>From: "ILC" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: Yugoslavia: Another battle was lost, but not the war >Date: Sun, 19 Nov 2000 23:41:40 +0100 : > >Following we publish a part of the evaluation of the fall of Milosevic by >the International Leninist Current (ILC). > >Another battle was lost, but not the war >Strategic considerations on the fall of Milosevic > >The full document can be retrieved under: >www.leninist-current.org/cgi-bin/ilc/news/viewnews.cgi?category=all&id=97467 >2983 > >Rise and fall of Milosevic > >While the growing nationalist tides threatened to break up the country the >central government in Belgrade was already taken hostage by the IMF that >ordered several structural adjustment programmes further increasing the >social discontent. > >As a reaction to this in Serbia the �anti-bureaucratic revolution� of >Milosevic set in. It consisted of three major announcements: a) It claimed >the Serb national interests first of all in Kosovo that had been dammed in >systematically by Titoist Yugoslavism. b) An attack on the power of the >central bureaucracy and the corrupted linked to it. This included the >transformation into a multi-partite system and the right of free political >opinion and organisation. c) The proclamation of the transformation to a >market economy while preserving a strong state sector including far-reaching >worker�s right and welfare system. > >In order to understand the return to Serb nationalism the role of Kosovo >must be touched that is perceived as the cradle of Serbdom. As already >mentioned Tito made increasing concessions to the Albanians of Kosovo that >led to a de-facto republic with a far-reaching Albanisation of >administration. As long as Yugoslavia had a prospective that could in a >certain sense be conceived as the realisation of the aims of Serb >nationalism, the Serb masses accepted it. However, as soon as the menace of >the dismantlement of Yugoslavia became acute, the Serb claim on Kosovo woke >up again � on a Kosovo which meanwhile has become predominantly Albanian. >The defence of the Serb interests in Kosovo that reached its first climax in >the reduction of the autonomy in 1989 which was a key factor of the mass >support for Milosevic. > >The majority of the Kosovo Albanians that in the 60s and 70s actually had >been won for Yugoslavia by the Titoist policy facing the Yugoslav >disintegration turned � led by Hoxhaist groups � first to the direction of >an own republic and following the fall of the Berlin wall and the collapse >of Hoxhaist Albania to pro-imperialist secessionism. The reasons for the >reactionary development among the Kosovo Albanians are various and >intertwined: The base is the failure of the Yugoslav model of economic >development that provided for a certain period of time significant progress >for the Albanians living in the poorest regions of the country but turned at >latest by the 80s into decay further increasing the differences to the rich >North. Furthermore there is the political cultural connection to the >backward and anti-communist North of Albania of the Ghegs (who were always >contrary to the Tosk South on that Hoxhaism was built) and the steady >illegal immigration from that region which contrary to Kosovo with its rich >soils offers only adverse living conditions. The political tradition of the >Albanians from the North and from Kosovo has been since the end of the >Ottoman empire consisting of the liaison with anti-Serb imperialism, first >of all with German fascism as it promised and actually realised the Albanian >claim to Kosovo. This tradition never had been fully overcome and once again >gained the majority in the 90s. > >Although the return of the Serb masses from Yugoslavism to Serb nationalism >doubtlessly reflects a step back, nevertheless they preserve an >anti-imperialist momentum. For already in the 80s it was obvious that the >restorationist forces would mainly operate with Croat and Slovene >nationalism that had kept the historically close link to German imperialism >and regarded Serbia as their main enemy. In Kosovo where the Albanian >national movement was led by Hoxhaists until the 80s its reactionary >character become obvious only with the fall of the Berlin wall and the >collapse of Albania. > >Retrospectively speaking the defence of Serb interests was not only >necessary against Croatia but also in Kosovo regarding the pro-imperialist >turn of the Albanian national movement. This include the change of the >status of autonomy that unchanged would have led to the secession of Kosovo >from Yugoslavia. Although the form in which it was carried out was not >appropriate as it eventually closed the door to the Kosovo Albanians. >However, it should be questioned that facing the annexationist position and >refusal of the Albanians to grant Serb rights (at least the