>
>OTTAWA CITIZEN [Canada], Friday, 22 September 2000
>
>Colombia suffers 32,000 casualties a year fighting a war created by the
>West's appetite for drugs
>By Boris Johnson
>
>LONDON - "It is like that," says His Excellency Victor Ricardo, the
>Colombian ambassador to England. He gestures with an elegantly
>flannelled arm at a plant on top of the television in my office. "Only
>larger." I gaze at the plant, which looks particularly droopy and
>unthreatening, and try to imagine the amazing properties of its Latin
>American lookalike.
>
>The ambassador has done us the honour of dropping in for tea, and we are
>of course discussing the coca plant, the key ingredient of a
>$350-billion global industry. They pick it, mash it, boil it and then
>somehow turn it into a white powder which disappears at a prodigious
>rate up the noses of the western world. Burst into the lavatories of one
>of those trendy clubs in London, England, I am told, and you will find
>any number of New Labour PR types inhaling Colombia's No. 1 export; and
>when they found poor Paula Yates earlier this week, the chances are,
>alas, that there was a little piece of Colombia somewhere in the room.
>
>Yes, says the ambassador, a "high percentage" of the cocaine in Britain
>probably originated in his country. The Americans say that 90 per cent
>of their cocaine consumption-and much of their heroin-comes from
>Colombia, and once again they are going ape. In a plan that has been
>likened to the Vietnam War, U.S. President Bill Clinton has decided to
>stamp out the source of so much misery by eradicating the crop itself.
>At a cost of $1.3 billion to the American taxpayer, he is sending 60
>Black Hawk helicopter gunships, 300 troops, and innumerable spies and
>Drug Enforcement Agency officials to this proud and independent country.
>
>Yet more American money-about $900 million-is to be poured into the
>fight against the left-wing guerrillas who control the coca production.
>
>Fifteen more spray planes will be supplied by Uncle Sam to squirt the
>countryside with a Monsanto-made defoliant called Glyphosate-a
>particularly nasty substance that destroys all vegetation, be it coca,
>coffee or bananas.
>
>Between 1992 and 1998, the Americans funded the destruction of 140,000
>hectares of crops-and guess what? Production of coca has tripled.
>
>"It is stupid," says Mr. Ricardo, a jovial man of not much more than 40,
>who has been ambassador to Argentina, high commissioner for Peace, and
>governor of the province of Cundinamarca.
>
>This seems oddly frank from a man whose government has been quite
>content to mainline American money. But then I guess he would not have
>come to tea if he was entirely happy with U.S. policy. His first
>objection is that the defoliant causes side-effects -- he rubs imaginary
>blisters on his arm. Calves are born hairless. Chickens die after eating
>sprayed areas.
>
>"No matter how much you spray, the production doubles in five years.
>There are 300,000 campesinos involved, and when they see that their
>fields are being sprayed they move into the forest, and they destroy the
>forest."
>
>The big cartels-Cali, Medellin-may be on the wane, but the war is
>bloodier than ever: between left-wing guerrillas who protect the
>drug-growing peasants, and right-wing paramilitaries who retaliate with
>Arkanesque ferocity and who are the proxies and, in a sense, the
>hirelings of America.
>
>"We have the worst of both worlds," says Mr. Ricardo. "We have 32,000
>dead per year in the fight against drugs, and we will keep seeing more
>deaths if there is not a new approach. We accept that Colombia has a
>problem with the production and trade in illicit drugs, but we demand
>that the entire picture is analyzed. There is a demand, and that demand
>is not in Colombia. We haven't seen any progress in the debate on
>demand."
>
>Of course, the ambassador would like help-generous help-in steering the
>poor of Colombia away from coca production.
>
>He deplores the $1.2 billion wasted by his own government in fighting
>the drug trade when, so he claims, this money could be given over to
>helping the campesinos. He speaks of flowers or palm oil or exotic fruit
>or even oxygen quotas, as possible cash-generating alternatives to coca.
>
>But when he talks about the "problem of demand," he can only mean one
>thing: that the West is being dishonest and hypocritical in blitzing the
>jungle and plantations of Colombia with a latter-day Agent Orange.
>Because the problem lies not in this modest shrublet, but in the moral
>weaklings of the West who take drugs, and the muddle of western
>governments who wage a "war on drugs" rather than on the akrasia of
>their own citizens.
>
>Coca is by far the most lucrative crop produced by Colombia, but the
>Colombians can't tax it, and the Colombian state derives no benefit from
>its production. We are led irresistibly to the case for legalization.
