>Zagir Gusseinov, a resident of the Khasavyurt region of Dagestan, who had
>served three jail terms and was "an active Wahhabite". (Apparently common
>wisdom holds that anyone who is deranged is automatically a Wahhabite, since
>the reverse is clearly the case).
>
>The Israeli authorities were quick to announce that the hijacker was an
>Islamic militant from Chechnya who had re-routed the plane to the Middle
>East as a demonstration of support for the Palestinian uprising. Israeli TV
>claimed that the Chechens had dubbed the operation "Al-Aha" after a mosque
>of the same name in Jerusalem.
>
>Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, chief of the Israeli general
>staff, took personal charge of the operation and Prime Minister Ehud Barak
>turned back from a trip to Washington as fears grew that the drama might
>turn into a re-enactment of the 1972 anti-terrorist operation in Ben Gurion
>airport. The operation, incidentally, was headed by Barak personally, with
>the future premier, Binyamin Netanyahu, among the commandos.
>
>However, the suspense soon turned to disappointment as the hijacker
>surrendered and made just one demand - to hold a press conference. Press
>reports still fail to agree as to what Amirkhanov used as a fake bomb - a
>blood pressure gauge or a rolled-up bandage. But there is still more
>confusion over why the Chechen Wahhabite theory enjoyed such wide exposure
>in the Russian and Israeli press.
>
>With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still raging, the Israelis - to quote
>Daniel Pipes, director of the Middle East Forum in Philadelphia - "are in
>retreat". Both the nation's leaders and its people are desperate for some
>spectacular success to boost flagging morale.
>
>At the same time, Israel seems increasingly eager to strengthen its ties
>with Russia by emphasising the "Islamic threat" which faces both countries
>(see article by Mikhail Ivanov in CRS No. 54). And, while President Vladimir
>Putin tried to play down the incident, commenting, "It's a shame that crazy
>people drive the world crazy", Barak himself responded, "We should be
>prepared for similar threats and join forces in international efforts to
>combat terrorism."
>
>Of course, these are commendable sentiments - and it seems that Israel is
>not the only nation eager to help solve Russia's Chechen problems. On
>November 14, Polish secret service agents arrested a gang of five Chechens
>and announced that one of the suspects was implicated in August's bomb
>attack on Pushkinskaya Square. The claims astonished the Moscow team
>investigating the bombing and Kommersant daily quoted the officers as
>saying, "Well, send him to Moscow and we'll sort it out here". Apparently,
>the Polish authorities are equally keen to improve relations with the
>Kremlin by chasing the Wahhabite phantom.
>
>But, all this said, it is vitally important to keep a cool head in the face
>of the much-vaunted Islamic threat and to recognise that such a blaze of
>publicity can ultimately serve the Wahhabites' own political goals. Worse
>still, it could encourage genuine fundamentalists to follow suit and hijack
>other planes in a bid to further their cause.
>
>And, in the cold light of day, there are several aspects of last week's
>hijacking which raise a number of disturbing questions. Why were the four
>FSB operatives on board the Tupolev-154 (a fact confirmed by the head of the
>FSB in Dagestan, Vladimir Smirnov) unable to overpower the hijacker before
>he took control of the plane? And how is that a passenger with a criminal
>record and a history of mental problems was allowed to board a plane in an
>area which is supposedly the focus of a massive security operation?
>
>Perhaps the psychiatric examination will show that Amirkhanov is not quite
>as disturbed as his scribbled notes and erratic behaviour seem to indicate.
>After all, Platon Obukhov, the son of a high-ranking Russian diplomat, also
>pleaded insanity during his trial on spying charges. However, medical
>experts later declared Obukhov of sound mind and the court imposed a lengthy
>jail term.
>
>There is, however, one silver lining is this cloudy story. The passengers
>aboard the Tupolev-154 included a group of Dagestani soccer fans flying to
>Moscow to watch their team, Anzhi, play Torpedo in the bronze medal round of
>the national championship.
>
>Anzhi lost the match after Torpedo scored a penalty in the third minute of
>extra-time and won 2-1. Thus the Makhachkala fans stuck in the hijacked
>plane were spared the agony of watching the bronze medal slip through
>Anzhi's fingers. Of course, they're already arguing over the legitimacy of
>the penalty, but that is a different story altogether.
>
>Mikhail Ivanov is executive editor of Russian Life, a bimonthly magazine
>published by Russian Information Services, Inc.
>
>
>ABKHAZIA: GOD'S COUNTRY
>
>For years the darlings of the Soviet regime, the Abkhazians now face their
>greatest challenge: building a stable nation-state through hard work and
>personal sacrifice
>
>By Askerbi Minasharov in Sukhumi
>
>There is an ancient legend which the Abkhazians never tire of recounting.
>They say that, when God had created the earth, He allocated each tribe its
>ethnic homeland, according to the number of its people and the services they
>had rendered Him.
>
>The Abkhazian leader was the last to make an appearance and God asked,
>"Where were you when I was handing out the countries? I've got nothing left
>for you." The Abkhazian replied, "We had guests at our house, Lord, and we
>couldn't leave them without showing proper hospitality."