territorial >integrity of Yugoslavia and equal rights for Serbs on all levels) there >could have been hardly a policy not leading to a clash. Actually the >historic chance for a compromise between Serbs and Albanians was already >lost in 1948 with the failure of the Balkan Federation. During Titoist >Yugoslavia the conflict was kept underground only to surface later with even >grater explosive power. > >The superseding of Yugoslavism by Serb nationalism was no linear process but >came about by several turns and experiences. (Actually still some elements >of Yugoslavism are to be encountered.) The social resistance of the working >class against the IMF programme still had a predominant all Yugoslav >character even though its centre was Serbia. > >The rise of Milosevic in his anti-bureaucratic revolution was not only due >to the national aspect but also his reference to the social and democratic >demands of the Serb masses. He campaigned against the privileges and the >corruption of the central bureaucracy, raised against their monopoly of >power, allowed political parties and free political expression and organised >for the first time free elections. As the popular masses did not dispose of >an independent leadership the progressive impulses could be channelled by >the newly ruling Serb bureaucracy in the direction of a restorative process, >that already by the 70s and 80s was far advanced in comparison with the >Soviet sphere of influence. Against the dirty bureaucracy the clean market >economy was set via which the bureaucracy enriched itself by privatisation >similar to how it tried to transform itself to a capitalist class in the >other Eastern European countries. Democracy was not conceived as the >intervention of the masses but channelled into forms of bourgeois >parliamentarism. > >Even if it is true that the Serb bureaucracy was supporting a capitalist >restoration process and that it tried to integrate itself into the >imperialist system while keeping Yugoslavia as a whole this was blocked for >following reasons: a) The federal state and first of al the army that were >products of a socialist revolution were expected to mount resistance against >capitalist restoration and actually did, had its deepest roots in Serbia >that therefore became the main enemy of imperialism. b) From the viewpoint >of imperialism national tensions and splits must be utilised at any cost in >order to weaken the non capitalist Yugoslavia. c) Using its historic links >to Croatia German imperialism in its triumphant euphoria of re-unification >advanced to the dismantling of Yugoslavia which the US had to follow if it >did not want to risk to see its world supremacy put into question. > >Facing the massive attacks of imperialism through is local agents Croatia, >Slovenia, the Bosnian Muslims and finally the Kosovo Albanians Milosevic was >forced to defend himself and Serbia against the aggression in order to >preserve the rule of the bureaucracy. He had to give in to the social >demands of the masses, had to soften or even to stop the IMF programmes and >to partially preserve the social gains of the Titoist period. National and >social elements were melt to an anti-imperialist defence. > >However, that was by no means a linear or consequent process let alone it >had revolutionary character. Whenever its seemed to be possible Milosevic >sought for a compromise with imperialism. This is true for the national >question: He hoped for a compromise with imperialism in exchange of giving >them the Serb-populated regions of East Slavonia, Krajina and Bosnia which >in Dayton even took the form a treaty. And this is also true for the social >question: Despite all softening he advanced the measures of capitalist >restoration like privatisations � all in vane. Imperialism continued its >aggression for it demanded the complete subjugation to the New World Order � >which neither the Milosevic regime nor the popular masses wanted and could >accept. > >For more than a decade Milosevic�s SPS was thus able to rally not only the >support of the majority of the population and first of all the peasants, >workers and the poorest layers including the national minorities like the >Romanies but also the bureaucratic elite, the red directors organised in JUL >that in the other countries were the first to join the ranks of imperialism. >Furthermore there was a cunning and changing policy of alliances with the >bourgeois Serb nationalist parties of Draskovic and Seselj that had to join >at least temporarily the defence against imperialism in order to keep their >nationalist profile. > >The bourgeois opposition that openly collaborated with the West and even >NATO and had tied their fate to them were therefore unable to take roots >among the masses. Its influence was limited to the mafia bourgeoisie and a >part of the