliem Valley,
>gesturing wildly with his arms, tears in his eyes. "The soldiers came
>from over there. They took people from my village, tying their hands,
>and brought them to these holes."
>
>He bends forward, his hands behind him, re-enacting what happened
>when 11 of his terrified neighbours were shot and dumped into shallow
>graves on the ridge.
>
>A silent crowd gathers as he continues his story. A tribesman,
>wearing only a codpiece and feathers in his hair, stamps his spear
>and utters a deep moan. An old man in soiled shorts steps forward,
>pointing to bullet wounds in his thigh and foot.
>
>Rain suddenly sweeps in across the valley. Everyone scrambles for
>shelter. The man's words now compete with rain on the tin roof: "They
>hacked the bodies before they threw them into the holes."
>
>For the first time, the full horror of Indonesian rule in Irian Jaya
>(or West Papua, as Papuans prefer to call it) is emerging.
>
>For more than 30 years Jakarta fought a dirty war against the rebel
>group OPM and anyone thought to sympathise with them. Thousands are
>thought to have died. Only now are villagers coming forward to have
>their reports documented by human rights workers in the highland
>capital of Wamena.
>
>"We're not scared any more. Before, if you as much as mentioned the
>rebels you'd be killed. People would be terrorised for as much as
>writing down their name. People were scared to even use the word
>Papua," says Yafet Yelemaken, who is gathering the evidence.
>
>Years of repression now fuel an urgent desire for independence. The
>Baliem Valley is technically still an area of military operations,
>but suddenly the hated Indonesian military has disappeared.
>
>All along the bumpy road that threads through the valley, villagers
>have set up their own security posts. Groups of men in bare feet and
>tattered clothes spring to attention as strangers approach. They
>brandish the ancient weapons of the Dani tribe that dominates this
>valley: bows and arrows, spears and crude knives.
>
>Veteran members of the OPM emerge from the hills, wearing
>feathered head-dresses, necklaces of giant boar's teeth and enormous
>gourds over their loins. "We're not afraid. Not now," they insist.
>
>In Jayapura the independence movement organised its most
>forthright challenge yet. Hundreds flooded the city centre last week
>for the raising of the outlawed Morning Star flag. The only sign of
>Indonesian authority was a solitary and bemused traffic policeman.
>
>Indonesia's President Abdurrahman Wahid has said he will never let
>Irian Jaya go. Yet in the valley and here in Jayapura it looked too
>late, as black-clad militiamen, forbidden flags on their breasts,
>paraded openly.
>
>These men policed the port with sticks and knives when a refugee
>ship arrived from Ambon. At first nobody was allowed ashore. The few
>eventually permitted to land for medical treatment were escorted,
>menacingly, by those same militiamen.
>
>One pro-Indonesian businessmen was reportedly kidnapped and beaten
>by militiamen. Chinese shop owners have been threatened.
>
>At the local human rights office, long-standing critics of
>Indonesia's heavy-handed rule were deeply uneasy, drawing parallels
>with strife-torn Ambon and East Timor.
>
>"This is a time-bomb waiting to explode. I'm afraid it's all going to
>end in tragedy," said Albert Rumbekwan, one activist. And then
>cryptically: "Why are we accepting favours from our enemies?"
>
>Among those "favours" is cash for the militia, from a disturbing
>source. The self-proclaimed "Big Leader" of the West Papua
>independence movement, who runs the militia, is 62-year-old Theys
>Eluay, a tall, imposing man with a shock of white hair. He was once a
>member of the ruling Golkar party and voted for integration with
>Indonesia in a dubious 1969 plebiscite of local leaders. For 30 years
>he kept quiet about Indonesia's human rights abuses.
>
>More sinister is his main source of money: Yorris Raweyai, deputy
>head of an Indonesian youth organisation with close ties to the
>Indonesian army and ex-President Suharto.
>
>Yorris's youth organisation is involved in gambling, prostitution
>and protection rackets. In the past it was used by the military for
>the dirty work that they preferred to avoid: Yorris is awaiting trial
>over an attack in 1996 on the headquarters of Megawati Sukarnoputri,
>then an opposition leader.