>
>As a reward for such generosity of spirit, God gave the Abkhazians the lands
>that he had set aside for himself.
>
>But this promising start has turned out to be more of a curse than a
>blessing. It was largely due to this abundance of natural beauty and
>legendary hospitality that, during the Communist period, the proportion of
>ethnic Abkhazians in the republic dropped from 80 per cent to just 17 per
>cent.
>
>Boasting one of the few sub-tropical climates in the former Soviet Union,
>Abkhazia became a major producer of tobacco, tea, citrus fruits and grapes.
>
>Most importantly, as the old joke goes, the Caucasus mountain ridge was so
>high that the shadow of Communism never really fell on Abkhazia. Instead, it
>become a destination of choice for the Soviet elite who built their heavily
>guarded dachas along the Black Sea coast.
>
>However, during the Stalinist era, a process of Georgianification was set in
>motion with the Georgian population of Abkhazia soaring from 10 per cent in
>the 1930s to 46 per cent by 1952. And, despite the moderating influences of
>Khrushchev and Brezhnev, a huge rift opened up between the Georgian and
>Abkhazian political elites.
>
>War broke out in 1992 and a series of Abkhazian victories, supported by
>Russian troops, forced 250,000 Georgians to flee either to Georgia or to
>southern Russia. The population of the republic was almost halved but only a
>third of those who remained were actually Abkhazian. Other major ethnic
>groups include Armenians, Russians and Megrelians (from the Galsky region,
>which borders on Georgia).
>
>Nevertheless, the Abkhazians are today effectively the masters of their own
>destiny. The republic enjoys de facto independence, and has all the
>attributes of a nation state, including an army, border forces and customs.
>
>Ten years ago, there was little to mark the border between Georgia into
>Russia. But today, the far bank of the Psou River is manned by cohorts of
>Russian border guards, typically puffed up with the vast importance of their
>work. When you cross to the opposite side, the border troops stage a truly
>Abkhazian welcome - full of warmth and greeting and yet politely insistent
>on the complex rules of local border etiquette.
>
>The trip from the border to Sukhumi is not without its problems - petrol is
>wildly expensive and trains are erratic. Still, with the average wage in
>Abkhazia eight times lower than in neighbouring Russia, a little money goes
>a long way. Even the Russian tourists feel like wealthy visitors to a
>benighted backwater.
>
>It is only recently that the Russians have started returning to their
>erstwhile tropical playground. The Black Sea resorts of Gagra, Pitsuna and
>Sukhumi were slow to recover from the war, when they were used as barracks
>for Abkhazian military units and volunteer brigades from
>Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Chechnya.
>
>But, to those who remember Sukhumi before the war, today it resembles a
>ghost town. In the old days, Georgians, Megrelians, Russians, Armenians and
>even Greeks met together and drank coffee in their cafes and restaurants.
>Now, the streets are poorly lit and overshadowed by unkempt eucalyptus, palm
>and chestnut trees. There are few cars and even fewer pedestrians.
>
>The city's bureaucracy begins work at around 10am and finishes at 11. Then
>most of the state workers slip away to a friend's wedding or a relative's
>funeral. Official duties come a poor second to the consuming passion for
>good company, good food and a bottle of Isabella.
>
>And, to be fair, there is little enough for them to do. Wallowing in its
>political limbo, Abkhazia pays taxes neither to Moscow nor to Tbilisi. The
>state budget is practically non-existent and the bureaucrats have nothing to
>allocate. The most profitable sectors of local industry - the import of
>energy resources and the export of wood - are presidential monopolies. The
>lion's share of this income is spent on the army and the police.
>
>Strangely enough, Abkhazia's rural communities have become the most
>prosperous in the republic. They can sell almost unlimited supplies of tea,
>tobacco and citrus fruits to the voracious Russian market.
>
>Meanwhile, the city people understand that the rebirth of the tourist and
>service industries is their only hope of salvation. And yet, typically
>fastidious, the Abkhazians among them find the prospect of working in this
>sector faintly distasteful - unless, of course, it is as a director or
>administrator.
>
>The Abkhazians have managed to outstrip their former Soviet comrades in many
>respects - there are more writers, scholars and mafia dons per capita than
>in any other former Soviet republic. They admire qualities of leadership and
>resourcefulness above all other things.
>
>But, once the darlings of the Soviet regime, the Abkhazians have an inbred
>loathing of discipline, officialdom or regimented labour. There are, for
>example, almost no ethnic Abkhazians in the local police force - the
>interior ministry, with the exception of the officer corps, is made up of
>Armenian volunteers. Unsurprisingly then, the idea of serving tourists is
>anathema to them.
>
>This innate snobbism lies at the root of today's economic problems. Caught
>between Georgia's open hostility and Russia's political machinations,
>Abkhazia is being forced to engineer its own national rebirth. But it finds
>itself in the position of a bankrupt aristocrat who, in order to restore his
>lost fortune, is obliged to swallow his pride and get his hands dirty.