intelligentsia. Again the escalation of the NATO war in spring >1999 unified once again the nation behind Milosevic and rendered the >attempts to overthrow him impossible. > >But ten years of economic decay have worn out the masses even though many >have grasped the connection with the sanctions and imperialist aggression. >The steady decrease of the living standard of the masses even if relatively >equally distributed among all layers and with social compensation for the >poorest was contrasted with the corruption and the enrichment of the elite >which paradigmatically was expressed in the personality of the son of >Milosevic, Marko. The social discontent that could not be calmed with any >future prospective combined itself with the rebellion against the >bureaucratic exercise of power, against a form of armoured democracy. > >Getting rid of the stigma of the alliance with imperialism and the fifth >column of NATO by choosing Kostunica as its candidate who raises on his part >the banner of Serb nationalism (with the agreement of imperialism) the >opposition was for then first time able not only to get the support of the >lowest layers of the people including the former core strata of the SPS, the >workers and peasants, but even to bring to the streets a strong mass >movement and to foment a strike movement in central sectors of industry that >finally forced Milosevic to resign. > >Beside the unfavourable international relationship of forces that did not >leave much room for other political options than military withdrawal and >economic decline the bureaucratic form of the anti-imperialist defence is >the main reason for the defeat. Following the main errors of the regime of >Milosevic: > >National defence against imperialism must be combined with a programme of >social justice for the popular masses, against the capitalist restoration >and the new bourgeoisie being linked to imperialism. But Milosevic neither >could nor wanted to do this since parts of the bureaucracy were about to >transform themselves into a capitalist class. It is nearly impossible to >attack the privileges and the corruption of the new bourgeoisie without >attacking those of the old bureaucracy. > >The masses must be mobilised and politically organised in order to lead the >struggle that eventually should bring them to power. Therefore they are not >to be lied to but they must be told the truth in order to give them the >possibility to judge the political situation and the relationship of forces >by themselves. Milosevic could not and did not want to go so far since this >had not only questioned his power but also the privileges of the >bureaucracy. > >The economy can only be revived by a decided planned control of the central >industries, the banks and the retail trade combined with the controlled >attempt to invite foreign capital preferably from friendly countries. >Therefore the initiative of the masses is necessary that the regime could >not and did not want to mobilise. > >Facing the secession of the other Yugoslav republics and their >transformation to instruments of imperialism the national defence of Serbia >was an imperative and the alliance with Serb nationalism indispensable. >However, a clear demarcation from bourgeois nationalism and first of all >from its doubtlessly existing chauvinist elements as well as the steady >repetition of the offer to the other nationalities of Yugoslavia and the >Balkans to join hands and to unify against imperialism was necessary � even >though the actual precondition for the realisation of such an alliance are >not given today. Only with a clear declaration of insistence on the >multinational character of Yugoslavia and Serbia as well as the propagation >of the idea of the Balkan Federation new class cracks inside the nations >having passed over to imperialism can be supported and possible partners for >anti-imperialist alliances can be found. > >The national defence against the attacks should have been led in an >offensive way. History has shown that war with imperialism was inevitable. >The earlier and the more offensive it would have been led the better the >chance for victory were. While the will to secede by the Slovenes and the >region populated by majority by Croats should have been accepted (as it >actually happened) East Slavonia, the Krajina and Bosnia as a whole (maybe >with the exception of Herzegovina) had to be offensively defended by all >means in order to keep it in Yugoslavia. The withdrawal from East Slavonia, >from the Krajina and the Dayton treaty are a betrayal that did not result in >the appeasement of imperialism hoped for. In the same way KLA had to be >eradicated ruthlessly maybe even with preventive attacks against their bases >is Albania. > >In the last consequence only the connection to the international >anti-imperialist, revolutionary and communist