>
>Now it is his money funding Eluay, his West Papuan separatist
>movement and their militia, which claims to be 7,000-strong.
>
>"The people are hungry for freedom, and that seems to matter more to
>them than the personalities fighting for it," says Mr Rumbekwan.
>
>More worrying, Mr Rumbekwan's office has received reports of rival
>"red and white" militias, loyal to Jakarta, being trained by the
>military in other cities.
>
>Unlike East Timor, or Ambon, Irian Jaya has rich reserves of minerals
>and metals. The Grasberg mine, in the mountains of this wild
>province, has the world's biggest gold deposit. Freeport McMoran, the
>American firm that runs it, is Indonesia's single biggest taxpayer.
>
>Economically, the province is vital to Indonesia. The fear among
>human rights groups in Jayapura is that some powers in Jakarta want
>to create conditions to justify a military crackdown or to unleash
>chaos to undermine President Wahid's dwindling credibility. The
>parallels with East Timor and Ambon are frightening indeed.
>
>The Observer
>
>           *********
>
>from: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: East/West Timor
>Date: Tue, 29 Aug 2000
>          Via: Sydney Morning Herald . August 26, 2000
>
>   "A prosperous future"
>                    By Lindsay Murdoch
>-----------------------------------
>
>A World Bank report acknowledges that the scale and shock of the UN
>spending does not match the distortions that come with it. "It's a
>very big bubble. UN spending accounts for 20 per cent of GDP," said
>Sarah Cliffe, chief of the World Bank's mission in Dili.
>
>The bank has given small loans to each village to be spent at the
>discretion of elders. But the population of Dili is still double what
>it was before last year's violence, creating hardship and social
>problems.
>
>Despite the presence of armed UN peacekeepers and police, unemployed
>gangs of youths still fight on Dili streets. The UN has traced some
>of the worst trouble-makers to a breakaway group of Gusmao's former
>guerrillas.
>
>The lure of the UN money has attracted hundreds of entrepreneurs,
>many of them Australians, who have opened restaurants, supermarkets,
>hotels, car hire firms and other businesses that will suffer, if not
>collapse, when the UN operation winds down and Timorese take control.
>
>An estimated 75 per cent of Timorese are subsistence farmers, eating
>hand to mouth. Few of them have so far benefited from the arrival of
>the UN.
>
>The UN's development co-ordinator in East Timor, Finn Reske-Nielsen,
>says the UN's artificial economy is a serious problem. "There has got
>to be a development strategy aimed at economic development for the
>short to medium term," he said. "And agriculture must become the
>mainstream of that."
>
>A former Jakarta-appointed Governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao,
>says the territory's coffee production should double in the next two
>or three years.
>
>"We have the best coffee in the world," he said. "At the moment
>48,000 hectares of plantations are being worked. That is nothing. We
>can easily go up to 100,000 hectares, and that will create a lot of
>jobs for a lot of people."
>
>During Indonesia's occupation huge tracts of fertile land were not
>farmed because of the security situation.
>
>De Mello says experts have told him that, given limited quantities
>of fertiliser and high quality seed, East Timor could quickly
>become self-sufficient in rice and maize.
>
>More than anything else, East Timor's economic viability will depend
>on talks with Australia over oil and gas revenues from the Timor Gap,
>the resource-rich seabed between the two nations. But Gusmao has
>asked Timorese and UN planners not to factor a big windfall from
>Timor gap royalties into their calculations.
>
>"East Timor has a lot of potential in the areas of tourism,
>agriculture and fishing," said Mari Alkatari, the Minister for
>Economic Affairs in the country's transitional cabinet set up by the
>UN. "It would be bad for us to create a sort of cargo-cult mentality
>where all our thinking is on the Timor Gap," he said. "If money comes
>from oil or gas in the Timor Gap it will be a bonus but we won't be
>counting on it."
