>From: "John Catalinotto" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: "Yugoslavia in crisis--reports and analysis" from IAC >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > >Yugoslavia in Crisis--reports and analyses > >Dear Friends > >In light of the grave events in Belgrade Oct. 5, 2000 and >the threat of a complete U.S.-NATO takeover of Yugoslavia, >the International Action Center has decided to set up a new >section on its web site called "Yugoslavia in >Crisis--reports and analyses." Here we will reproduce some >of the reports and analyses from sources independent of the >corporate media, both organizationally and ideologically. >Where possible this will include reports from Yugoslavia >written by honest journalists who have proven themselves >opposed to the NATO bombing campaign and war of 1999. > > The articles include reports from Michel Collon, author of >two books on the Balkan crisis and a resolute anti-war and >anti-NATO activist, Ruediger Goebel, an editor and >correspondent from the German progressive daily newspaper, >Junge Welt, who was in Yugoslavia during the NATO bombing >campaign writing daily articles, and Tanja Djurovic, a Junge >Welt correspondent from Belgrade. We will also publish IAC >analyses and those from other non-corporate sources. > >Where we receive articles not in English, we will include >the original language as well as our English translation. > >You can find this material at www.iacenter.org on the home >page under the above title. For your information, we include >some sample reports from the correspondents. > >Yours in struggle, >Sara Flounders and John Catalinotto >October 9, 2000 > > > BELGRADE JOURNAL - Friday October 6, 3 p.m. > >Michel Collon > > > >The 8 questions of the day > > I shall try to answer the 8 questions that sum up the >events : 1. Did the TV show all ? 2. Did we experience a >well-prepared coup-d'Etat ? 3. What is the U.S. trying to >accomplish in the current situation ? 4. Did people vote for >Kostunica or against Milosevic ? 5. Why did those in power >not forsee their electoral setback ? 6. Were the elections >truly free and fair ? 7. Are those people who support >Kostunica also for the United States ? 8. What is going to >happen ? > >1. Did the TV show all ? Nothing to add to the images >presented by BBC and CNN. In effect there was an enormous >crowd, the police put up a very weak resistance and above >all looked for ways to avoid serious confrontations. But >what I didn't see exposed on the Western networks was the >plundering of the headquarters of the Socialist Party (while >Kostunica had announced that there should be no >revenge-taking toward the parties), and the buildings of >various public enterprises. Neither was shown the broken >windows of a certain number of stores in the center, which >were subsequently looted. I personally saw demonstrators >leave center city by the bridge over the Sava, while >carrying on their shoulders stolen computers. In the center >also, those not demonstrating found it deplorable that >people were destroying public property : " We'll have to pay >for it. " But the most important thing is that the >opposition succeeded in bringing out an enormous >mobilization and that those in power were unable to oppose >it with a counter-mobilization. > >2. Carefully prepared coup d'Etat ? The demonstrators were >led by some hundreds of very active young people, most of >whom had come from Cacak, Kragujevac and other opposition >strongholds (Belgrade is luke-warm). You could say that they >proceeded methodically to take control of a series of key >places. First of all, the Parliament. Obviously a symbol. >Still one could notice that Mr. Kostunica, always presented >as a convinced legalist and constitutionalist, had taken >over the Parliament at the moment when that Parliament had >just been elected and that the opposition was not >challenging the results of the parliamentary elections. What >does the USA want ? We shall soon see. Next, the television >station RTS. Just like in Romania in 1989 and in each coup >d'Etat, to take over the big media centers and deprive the >enemy of the right of response seems to have become >Objective Number 1. The other media centers and certain >buildings of public enterprises followed. > > This systematic and well-planned character of the action >reminded one that the real chief of the opposition, Zoran >Djindjic, had declared several months ago to Greek TV that >if they failed to win the elections, they would take over >parliament. This was nothing new. In 1993 in Moscow, Yeltsin >- backed by the U.S. - had burned down Parliament [the >Russian Duma] and killed a number of deputies that had been >resisting him. Another opposition leader, Mrs. Pesic, had >raised the need to " create a Bucharest syndrome. " These >things were prepared long in advance. > >3. Why is the U.S. still pushing for a test of strength ? >Why this attempt at a total confrontation ? Why do they >refuse all negociated compromise that would permit them to >avoid the risk of a bloodbath ? Because they know that the >opposition that they are about to lead to power suffers two >serious weaknesses that could be fatal to it, and without >needed to wait long years for these weaknesses to