movement can provide for a way >out for a isolated country attacked by imperialism (although only in long >time terms). However, SPS and JUL were hardly interested in that. They were >looking for short term solution that proved to be impossible. > > >Kostunica is not Yeltsin > >In 1991, Yeltsin seized power through a coup d��tat and he consolidated it >by a second coup in 1993. Repressing the resistance of an isolated part of >the state apparatus, he could replace the leading functionaries with his own >men. He could not completely destroy the state apparatus and replace it with >a new one, as happened in many eastern European countries, but he succeeded >in controlling the resistance at least for a decade. > >Whereas in Yugoslavia, the relation of forces is different: > >Kostunica has seized power on the bases of a mass movement with strong >nationalist elements, which potentially could get into conflict with >imperialism. It might be true that there are strong illusions in the >capitalist market economy. However, popular masses have not forgotten about >their social demands and the deeply rooted idea of social justice. Moreover, >due to experiences gained in the own country as well as in Eastern Europe >there is a certain amount of scepticism about the West as well as about its >economic institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO. Djindjic� >s openly reactionary and pro-imperialist current is a small minority. > >SPS is well rooted among at least one third of the population, even if they >are acting in a passive and defensive way. Therefore, it is impossible to >ban the SPS as is happened with the Russian KPSU. The reactionary terrorist >behaviour Djindjic�s forces used immediately after the coup d��tat was not >backed by the masses since they oppose any form of civil war. Even Kostunica >disapproved it. Another point is that the army�s summit as well as many >other high positions within in state apparatus could not been replaced by >now. > >Djindjic strived for a putsch following the Russian example, but Kostunica >knew that this was not possible the relation of forces being completely >different. He met Milosevic and they sorted out a temporary and fragile >compromise. The constitutional framework was not broken unlike Djindjic�s >intentions who wanted to overthrow all institutions controlled by the former >governmental forces. However, the Milosevic controlled Serbian government >had to resign. Today we are facing a situation of fragile equilibrium with >the anti-imperialist forces retreating. > >In the coming weeks until the Serbian parliamentary elections on December >23rd, the main question will be whether the SPS will be able to withstand >the pressure or whether there will be splits with one part capitulating just >like what happened in Momir Bulatovic�s Montenegrin SNP. > >In the first phase, imperialism will support Kostunica. However, in a long >term perspective, a conflict seems to be unavoidable, since Kostunica, >having accused Milosevic of betrayal of the national interests, has to show >that he is sticking to these Serbian national interests. This will need >concessions imperialism is not willing to give. > >The bourgeois DOS being quite heterogeneous � besides Serbian nationalists >as Kostunica there are openly pro-imperialist forces as well as forces >striving for Vojvodina�s and Sanjak�s autonomy � it would not survive such a >conflict. The question is, however, if the equilibrium of forces with the >SPS can be maintained until the potential decisive moment or whether the SPS >resistance and opposition will break down shifting the relation of forces >towards imperialism. > >Kostunica will open the economy to Western neo-liberal globalisation. Since >this, in the first period, will provide the country financial aid and >strongly needed investments, there will not be any immediate opposition. >Only when it will appear clearly that the IMF programs will not bring the >expected improvements to the masses, opposition could develop. However, this >will take a certain time, in any case to long in order to counter the set up >of a pro-imperialist regime in Serbia. > >Thus, everything depends on the left wing, anti-imperialist forces, amongst >others the army. Only they are potentially able to prevent subjugation under >imperialism and to inflame class conflict. Will they be able to maintain the >masses� support and continue their resistance against the set up of an >openly pro-imperialist regime or will they capitulate eventually being >integrated or chased away? > >The appointment of an openly pro-imperialist regime is not excluded. It >will, however, always remain fragile given the historically determined >independence endeavour and the traditions of social justice deeply rooted >within the Serbian popular masses. However, once such a regime has