>
>Ramos Horta says the Timor Gap's potential is linked to development
>of industry in the Northern Territory. "Yes you have to be realistic
>about that," he said.
>
>He cites some estimates that East Timor will receive more than $200
>million in oil revenue and $300 million from natural gas in the Timor
>Gap within a few years.
>
>He predicts the negotiations with Australia will greatly favour East
>Timor. "The Australians will tell you they are being most flexible,"
>he said. "Without negotiating the sea boundaries, we believe
>Australia will agree with our basic principle that the middle line in
>the exclusive economic zone is the boundary. This means that at least
>90 per cent of revenues from the Timor Gap would come to East Timor."
>
>One of Gusmao's biggest worries is security for his people,
>especially after a recently stepped up campaign by pro-Jakarta
>militia to destabilise the border between East Timor and Indonesian
>West Timor.
>
>But he shows a remarkable ability to forgive Indonesia, developing a
>warm relationship with its reformist president, Abdurrahman Wahid,
>who has apologised to East Timor for atrocities committed by
>Indonesia and has promised to disband the militia.
>
>Gusmao realises how important it will be for East Timor's future to
>have good relations with its giant neighbour and to be able to put
>aside the lingering hatred.
>
>"If you really want peace, if you really want stability, we have to
>put everything behind us," he said. "If not you will live under some
>kind of spell. You cannot see the future. You cannot work towards the
>future."
>
>Isn't that tough? "Yes, of course, yes. But we learned during 24
>years that we can win despite the odds being against us. They were
>killing our people ... but we found the better way was to ... bring
>them to our side. They joined with us in the jungle. They died like
>heroes with us."
>
>Gusmao plans to create an army of perhaps 3,000 to 5,000. The core of
>the ranks will be his former guerrilla fighters, who have been bored
>and restless since they came out of the mountains last September and
>October. "We will feel nothing without a sense of security," he said.
>
>Carrascalao says there are many in Indonesia "who want to create
>instability so they can say Indonesia's rule was better".
>
>"Why do you think they destroyed everything when they left? They
>didn't want to leave anything behind to make it easier for the
>Timorese ... they formed the militia groups to create a situation
>conducive to civil war."
>
>The Carrascalaos are one of the most prominent of only 20 to 30
>families that make-up East Timor's political elite.
>
>It will be mostly from the existing elite families that Timorese will
>elect members of a constituent assembly at UN-supervised elections,
>to be held possibly between August and December next year.
>
>Joao Carrascalao, Mario's brother, who is Infrastructure Minister in
>the transitional cabinet, says there is a determination among East
>Timor's emerging politicians to establish a government of national
>unity, involving all the significant parties, for several years.
>
>"Things could easily go back to the fighting of the mid-1970s,
>especially if people don't have a strong vision of unity," he said.
>
>The main political parties that have re-emerged are Fretilin,
>the revolutionary group once headed by Gusmao that fought for
>independence, and the UDT, whose fighters assisted the 1975
>Indonesian invasion of East Timor.
>
>A new centre-right Social Democratic Party was formed last week with
>the Gusmao's blessing . It aims to offer an alternative to what it
>calls "revivalism of the past".
>
>A Western diplomat monitoring East Timor said: "Normally it is a
>recipe for disaster to expect former enemies to work together. But
>one factor brought them together: the behaviour of Indonesia after
>the invasion."
>
>A small group of Timorese leaders surrounding Gusmao are anxiously
>waiting to take charge of their new country. But in interviews none
>of them underplays the enormous challenges. They speak candidly about
>the difficulties solving issues such as land ownership. Thousands of
>properties are in dispute.
>
>Foreign investors will lack the confidence to spend money until they
>are settled. Some claims date back to the Portuguese days.
>
>Questions fundamental to East Timor's future are being argued
>passionately. What should the national language be, Portuguese or
>English? Should there be a presidential system, like Indonesia's, or
>a parliamentary system based on the English model? People are deeply
>traumatised.