show. What >are these weaknesses ? > >First, the DOS coalition is completely heterogenous. >Nineteen (18 ?) parties that have nothing in common but the >will to take power and a taste for dollars from Washington. >In this coalition you can find people who have fought each >other more or less to the death for years (Djindjic had >pushed out Kostunica and many others), monarchists and >republicans, Serbian nationalists and separatists (from >Sandjak and Vojvodinje) whose programs are diametrically >opposed. Once in office, it is clear they will once again >begin making the gravest splits and conflicts of interests. >It will be absolutely impossible to carry out the programs >of all the parties. The magic of " Unity behind Kostunica " >won't last long. > >In addition, and this is the second factor, the DOS will >strongly disillusion its electors. Those voters, financially >and morally exhausted by 10 years of sanctions, desire to " >live normally, " (that's the idea that was most frequently >expressed to me by the demonstrators that I questioned on >October 5), that is to have a standard of living as close as >possible to that of the West. But, as we have already >explained in an earlier article, the opposition's G-17 >program forsees the liquidation of social protections and >the public enterprises, massive layoffs and carte blanche >for the multinational corporations to buy the enterprises >they are interested in and to more effectively exploit the >workers. A few people will live better, many will live >worse. > >With the result that, sooner or later, Kostunica will >disillusion his supporters and they will give up hope. Will >there be an alternative then ? Could the left parties and >those who defend the independence of the country return to >power (on the condition that they carry out certain >self-examinations, as we will see) as could be the case in >the next elections in three neighboring countries : >Macedonia, the Serb Republic in Bosnia and Romania ? It is >just to avoid this possibility of a legitimate return to >power in the next elections that the U.S. is trying so hard >to break the current governmental apparatus and that of the >left parties in Yugoslavia. > >In the last elections in Macedonia, the left candidate was >leading, but violent incidents grew to the point that the >leader of the left finally pulled back for fear of very >violent confrontations. We should point out that U.S. and >other troops occupy this country and there is no doubt their >intervention is aimed at stopping the left. We add that for >the West that claims it is so careful of legality, the >elections in Macedonia were " perfect. " > >4. Did people vote for Kostunica or against Milosevic ? The >latter answer is correct according to many people I spoke >with. Despite his 10 years in power, Milosevic had acquired >a great prestige during the war for firmly resisting NATO, >which is what corresponded to the will of all his people. >But the party in power wasted its opportunities by commiting >two major errors. > > First, it permitted, even favored the growth of social >inequalities. Yes, sanctions (embargo) are a crime the West >imposed that made the population suffer cruelly. But that >public had also seen certain outrageously large fortunes >grow up under its eyes. It is incorrect to claim, as the >Western media does, that " all the nomenklatura lives in >luxury. " I managed to visit the appartments of certain >mid-level ministry officials - they were just as modest as >those of the neighbors, in the socially constructed >buildings that had nothing of luxury about them. >Nevertheless, there were also scandalous life-styles of >those in business and in trafficking. To hold onto its >support, the regime would have to fight against the interest >of those with large fortunes and devote more effort to >social services to aid the poorest people. > >In addition, the communication strategy of the leadership as >well as the public media had not proven fruitful. A number >of jokes circulated about RTS television and messages from >the top leadership had lost their credibility when it was >constantly repeated that all was going well. > >5. Why didn't Milosevic see it coming ? How could it be that >Milosevic had decided to call these early elections himself >? And that, up to the last minute, the parties in power >showed themselves sure of winning, so much so that they were >taken completely aback when they had to " manage " their >defeat ? > >A certain bureaucratism is involved in the answer. You can >find among the officials and functionaries many very devoted >people, full of enthusiasm to defend their country. You also >find a certain number of bureaucrats who never tire of >looking for solutions to problems. And one has the very >clear impression that the reports that they send to the " >top " are of the sort : " All is very well, your grace. " >Those in power had not taken into consideration that they >had lost a great part of the popularity they had during the >war. They believed that the elections were in their pocket. >And their campaign strategy was not good : Milosevic absent, >the self-satisfied discourses on reconstrution that is real, >but also negating the social problem and a systematic >message of the