>
>"That is not our problem," says Mr. Ricardo. "We have to take a lot of
>care because the position we take could be seen as benefiting the people
>in the drugs business. "But speaking personally," he says, "what is
>banned is clearly more valuable, and without prohibition there wouldn't
>be  a business. We used to have a lot of marijuana in Colombia, and once
>they legalized consumption in 11 states of the U.S., the problem was
>gone."
>
>If the United States, and the West generally, legalized cocaine and
>other coca-derived drugs, would that end the war in his country?
>
>"Politically, no; but it would greatly diminish the violence."
>
>Of course, we have our drug-related tragedies in the West. But this
>man's country is losing 32,000 a year to a drug-related conflict. Who
>suffers more?
>
>He well may be wrong about liberalization: however strong one's love of
>individual liberty, there is something comforting about a ban on what is
>so obviously destructive.
>
>And yet one has a strong feeling that this is a case that deserves to be
>heard, and that it is up to us western hypocrites to respond.
>
>Has he taken cocaine himself, I ask. "I've never had any chance, " he
>beams. "I've seen more coke outside Colombia than inside."
>
>        Copyright 2000 Southam Inc.
>
>  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Friday, 22 September 2000
>Privatization program founders in Colombia
>
>BOGOTA -- The cancellation of the privatization of Bogota's fixed-line
>telecommunications provider-known as ETB-came only a day after
>government officials formally suspended the sale of a major electricity
>generator. The markets received the news nervously, adding to pressure
>which has seen the currency devalue by nearly 20 percent this year.
>
>Enrique Penalosa, Bogota's mayor, announced the cancellation of the ETB
>sale, saying that the foreign investors interested in the company had
>pulled out owing to the actions of guerrilla groups in the past few
>days.
>
>In an official statement Penalosa said that Telefonica de Espana and
>Telecom de Italia-the two companies in the bidding process-had
>reconsidered their interest after guerrillas kidnapped more than 60
>people near Cali on Sunday. The separate kidnapping of three Italian
>engineers last week near Medellin was also cited.
>
>However, the veracity of Penalosa's claim was widely doubted as the
>privatization of ETB had proved highly controversial since the project
>was first announced in 1998.
>
>The controversy was later fueled by a series of accusations regarding
>the legality of the sale. Earlier in the week Jaime Bernal ,the Public
>Minister responsible for overseeing the activities of state entities,
>had said he would proceed with an investigation of all the officials who
>had participated in the process, including the mayor. Such an
>investigation could have led to the cancellation of the sale even had it
>gone ahead.
>
>Bernal had supported claims from other authorities that the sale price
>of $1.4 billion was not enough. Statements originating from Bernal's
>ministry also indicated that there were significant legal irregularities
>in the proposed sale.
>
>In response to these allegations, Penalosa later said that in his view
>there were no legal conflicts or irregularities in the sale.  Penalosa
>has always insisted that Colombia needs to adopt a more "positive
>attitude" to privatizations if the country is to attract foreign capital
>necessary to modernize infrastructure.
>
>The failure to sell ETB is considered a serious blow to the government's
>privatization programme. The news came only 24 hours after the
>government was forced to suspend the sale of Isagen, Colombia's second
>largest electricity generator.
>
>This followed a high court's decision which ordered the government to
>suspend the sale after EPM, a another Colombian generator , had claimed
>the authorities had unjustifiably tried to exclude it from participating
>in the bidding process.
>
>Isagen was originally going to be sold along with ISA-Colombia's most
>important power transmission company-back in 1998. But, these
>privatizations had to be put off several times owing to a series of
>difficulties in structuring the sale. Another major reason for the
>continued delay was the wave of attacks launched against the electricity
>infrastructure by the country's two principle leftist guerrilla
>organizations. Over the past 18 months more than 360 electricity pylons
>have been destroyed and hydroelectric stations have been attacked on
>several occasions. While these attacks made the sale of ISA especially
>unviable the latest legal decision also makes the sale of Isagen look
>increasingly unlikely in the near future.
>
>The inability to privatise these companies will deny the government of
>revenues of more than $2 billion. The availability of these funds was
>included in the deficit cutting agreements which Colombia signed with
>the IMF last year, causing a degree of measured nervousness in the local
>financial markets.
>
>The peso closed Friday at a low of CP 2,226 against the dollar after a
>much higher than usual number of transactions.