>
>In Dili, a group of women with newborn babies seek counselling; they
>want to know whether they should baptise their babies, conceived
>during rapes by Indonesian soldiers. When Gusmao goes into towns or
>villages he tells his people to be patient, to understand that
>independence did not suddenly arrive with the departure of the
>Indonesians.
>
>"I tell them to be humble, to accept that we are not perfect."
>
>UN officials and diplomats in East Timor say the emerging state is
>lucky to have leaders such as Gusmao and Ramos Horta.
>
>But strains are already taking their toll. Gusmao has angered some
>party leaders by denouncing what he calls their inappropriate
>ambitions for power at a time East Timor needs national unity.
>
>"[Gusmao] has his faults like everybody else, but he understands his
>own limitations," said a Western diplomat based at a Dili mission.
>"He cares deeply about the fate of his people. He has an ability to
>listen and compromise. He will be able to tap an enormous amount of
>international goodwill for his new country."
>
>Like most East Timorese. Maria Lourdes de Sousa, 40, has a horror
>story. At the height of last year's rampaging by pro-Jakarta militia
>she had to run the gauntlet of mobs to reach West Timor with her
>lawyer husband and four children.
>
>The militia were hunting her because she had worked for the UN. At
>a checkpoint thugs tried to drag her two-year-old son from the car.
>"I held on and held on ... it was frightening," she said. The boy
>still carries the scars.
>
>Several weeks ago, days before she gave birth to her fifth child, she
>sat for an exam to select 50 trainee diplomats. "I never imagined I
>would ever be a diplomat, but I passed," said the face of the new
>East Timor.
>
>******* END ********
>
>Sydney Morning Herald . August 26, 2000
>
>"War crimes lawyer to study 1975 invasion"
>           By MARK DODD, Herald Correspondent in Dili
>------------------------------------------------------
>
>A senior United Nations prosecutor investigating Indonesian war
>crimes in East Timor will compile a report on atrocities committed
>after the bloody 1975 invasion in which up to 200,000 Timorese were
>killed.
>
>Mr Mohamed Ottman, the UN Chief Prosecutor in East Timor, a Tanzanian
>lawyer and former chief prosecutor at the Rwandan International
>Criminal Tribunal will lead the team examining whether there was a
>systematic campaign of violence.
>
>The former Australian consul in Dili and expert on East Timor, Mr
>James Dunn, will help compile the report, which will be essential in
>proving crimes against humanity stemming from political violence
>leading up to and after last year's referendum.
>
>"In order to prove crimes against humanity, you need to to prove a
>pattern of systematic and widespread attacks against a civilian
>population," said the UN's human rights chief in Dili, Mr Patrick
>Burgess.
>
>He said that under international law, militia killings such as the
>Suai cathedral massacre on September 6 last year in which up to 200
>people died, did not alone prove a case for crimes against humanity,
>but a criminal case of mass murder.
>
>A systematic pattern of violence directed against East Timorese
>civilians by Indonesian troops stemming back to 1975 would help prove
>the more serious charge of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
>
>It is understood that once a case is established for crimes
>against humanity, international warrants are likely to be issued
>against a number of senior Indonesian military commanders. This
>process is expected to be completed before East Timor gains
>full independence next year, but the biggest challenge facing UN
>prosecutors will be to bring the alleged perpetrators from Indonesia
>to East Timor.
>
>Earlier this year, the United Nations Transitional Administration in
>East Timor established a Serious Crimes Unit to hear six categories
>of crimes including war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture,
>rape and murder.
>
>Mr Ottman who arrived in East Timor earlier this month.
>
>Mr Dunn said crimes committed by Indonesian forces in East Timor from
>1975 to 1998 ranked alongside the worst excesses of Nazi Germany.
>
>They included a series of massacres at Dili wharf in December 1975 in
>which several hundred East Timorese men and women were shot and their
>bodies dumped into the sea. The victims included Australian
>journalist Roger East and the wife of former Fretilin leader Nicolai
>Lobato. Soldiers from airborne Battalion 502, the same battalion now
>deployed opposite Australian peacekeepers at Balibo, were allegedly
>responsible.