sort that " all will be very well " that had >lost its credibility. > > 6. Were the elections truly free and fair ? Of course, this >attempt at an analysis of the weaknesses of the parties in >office removes nothing from what we have already shown. Yes, >the elections were not at all free and fair. When you >bombard a people, destroy their factories, their electricity >and heating plants, their roads and their bridges, when you >throw horrible weapons like fragmentation bombs and depleted >uranium at them, when you submit the population to a >disgusting extortion - " Vote for the pro-West parties or >you will continue to starve " -- when you spread hundreds of >millions of dollars to aid certain political parties to >deceive the people with the help of advisers specialized in >scientific methods of organizing campaigns based on lies, >they one has to conclude that if these elections are as free >and fair, then Jamie Shea [spokesperson for NATO during the >bombing campaign] is a sincere and objective person. > >7. Are those people who support Kostunica also for the >United States ? A argued with Kostunica's supports. It was >instructive. Since the opposition parties are financed - >grossly - by Washington, one could believe that Kostunica's >supporters were also partial to the United States. > >False. A proverb that the Serbs apply to themselves with a >sort of self-mocking, points this out : " If you have two >Serbs, you will have three opinions. " Many demonstrators >spontaneously told me " We are not NATO. " A hairdresser of >French origin, having recognized me in the street (following >my television appearances), came spontaneously to let me >know that he greatly appreciated my criticisms against NATO, >but that I had been wrong to put the opposition parties in >the same bag. " We here detest the Americans, we know very >well what they are and what their interests are. " > >" But we want no more of Milosevic. We want to live normally >without sanctions and like you others in the West. " Like >the unemployed and those on welfare in the West or like the >rich of the West ? Doesn't he realize that the Western >multinational corporations will not bring prosperity here >but a harsher exploitation ? No, this type of talk, for the >moment, they don't want to hear : " You could be right, but >we have to try it, we want change, change ! And if these new >leaders don't keep their promises, we will change again ! " >That though is a grand illusion, to believe that NATO will >permit a " step back. " But that is the current mood. > >Another element to take notice of is that the DOS election >campaign strategy succeeded in promoting a strange but >effective idea : Milosevic was in fact a tool of the United >States - he served them and helped maintain their influence. >That idea doesn't hold up - why would the U.S. do everything >it could to eliminate the one that served them so well - but >certain people bought it anyway. Indeed, it was a classic >method of advertising : those who steal, cry " Stop, thief. >" Those who are paid by the [north] Americans, seem to by >crying " Down with the United States ! " > >8. Que va-t-il se passer? Cette apres-midi, une vie plus ou >moins normale a repris dans les rues, encore que les >commerces restent fermes. Mais l'opposition veut maintenir >ses troupes dans le centre, pour eviter toute intervention >policiere de reprise en mains. Elle annonce une mobilisation >plus importante encore. D'une part, l'opposition DOS cherche >a conclure une alliance au parlement en faisant eclater le >parti montenegrin de Bulatovic et en y trouvant les voix qui >leur manquent pour acquerir la majorite. On peut etre >certain que les dollars de Washington servent d'appat. De >l'autre cote, le gouvernement cherche la parade sans l'avoir >trouve. Il affirme ne pas vouloir lancer l'arm�e pour eviter >un bain de sang, il demande que la l�galit� soit respectee. >Il s'efforce de retrouver un m�dia qui lui permette de faire >passer son message. Mais sa strat�gie de communication >s'avere toujours aussi lente et chaotique. On attend en vain >une prise de position officielle. Ilosevic pourrait >prononcer un discours... On attend. A bientot! > >8. What will happen ? This afternoon [Oct. 6], a >more-or-less normal life returned to the streets, although >the shops remained closed. But the opposition wants to keep >its troops in the center to avoid all possible police >intervention to retake it. It announced an even larger >mobilization. On the one hand, the DOS opposition is looking >to conclude a parliamentary alliance by splitting up >Bulatovic's Montenegrin party and finding there teh votes >that they lack to obtain a majority. One can be certain that >Washington's dollars will serve as bait. On the other hand, >the government is looking for a path of action without >finding it. It affirms it doesn't want to call out the army >because it wants to avoid a bloodbath, and demands that >legality be respected. It tries to find a media that will >allow it to spread its message. But its strategy of >communication is still slow and chaotic. One waits in vain >for an official position. Milosevic could be making a speech >� one waits. Soon. > > > > NATO is getting ready to pick up the harvest. By Tanja >Djurovic, Belgrade > >"I've just received information from official sources that >Vojislav Kostunica won the elections. I congratulate Mr. >Kostunica on his election victory...", said recent Yugoslav >president Slobodan Milosevic in his address to the nation >broadcast on Yu-Info TV channel on Friday (Oct. 6), >admitting defeat in the presidential elections by his >opponent Vojislav Kostunica, candidate of Democratic >opposition of Serbia (DOS). > >"I personally intend to take a short break, to spend more >time with my family, and then, afterwards, to primarily >strengthen my party...Socialist party of Serbia will be a >very strong opposition" finished Milosevic his address >making it clear that he has no intention of fleeing the >country, or leaving political life. > >This seems to be the epilogue of election crisis in >Yugoslavia and two-week long fight between Milosevic and >Kostunica for presidency of FRY, which culminated on >Thursday in Belgrade with mass and violent protests >orchestrated by DOS. > >Vojislav Kostunica made his oath on Saturday night in >Belgrade "Sava Center", by which he officially became new >president of Yugoslavia. On the joint constitutive sessions >of both chambers of Federal Parliament, Kostunica bounded >himself to "respect and implement the Constitution of FRY >and federal laws, to preserve the sovereignty, independence >and integrity of FRY..." > >Earlier in the night, both chambers of the Yugoslav >Parliament were constituted for the new session. The Chamber >of Citizens verified 119 out of 138 deputy mandates, and >Chamber of Republics 39 out of 40 mandates. > >In both chambers of the Federal Parliament the >representatives of Milosevic's left coalition have the >majority. This was clear from the start, and even DOS >representatives agreed to it. > >Still, Milosevic's obvious presence in Yugoslav capital and >appearance on TV, putting the end to rumors and wild guesses >as to his whereabouts and intentions, came as a shock to DOS >leaders and their supporters, who had been convinced that >ex-Yugoslav president had long since left Belgrade, if not >indeed the country. That, coupled with the fact that a >leftist government might be formed soon, is casting a shadow >on DOS's present advantage. > >Zoran Djindjic, DOS campaign manager, gave a statement to >the press immediately after Milosevic's address on Friday, >saying that Slobodan Milosevic is just preparing a blow from >the back and intends to consolidate the police forces, so he >could come back on scene as a tough hand. Obviously afraid >that someone or something can still endanger their >"democratic revolution", Djindjic finished rather >paranoically: "I do not trust Milosevic!" > >Still, if Milosevic is not to be trusted, why not accept the >assurances and congratulations offered to Kostunica by >thehighest representatives of the army and police? It seems >that DOS's fear of one man and his presence is so great, >that not even the fact that those institutions didn't react >during Thursday's vandalistic demonstrations can reassure >the Serbian opposition. > >Perhaps the DOS is simply being aware of its own fragility: >from the very beginning, it has been highly dependent on >foreign support and money. This ad hoc alliance of some 18 >parties has only one common ground and program - to oust >Milosevic. > >Not to forget that the DOS candidate, newly-proclaimed FRY >president Kostunica, is a leader of a small party with low >support from the people, and a man of low significance. The >person running the show for this particular puppet on a >string is Zoran Djindjic, who in his own turn is a puppet of >the administration in Washington. > >Not to forget that over 2 million Yugoslav citizens voted >against Kostunica precisely for the above mentioned reasons, >knowing who the powers behind DOS are and not wanting to be >a part of "Pax Americana". > >"Slobodan Milosevic had very little or no chance at all" >said Petar Raskov (70), a Federal court judge on pension, >underlining that pressure exercised on Serbia, of power, >money and media combined, was too heavy for Serbian people >not to yield. "Milosevic was the only man to preserve the >FRY resistance to NATO's "Drang nach Osten" (Push to the >East) strategy. I couldn't vote for NATO, not even if it >puts on a disguise of Serbian nationalist with anti-American >policy". > >As for those who did - a gun at man's temple can be a good >incentive, and endlessly repeated "international community" >treats to Serbian people that as long as Milosevic is >Yugoslav president, sanctions against their country won't be >lifted, obviously influenced the ultimate decision, >especially with the young people. > >"I didn't vote for Kostunica, he is nobody!" says Milan >Ristic (24), a student from Belgrade. "But his victory might >bring better days for Yugoslavia. I voted against Milosevic, >because the whole world was against him!" > >Therefore, after plowing Yugoslav land with bombs and >missiles in Spring of 1999, after fertilizing it for over a >year with media-launched lies and money, Military Alliance >of the West is getting ready to pick up the harvest. > >END > > _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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