Dear All,
This would add to the problem of space militarization in terms of tests on the
Central Coast. -sheila
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
Point Mugu Sea Range EIS
Att: Ms. Gina Smith, Code 8G0000E
521 9th Street
Point Mugu, CA 93042-5001
Fax (805) 989-0143
Dear Sir/Madam:
I am writing to comment certain aspects of the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement on the NAWCWPNS Point Mugu
Sea Range expansion. The U.S. Navy is proposing to expand present Point Mugu
test and training range operations to
accommodate Theater Misssile Defense (TMD) testing and training. At present
there is no specific commitment to
conduct TMD testing in the Point Mugu range, but it is expected that such
testing will be conducted in the future.
TMD is a "family of systems" of atmospheric and exo-atmospheric defensive
missile programs, involving all services
within the Department of Defense as well as several foreign countries. TMD
systems are mobile rather than fixed and
are designed for rapid deplyment anywhere in the world. Different types of TMD
are designed for varying distances
and altitudes. The total cost of the TMD program is an estimated $47.3 billion.
The U.S. Navy is proposing that four types of TMD testing and training be
conducted at Point Mugu:
nearshore intercept events (under 1,000 ft.)
boost phase intercept (1-50,000 ft.)
lower tier (50-100,000 ft.)
upper tier (over 100,000 ft.)
Evidently, these four types of test and training cover the entire range of
altitudes from below 1,000 feet to over
100,000 feet. The Navy is proposing a total of twenty test and training events
per year at Point Mugu.
The Point Mugu expansion EIS is quite comprehensive in its coverage of
significant environmental aspects, but omits
two major areas of concern to citizens.
a.The EIS does not address the TMD program in the context of the DOD's global
organization; in particular, there
is only passing mention of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, a
DoD unit whose "highest priority" is the
Theater Missile Defense (TMD). On the BMDO, see
http://www.acq.OSD.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/; on TMD in
particular, see http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/tmd.htm. Besides
TMD, BMDO has two other
programs: National Missile Defense (NMD) and advanced ballistic missile
defense technologies. The TMD
program, in turn, has several divisions:
Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD): the Army upper-tier
program; THAAD "addresses
critical warfighter requirements to intercept longer-range theater-class
ballistic missiles at high altitudes and
further downrange from the intended target".
Navy Theater Wide Defense: the Navy upper-tier system, also building on the
AEGIS weapon system and
STANDARD missiles. The upper-tier Navy Theater Wide system "will further
modify the missile for ascent,
midcourse, and descent phase exoatmospheric intercepts. In addition, BMDO
will work with the Navy to modify
the AEGIS Weapon System to support the increased battlespace required for
the improved, longer range
interceptor."
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3): lower-tier, Army, builds on the
Patriot missiles systems used
extensively in the Gulf War; on the Patriot TMD, see
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/patriot.htm
Navy Area Defense: lower-tier, Navy; entails modifications to AEGIS and
Standard missiles (modified
Standard Missile II, Block IV).
Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS): lower tier, Army and Marine
Corps; cost-sharing with
the governments of Germany and Italy.
A Cato Institute study has proposed that half of these systems, and most of the
TMD budget, is unnecessary:
Theater High-Altitude Area Defense is intended to be a
forward-deployed, ground-based, wide-area defense system
designed primarily to protect allies and other friendly nations.
Medium Extended Air Defense System--a mobile defense for
ground forces--is plagued with fiscal uncertainty. The Airborne
Laser--a system designed to attack missiles just after launch--is
fraught with technical uncertainty. Eliminating those systems
would save an estimated $30 billion.
While the Cato Institute study favors the Navy systems, part of the rationale
for
expanding the Point Mugu Sea Range operations concerns Army Air Defense
and BMDO operations generally (p. 1-3). These considerations are, germane to
the No Action and to the Minimum Components alternatives (p. 2-20, 2-21).
This, in a wider context of failed tests of TMD systems� not unlike the
experience with National Missile Defense.
It is actually rather stunning to contemplate, but there is simply
no
precedent in the annals of Pentagon waste for a program
consuming over fifty billion dollars over fifteen years and
producing not a single workable weapon. At least the forty billion
dollars spent on the Stealth bomber produced 21 planes, and
aircraft carriers are selling for a measly four billion. All this
missile
defense money has produced a grand total of fourteen actual
attempts to intercept strategic missile targets since 1982, of which
only two have actually succeeded, with the most recent nine tests
failing. These experimental results closely match the actual combat
experience of Patriot in Desert Storm -- which was impressive on
television but was later determined to have missed far more often
than it hit. Clearly, we are nowhere close to having a reliable
shield against missiles aimed at American cities, though not for
want of trying.
Contrary to what the EIS might suggest, TMD deployment in Point Mugu is quite
imminent, partly because of competition with the Army's ground-based,
high-tier Theater High Altitude Area Defense System (which has had repeated
flight test failures). On February 1999, the Navy announced that it was speeding
up its own high-tier project, Theater Missile Defense, with significantly
increased
funding.
Headquarters for the TMD Testing Team are at Eglin AFB, in Florida.