>
>Other mass killings to be investigated include the slaughter of
>Liquica's ethnic Chinese community and the murder of up to 1,200
>people in Bobonaro in 1976.
>
>Mr Dunn said he was aware of hundreds of individual cases of rape
>and torture committed by Indonesian soldiers, including eyewitnesses
>to a case in which a 15-year-old girl was raped and then thrown into
>a crocodile pit in Dili.
>
>Other atrocities included the infamous 1991 Dili Massacre at Santa
>Cruz cemetery in which Indonesian troops opened fire on unarmed
>protesters killing as many as 271 people.
>
>****** END *******
>
>Sydney Morning Herald . August 26, 2000
>
>"Time for fortress Australia to change attitude on Timor"
>By Hamish McDonald, Foreign Editor
>-----------------------------------------------------------
>
>In May the leader of the East Timor independence movement, Xanana
>Gusmao, was in Canberra and heading into a meeting with Dr Ashton
>Calvert, the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
>(DFAT).
>
>A federal police officer intercepted the legendary freedom fighter
>with a message, looking embarrassed: the Department felt it was
>inappropriate for Gusmao to bring his Australian adviser, Canberra
>barrister Bernard Collaery, to the meeting.
>
>Mr Gusmao decided - out of gratitude for Australia's role in last
>year's military intervention against Indonesian-sponsored militia
>violence and a wish for continuing co-operation with Canberra - to
>swallow the snub and went into the meeting alone.
>
>As East Timor marks the first anniversary next Wednesday of its pro-
>independence vote, there is a feeling among many close observers
>that the Australian Government, and some senior officials of DFAT in
>particular, have not yet fully adjusted to the fact that a new nation
>with its own leadership is emerging on our northern approaches.
>
>The National Council of Timorese Resistance, or CNRT, the
>independence coalition now holding a congress to debate the future
>state, is known to be irked by negative briefings given by DFAT about
>its leaders like Mr Gusmao and Mr Jose Ramos Horta, or about their
>prospects of establishing a lasting democracy.
>
>The Australian Consulate in Dili, set up as a virtual fortress on the
>edge of town in the fraught months before last year's ballot, remains
>a closed bunker compared to the diplomatic missions set up by
>Portugal and other countries.
>
>It is to be hoped that the Foreign Minister, Mr Downer, sweeps aside
>these misgivings and sets a new tone for the emerging relationship
>when he goes to Dili and joins well-wishers like Nelson Mandela for
>the anniversary.
>
>Certainly the picture of the new state likely to emerge from the
>United Nations humidicrib in one or two years from now is becoming a
>little clearer:
>
>It will almost certainly be led by Mr Gusmao, who has cast aside
>diffidence about going for the presidency in next year's elections,
>and in preparation has just stepped down from a military role in the
>resistance force Falintil.
>
>An important concern could be the lack of open politics, rather than
>too much, as some analysts fear. Mr Gusmao has talked of a 10-year
>moratorium on all-out political contest during the nation's building
>phase. Intended or not, this could lead to one-party politics and
>corruption. East Timor should be encouraged to start as it means to
>continue, with constant scrutiny and criticism of its leaders.
>
>East Timor will have its own army, thanks largely to Jakarta's
>inability to stop diehard military elements setting out to undermine
>the new nation, by guerilla raids and trying to split the CNRT
>coalition. It will need continuing Australian and other military
>support for years.
>
>Mr Gusmao's leadership has taken a difficult decision in choosing as
>a national language Portuguese - spoken only by an older 15 per cent
>of the population - over Indonesian. But it is a right one: East
>Timor is independent because it was Portuguese, and has to reinforce
>its national identity.
>
>Accepting East Timor with all its peculiar legacies, and exerting the
>utmost diplomatic, aid and military efforts to have it securely
>launched into independence is now Canberra's duty. A foreign affairs
>department that was backing autonomy within Indonesia as the best
>outcome right up to the eve of last year's ballot has to be seen as
>fully on side. " JC
>
>
>
>
>


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