>
>Reflecting this, the Bogota exchange fell 0.24% , as investors sold
>stock to buy dollars.
>
>Traders consulted in Bogota said that the markets remain relatively calm
>and are awaiting the inflow of funds from the multilateral loans that
>will now be used to finance the budget deficit. Traders are also
>optimistic that the sale of Carbocol-the state coal marketing
>company-will go ahead without difficulty at the end of this month. The
>government is expecting to receive at least $ 500 million from
>Carbocol's sale.
>
>        Copyright 2000 U.P.I.
>
>  ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Jane's Defence Weekly, Mon, 18 Sep 2000
>Clinton's Drug War Pledge Raises 'Vietnamisation' Fears
>
>LATE in August, President Bill Clinton made a one-day visit to
>Cartagena in Colombia to pledge political and financial support for
>that country's anti-drug effort. The agreed $1.3 billion in military
>aid is limited to the drug fight and not directed toward ending the
>Colombian government's decades-long battle with rebel groups.  Clinton
>said: "This is not Vietnam, nor is it Yankee imperialism."
>
>He was reacting to critics at home and in and around Colombia  who fear
>the consequences of a growing fight to stop the  Colombian drug
>traffickers, who supply 90 per cent of the cocaine  and most of the
>heroin that enters the United States.
>
>American intelligence estimates say that Colombia produced 520  metric
>tons of cocaine last year, three times what the CIA had  previously
>calculated, and its opium-poppy cultivation jumped 23  per cent in 1999.
>
>Clinton said the US was helping Colombia with its $7.5 billion
>five-year programme to destroy much of its drug crop, root out
>traffickers, and rebuild its judiciary and other government  operations.
>A proportion of the funding is also coming from  Europe and
>international agencies.
>
>He said continued support would require the government in the  capital
>Bogota to break its ties with paramilitary groups and  adhere to strict
>human rights standards.
>
>Clinton also urged Colombia's neighbours to stand by it in its  struggle
>against the drug trade, even if they suffer from an  overflow of
>refugees, coca growers and guerrillas. Some of those  neighbours are
>worried about the American attack helicopters,  including 18 modern
>Blackhawks.
>
>Guaranteed revenue Colombian president Andres Pastrana is  trying to
>promote economic recovery, enhance national security,  make peace and
>strengthen institutions of both the state and civil  society in a
>country where a 50-year insurgency has grown  remarkably in recent days,
>amid depression and the mushrooming  narco-traffic. The largest and
>oldest Marxist insurgency group,  the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
>Colombia (FARC), enjoys  guaranteed revenue by protecting and taxing the
>narcotics  industry. A smaller group, the National Liberation Army
>(ELN),  funds operations by kidnapping people for ransom.
>
>FARC is the most powerful guerrilla group in Latin America. It  has
>17,000 members and is dedicated to the violent overthrow of  Pastrana's
>government and is now openly defying the US. FARC  leaders say they will
>continue to use money from illicit drugs to  finance their escalating
>war. They claim that, given the steady  build-up of US military might in
>Colombia, it is only a matter of  time before they train their gunsights
>on US troops.
>
>Andres Paris, spokesman for the FARC leadership, said: "This
>confrontation is inevitable, but we are making efforts to  avoid it."
>
>In August, to coincide with approval in Washington of the aid  package
>for Colombia, the FARC staged high-profile attacks on  towns across the
>country. These defy a peace process that has  yielded only limited
>progress since Pastrana initiated it 19  months ago.
>
>While in Colombia, Clinton did his best to dispel the notion that  the
>US is about to slip into the morass of another jungle war such  as El
>Salvador, or worse, Vietnam. But the fact is that half of  Colombia's
>territory is now controlled by the Marxist guerrillas  in league with
>coca growers and drug traffickers.
>
>Guerilla mode Critics say drugs are so lucrative that they cannot  be
>easily separated from a tangle of risks that will face any  growing
>American involvement in Colombia.
>
>James Jones, who served from 1997 to 1999 as a regional adviser  to the
>United Nations International Drug Control Programme in  Colombia, Peru
>and Bolivia, said: "US officials are disingenuous  when they say we are
>fighting drugs, not insurgents. The  distinction is illusory. There is
>only one battlefield. The aid  will not only ratchet up the violence, it
>may well derail the  ongoing peace process.