>
>The transition process will undoubtedly be slow - but there are some signs
>of a change in attitude. Until recently, the coastal coffee shops were full
>of talk about how much better life was before the war, now people discuss
>plans for the future with a determined pragmatism.
>
>And, despite all their present hardships, the Abkhazians still enjoy two
>unique advantages - the stunning beauty of this coastal paradise and their
>special relationship with God, who once gave them this land.
>
>Askerbi Minasharov is an independent journalist based in Nalchik,
>Kabardino-Balkaria
>
>
>NALCHIK AUTHORITIES LAUNCH WAHHABI WITCH-HUNT
>
>Police say the Wahhabi religious cult is targeting young people in rural
>areas and promoting Chechnya as a spiritual Mecca
>
>By Musa Alibekov in Nalchik
>
>Regional leaders in Kabardino-Balkaria have called on teachers and parents
>across the republic to join in the fight against Wahhabism.
>
>At an emergency session of the Nalchik administration, top city officials
>unanimously condemned the purist branch of Islam which, they say, targets
>the young and the disaffected.
>
>The session was aimed at drawing up a list of countermeasures to combat the
>spread of Wahhabism in Kabardino-Balkaria and beyond.
>
>Ever since extremist fighters under Chechen warlord Shamil Basaev staged a
>shock incursion into Dagestan last September, Wahhabites have become Public
>Enemy Number One in the Caucasus. Many believe the fundamentalists are
>committed to destabilising the entire region in a bid to create a breakaway
>Islamic state.
>
>In his opening speech, Khazretali Berdov, head of the Nalchik city
>administration, stated, "Wahhabism in our republic is by no means a
>horrifying myth. The Wahhabites work according to a well established plan:
>first, they infiltrate existing religious organisations, then they spark off
>confrontation between traditional Muslims and extremist factions. Finally,
>they start shouting and screaming about the suppression of Islam in the
>Caucasus."
>
>Nalchik's public prosecutor, Anatoly Tkhagapsoev, said Wahhabi groups had
>been spreading subversive literature across the republic. These included a
>leaflet entitled "An Appeal to the Youth and Inhabitants of
>Kabardino-Balkaria" and a book, "The Law of the Jihad".
>
>He added, "Both works make references to the claim that there is a threat to
>Islam hanging over the entire North Caucasus and this threat must be
>resisted."
>
>Tkhagapsoev went on to say that police had identified a total of 382 Wahhabi
>activists in Kabardino-Balkaria, 167 of whom were based in Nalchik. The
>majority were aged between 25 and 30.
>
>The prosecutor accused the republic's Spiritual Islamic Leadership of being
>too "passive". "The leadership is not defending its own interests," said
>Tkhagapsoev. "It must pay more attention to its recruitment policies."
>
>Colonel Naurbi Zhamborov, police chief for the 3rd Department, said the
>Wahhabites were actively targeting youths and students in rural areas. He
>explained that, of the four mosques in his district, three were not
>registered with the justice ministry.
>
>Furthermore, said Colonel Zhamborov, an imam had visited a number of local
>schools, without the prior permission of the teachers, and had been seen
>urging the children to visit his mosque.
>
>At School No. 31 in Nalchik, Wahhabi information sheets had been posted on
>notice-boards and a schoolboy, Kirill Kolesnikov, had violently resisted
>attempts to take them down.
>
>Colonel Boris Attoev, deputy head of the Federal Security Service in
>Kabardino-Balkaria, said, "...in recent years, various centres have been
>promoting their extremist ideologies under the guise of religious revival or
>educational purposes. Their aim is to seize power in the North Caucasus and
>create a confederation of Islamic states."
>
>Attoev went on to say that many youngsters from rural areas had gone to
>Chechnya on the pretext of continuing their religious studies there. It was
>thought that at least 10 youths had never returned and their parents had no
>idea of their whereabouts or their activities.
>
>Shafig Pshikhachev, mufti of Kabardino-Balkaria, said one solution was to
>reestablish the Islamic Institute in Nalchik and stop young people leaving
>the republic in search of spiritual instruction.
>
>The Institute was closed down earlier this year after the local government
>claimed it was operating without a licence.
>
>Pshikhachev called on parents, religious leaders, schools and police to work
>together to protect young people from subversive elements within the
>spiritual community.
>
>Musa Alibekov is a regular contributor to IWPR
>
>********** VISIT IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net **************
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>IWPR's Caucasus Reporting Service provides the regional and international
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>The service forms part of IWPR's Caucasus Project based in Tbilisi and
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>Editor-in-chief: Anthony Borden. Managing Editor: Yigal Chazan; Assistant
>Editor: Alan Davis. Commissioning Editors: Giorgi Topouria in Tbilisi,
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>The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) is a London-based independent
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>Copyright (c) IWPR 2000
>
>IWPR'S CAUCASUS REPORTING SERVICE, NO. 58
>
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>
>{#} ----------------------------------------------------+[ crsenglish ]+---
>
>
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