The TMD team includes Air Force, Army, and Navy, along with the Federal Aviation
Administration, Department of
Interior, and U.S. Coast Guard are Cooperating Agencies. The lead agency is the
Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization (BMDO). Only the actual execution of tests at the Eglin Gulf Range
are conducted under Eglin's Air
Force Development Test Center (AFDTC). In this regard, it is unclear why BMDO is
an absent party to the
Point Mugu EIS/OEIS.
a.The EIS describes the proposed test and training activities as if they were
an exclusively military operation. In
fact, the testing of the TMD components is part of the production process
of major corporate military
contractors who stand to earn hundreds of millions --if not billions--of
dollars from the sale of TMD components
to the U.S. Navy, to other branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, and to
foreign governments. In the interest of
adequate disclosure, central to the EIS process, the EIS should contain the
names of the contractors whose TMD
products will foreseeably be tested in the Point Mugu Sea Range. The
public-opinion process requires all
information that bears on the less visible reasons for the production --and
testing-- of proposed weapons
systems, and particularly the profit considerations at stake. As the
Washington Post noted, "War may be hell, but
in Washington, it's also a lobbying opportunity."
The corporations in question are manufacturers of missiles, radar systems, and
other equipment for nearshore
intercept, boost phase, and lower and upper tier TMD. This would seem to a
wild-goose hunt until one realizes that,
essentially, only two corporations are involved: Lockheed Martin and,
particularly, Raytheon Systems Corporation.
Theater High Altitude Area Defense System: the prime contractor for the
Army's THAAD system is
Lockheed Martin. Estimated cost: $14.5 billion.
Navy Theater Wide Defense is centered on the AEGIS air and missile defense
radar and on the Standard
missiles (modified Standard Missile 2 Block IV). Both are manufactured by
Raytheon (Standard missiles unit
cost, $409,000). On the Standard missile, see
http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/missiles/wep-stnd.html
PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) is centered on Patriot missiles;
Raytheon is the prime
contractor for PAC-2 Patriot Missiles, and Lockheed Martin is currently
developing PAC-3's.
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/patriot.htm
Navy Area Defense relies on AEGIS systems and Standard missiles
Raytheon (1999 revenues: $19.8 billion) also manufactures the HAWK (Homing All
the Way Killer) missiles. HAWKs
are currently being upgraded for TMD tasking, reaching deep into the upper tier
and up to 500,000 ft. HAWKs have
been the US Marine Corps' primary air defense since the 1960s. Raytheon sells
HAWK missiles for $250,000 each; $15
million per fire unit, and $30 million per battery.
Raytheon also operates a number of U.S. armed forces weapons ranges. Its
Training Services holds management and
operations responsibilities at the Army's Kwajelein Missile Range, one of the
two launching sites for the July 2000
NMD test. Raytheon also manages and operates the Navy's Atlantic Undersea Test
and Evaluation Center (AUTEC)
(8-year, $235 million contract). Raytheon is already privatizing Navy bases: the
company was selected by the U.S.
Navy to privatize the Naval Air Warfare Center in Indianapolis, the largest
Department of Defense privatization
initiative to date.
Regarding Lockheed Martin (larger than Raytheon, though less important in Navy
contracting) the Arms Trade
Resource Center recently reported:
Lockheed Martin is the nation's (and the world's) largest weapons
manufacturer. The company received
over $18 billion in U.S. government contracts in F.Y. 1999,
including $12.6 billion from the Pentagon
and more than $2 billion from the Department of Energy for nuclear
weapons-related activities. To put
this in some perspective, it should be noted that ONE COMPANY --
Lockheed Martin-- receives more
federal funding each year than the ENTIRE BUDGET for the nation's
largest welfare program, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families, which is meant to help tens of
millions of Americans living in poverty.
Both Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, as they stand today, are much larger than
they were a decade ago. Much of their
growth is the result of Pentagon- subsidized mergers.
Lockheed Martin has made over $1.6 million in Political Action
Committee (PAC) contributions since
1997, plus another $500,000 in soft money contributions to
Democratic and Republican party
committees. Surprisingly, the company's political spending has
favored Republican candidates by almost
a two-to-one margin, 66% to 34%. The company also spent $10.2
million on lobbying during 1997 and
1998, second only to Boeing among military/aerospace firms (Boeing
spent $18.4 million on lobbying in
1997/98).
Moreover, on Lockheed's specifc relationship with the TMD and NMD programs:
Lockheed Martin is in the unique position of deriving a double
benefit from the current push to deploy a
National Missile Defense system. For 1998/1999, Lockheed Martin
ranks second to Boeing in total missile
defense contracts with a total of $617 million in contracts.
Lockheed Martin's major missile defense
contracts include the Payload Launch Vehicle for the National
Missile Defense interceptor system; the
Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) "High" component, which is
supposed to improve the tracking of
incoming ballistic missiles; the Theater High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system, a medium
range ballistic missile defense system which recently yielded
Lockheed Martin a $4 billion long-term
contract from the Pentagon; the Airborne Laser (ABL) --in a
partnership with Raytheon and Boeing-- an
aircraft-based laser system that is designed to achieve the
capability for destroying medium-range
missiles as they leave their silos; the Navy Theater Wide system,
which is based in part on Lockheed
Martin's AEGIS anti-tactical missile system, which is produced at
the company's Moorestown, New Jersey
facility; and the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS), the
major U.S.-European missile
defense system which is being produced by Lockheed Martin in
partnership with Alenia of Italy and
Daimler Chrysler Aerospace of Germany.
These are the less visible actors, and less tangible forces, in the Point Mugu
expansion project. I trust that my
comments will be of some value during the EIS review process.
Yours,
Juan Giusti-Cordero
Associate Professor
History Department
College of the Humanities
University of Puerto Rico
San Juan PR 00926
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