>
>"The aid package, with its helicopters and improved surveillance, is
>more likely to push FARC into its guerrilla mode than to bring it to
>the peace table. It could also inspire the rebels to launch an urban
>campaign of sabotage and assassination. If so, right-wing militias
>would probably retaliate with increased assaults on the civilian  rural
>population that they think supports the FARC. An already dirty  war
>could get a whole lot dirtier."
>
>Ralph Peters, a retired US Army officer, believes the US is setting  a
>trap for itself. He said: "The Clinton administration's proposed
>security aid is a substitute for strategy. Our policy is essentially  to
>send a cheque and cross our fingers. There is no evidence that  the
>White House and the Pentagon have engaged in conceptual  thinking about
>Colombia and the troubled region around it. As with  the former
>Yugoslavia, US civilian and military leaders are declining  to think the
>problem through, fearing what serious analysis might  reveal."
>
>He went on: "The lesson of Vietnam is that no amount of US  largess or
>American might can save a government unable to save  itself."
>
>Human rights Some observers fear that the likeliest outcome in  Colombia
>is stalemate - complete with corrupt officials, black  marketeers,
>narco-traffickers and the broad assortment of  questionable elements who
>profit from disorder. The unwanted  result of US aid, it is feared,
>could be to strengthen the current  system just enough to preserve all
>of its worst characteristics.
>
>Human rights, religious and union groups have sharply criticised  the
>Colombian military's human rights performance and announced  their
>disapproval of the aid package, in that it includes nothing to  combat
>right-wing paramilitary groups. These, they claim, are allied  with the
>military and are also heavily involved in drugs trafficking  and
>wide-ranging atrocities against civilians.
>
>The Colombian president is not popular. Unemployment stands at  20 per
>cent and the country is enduring its worst recession in 70  years.
>According to a Human Rights Watch report in February, the  Colombian
>army is still fighting guerrillas and Clinton aides have  privately
>admitted that it will be impossible to separate the two  in future
>battles.
>
>The most important support the guerrillas have, say most analysts,  is a
>ready source of funds from drug protection money estimated  at several
>hundred million dollars a year. That is enough to keep  them well
>equipped, well fed, and unenthusiastic about making  peace.
>
>Critics of the aid package say it is designed in Washington to  meet
>domestic US concerns and has little relevance to what is  happening in
>Colombia.
>
>"There is no way to sustain the distinction between drug  traffickers
>and guerrillas in southern Colombia," according to Bruce  Bagley, a
>professor of international studies at the University of  Miami. "US
>policy will break down on the first day," he said.
>
>But Colombian officials disagree. They say the plan will ultimately
>destroy the guerrillas' capacity to make war. General Fernando  Tapias,
>commander of the armed forces, said: "It's not a matter of  Marxist
>philosophy anymore; the guerrillas are now in the fight for  the money.
>The plan for peace will not work without a decisive  fight against
>drugs."
>
>Disastrous consequences Those pushing for a strong US  programme assert
>that failing to counter insurgencies and curb the  drug trade now will
>lead to Colombia's collapse, with disastrous  consequences for the
>stability of its neighbours, the cause of  Latin American democracy, and
>the control of drugs.
>
>The White House argues that the Pastrana administration has done  more
>than its predecessors to seek a peaceful settlement with  insurgent
>groups, to clean up the armed forces and police, and to  strengthen
>civilian authority.
>
>Professor Abraham Lowenthal, of the University of Southern  California,
>said: "The strongest case for approving the requested  Colombian
>appropriation rests on the argument that there are some  real, if
>limited, prospects that the Pastrana government could  modestly advance
>its approach if it had US assistance.
>
>"The fact that the US has the resources does not mean it has the  right
>answers. Washington should make security and economic  assistance
>available while focusing on how to minimise the risks  of more direct US
>military involvement," he said.
>
>The day after Clinton's visits to Cartegena, an unprecedented  meeting
>of South American presidents took place in Brazil. The  leaders
>expressed their deep concerns about the possible  'Vietnamisation' of
>Colombia's civil war and how it might affect  them.
>
>Neighbours Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela have grown  increasingly
>vocal in expressing worries that they will become  victims of spillover
>from the Colombian government's efforts to  cripple rebel forces. They
>are shoring up their borders against  refugees and rebels seeking safe
>haven, saying they do not want  to become new centres of drug
>trafficking and production.
>
>Already there have been reports of guerrilla incursions into  Venezuela,
>Panama and Ecuador, as well as sightings of coca and  poppy plantations
>in Peru operated by Colombians.
>
>But at the summit their rhetoric softened and they agreed to send
>Colombia a message of solidarity.


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