been set >up (like in Russia), it is much more difficult to remove it. > >Therefore, the equilibrium of forces has to be maintained since this >reflects to a certain extent a situation of dual power. This means to >maintain the positions within the state apparatus and the army, split up DOS >obliging Kostunica and the centre group around him to carry out a policy of >vacillation between pro- and anti-imperialist forces. The point is to >prevent openly NATO-oriented forces such as Djindjic of gaining power in >order to prepare the ground for a new offensive once the circumstances will >have become more favourable. > > >Anti-imperialist popular front > >Although Yugoslavia�s radical left has reached a kind of succ�s d�estime >during the elections thus proving that there is a basis for a left-wing >political movement, it is not able, neither in its Titoist nor in its >Stalinist shape, to fulfil any political or organizational aims in this >decisive period. > >JUL, the party of the �red directors�, of corruption and >privatisation-profiteers, has died and it deserves its death. > >One could possibly expect serious opposition by the SPS left wing or by the >army, who are not willing to give up ten years of anti-imperialist struggle >representing the striving of a considerable part of workers, peasants and >above all soldiers. > >Anti-imperialist and communist forces would have to gather around the >following political program trying to involve the SPS left wing, parts of >the Titoist and Stalinist radical left as well as the People�s army in order >to form and anti-imperialist front: > >- Struggle for social justice and the interests of workers, peasants and the >population�s poorest strata. Mobilizations against the expected IMF programs >and their consequences such as impoverishment of the masses on one hand and >indecent enrichment of a small capitalist elite on the other. Against the >main industries� privatisation, on the contrary they should be nationalised. >Planned economy management by organs of popular power in the tradition of >the workers� self-management. Control of foreign capital by these organs. > >- Irreconcilable defence of national Serbian and Yugoslavian interests >against imperialism. Return of Kosovo, withdrawal of NATO from Kosovo, from >Bosnia and eventually from the whole Balkans. Kostunica�s and the opposition >�s nationalist speeches have to be proved as lies. The masses have to be >shown that Serbian national interests can only be implemented against >imperialism. Who sides with imperialism in the economic field will not be >able to defend himself. It�s not surprising that Kostunica has announced the >shortening of the military budget. > >- Defence against the terrorist actions of Djindjic�s counter-revolutionary >forces, who try to gain positions in the industry and the state through >armed gangs in order to replace the representatives of Milosevic�s regime. > >- The army has to remain under the people�s control. Formation of liaison >committees between garrisons, factories (possibly with the help pf trade >unions and organs of workers� self-management) and residential areas. > >- Convocation of a people�s congress in defence of the country and the >interests of workers, peasants and soldiers. All state officials, parties >and institutions pretending to represent the people�s interests have to >subordinate themselves under this congresses decisions. > >- For a multinational Serbia and Yugoslavia. For a democratic, >anti-imperialist Balkan Federation. > >- Integration of Yugoslavia�s and Serbia�s anti-imperialist and communist >forces into the international movement linking them to the world solidarity >movement for the Yugoslav resistance and against the imperialist aggression. > >With Kostunica having gained power, the Serbian and Yugoslavian masses have >lost another rearguard action. However, unlike many other Eastern European >countries, Yugoslavia�s resistance during the past ten years has shown >results giving birth to an anti-imperialist force within the people. Thus, >the last battle has not been fought, the war has not been lost. > >Rome-Vienna, October 15th, 2000 > >*************************************** >International Leninist Current (ILC) >Corriente Leninista Internacional (CLI) >PF 23, A-1040 Wien, Austria >Tel & Fax +43 1 504 00 10 >[EMAIL PROTECTED] >http://www.leninist-current.org >http://www.antiimperialista.com > > _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi _______________________________________________________ Kominform list for general information. Subscribe/unsubscribe messages to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Anti-Imperialism list for anti-imperialist news. Subscribe/unsubscribe messages: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] _______________________________________________________
