> >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > >22 November 2000 > >Dear Friends, > >Somehow we are managing to continue working despite the stalemate in Florida. >As we truck on we send warm Thanksgiving greetings to you, along with: > >NUCLEAR REPORT CARD >PRESIDENT CLINTON GRILLED ON WBAI >COLOMBIA: MORE MONEY, MORE WEAPONS, MORE DRUGS > >After the holiday we HOPE to bring you our analysis of the new president >elect, and the most expensive presidential campaign in history, our take on >pending arms sales, and much much more!! > >Stay Tuned, > >Bill Hartung >Michelle Ciarrocca >Dena Montague >Frida Berrigan > > >NUCLEAR REPORT CARD: >Abolition 2000 issued its "Annual Progress Toward a Nuclear Free World" report >card late last month, announcing an abysmal total grade of 20 out of a >possible 120 points. I would be afraid to bring those grades home to mother. >The report card tracks progress on Abolition 2000's eleven points. On many key >issues, namely ceasing to produce and deploy new nuclear weapons, ratification >of a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, prohibitions on new nuclear research and >testing in the laboratory, countries were given a 0 out of 10 grade. > >On a few issues, the nations of the world made progress and were rewarded with >higher grades. Progress was made in recognizing and upholding the 1996 World >Court decision on the illegality of the use or threat of use of nuclear >weapons, and for that a 6 of 10 grade was given. The report concludes with a >quote from Albert Einstein, "For there is no secret and no defense, there is >no possibility of control except through the aroused understanding and >insistence of the peoples of the world." Abolition 2000's report card is a >great tool for arousing that understanding. > >You can download the Report Card at >http://www.abolition2000.org/reports/reportcard2000.html or email Pamela >Meidell at Atomic Mirror to request a PDF file [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > >PRESS FOR CONVERSION: >The current issue of this Coalition to Oppose the Arms Trade (COAT) >publication is centered around the theme "Nonviolent Resistance to War and >Injustice." There is not enough room to list all the great articles and >resources in this issue, but suffice it to say it is worth picking up. >People's historian Howard Zinn has an article entitled "A Noble Tradition of >U.S. Nonviolent Resistance," Gener Sharp from the Albert Einstein Institute >writes on "Methods of Nonviolent Action." If you'd like to learn more visit >COAT's website at www.ncf.ca/coat or contact Richard Sanders at 613-231-3076 >[EMAIL PROTECTED] > >PRESIDENT CLINTON GRILLED ON WBAI: >One of the most exciting post-election web gleanings is the transcript of >Democracy Now host Amy Goodman's impromptu half hour interview with President >Bill Clinton. She "caught" Clinton as he was making election day tree shaking >calls to radio stations. The full transcript can be read or listened to at >http://www.democracynow.org. > >President Clinton answered a barrage of questions on the death penalty, the >Middle East violence, but finally lost his temper when Goodman suggested that >he was partly responsible for Green Party candidate Ralph Nader's popularity >"for having driven the Democratic Party to the right." "Now you listen to >this," Clinton fumed, "the other thing that Ralph Nader says is that he is as >pure as Caesar's wife on the environment," and proceeded to rattle off the >administration's accomplishments. Goodman then countered with questions on the >administration's passage of NAFTA and its continued support of sanctions >against Iraq. The questions came fast and heavy, and were challenging, well >informed and refreshingly "combative," suggesting that Amy Goodman would have >been a breath of fresh air as moderator of the Bush/Gore debates. > >COLOMBIA: MORE MONEY, MORE WEAPONS, MORE DRUGS >New Report from GAO Highlights Difficulties with Plan Colombia > >In October of 1999, at the urging of the U.S., Colombian President Andres >Pastrana unveiled his ambitious $7.5 billion counternarcotics effort known as >Plan Colombia, with hopes of reducing drug production by 50% over 6 years. >Pastrana indicated that Plan Colombia would also focus on advancing the peace >process, improving the economy, reforming the judicial system, and supporting >democratization and social development. But as the Center for International >Policy has pointed out, while Pastrana has stated only 25% of Plan Colombia >would benefit Colombia's armed forces, so far 75% of the US contribution has >been targeted for the military. > >The Colombian government pledged $4 billion of its budget to the plan (which, >considering Colombia's economic situation is an astronomical figure), and >pleaded with other governments to assist with the remaining $3.5 billion. >Now, more than a year later, the U.S. has agreed to provide $1.3 billion for >counter-drug activities, of which $862 million will go to Colombia, while >European nations have pledged, at best, $200 million in aid. > >Yet despite record increases in U.S. military assistance to Colombia over the >past five years, a new report from the General Accounting Office (GAO) reveals >that coca cultivation and production have more than doubled during the same >time period and Colombia has also become a leading producer of heroin. As for >Plan Colombia, "the total cost and activities required to meet the plan's >goals remain unknown, and it will take years before drug activities are >significantly reduced." Winifred Tate, senior fellow at the Washington Office >on Latin America (WOLA), points out, "Instead of learning from past decades of >misguided military follies, U.S. policy towards Colombia continues to focus on >expanding military operations." > >The GAO report focuses on the U.S. aid package for Plan Colombia (and previous >counternarcotics efforts) and details the difficulties and problems >encountered. Some of the report's findings include: (see link to report below >in resources) > >� U.S. assistance has been of limited utility because of long-standing >problems in planning and implementing this assistance. For example, >helicopters provided to the National Police and the military have not had >sufficient spare parts or the funding to operate and maintain them to the >extent necessary for conducting counternarcotics operations. >� The Colombian government has not demonstrated that it has the detailed >plans, management structure, and funding necessary to effectively implement >its programs and achieve stated goals. >� The challenge of reducing drug-related activities has become more difficult >as the two largest insurgent groups (FARC and ELN) and paramilitary groups >have expanded their involvement in drug trafficking. >� U.S. Embassy officials stated that the National Police have not always >provided necessary documents, such as budgetary and planning documents, to >determine if the National Police are using the resources in accordance with >eradication and interdiction plans. >� According to U.S. Embassy officials, despite extensive training and other >efforts to have the Colombian National Police develop a management program >that would ensure a more effective aerial eradication program, little progress >has been made. > >The report's findings are nothing new: a multi-billion dollar military aid >package is unlikely to make more than a dent in Colombia's drug production, >but will continue deepening U.S. involvement in Colombia's 40-year civil war, >which has claimed 35,000 lives in the past ten years alone. While the GAO >report examined the financial and logistical issues plaguing U.S. efforts to >stem drug production in Colombia, an article in the Fall 2000 World Policy >Journal by William LeoGrande and Kenneth Sharpe delves into the deeper reasons >why Plan Colombia will fail. > >First, despite administration's assurances that the U.S. aid package to >Colombia is to combat drug trafficking, "no one in Colombia believes that, and >no one in Washington ought to either." Beefing up the Colombian armed forces >is premised on the notion that a stronger Colombian army will force the >guerrilla groups to the peace table. As LeoGrande and Sharpe point out, this >didn't work in El Salvador, why does the U.S. think it will work in Colombia's >40-year war? Instead, "a billion dollars of US aid turned that [El >Salvadoran] army into a large, well-equipped, politically powerful force that >murdered noncombatant civilians with impunity for over a decade . . . the war >ended when the army finally recognized that it was unwinnable - a conclusion >it reached when the US cut military assistance by 50 percent, threatened to >end it entirely, and threw its full diplomatic weight behind the peace >process." > >Secondly, LeoGrande and Sharpe note that the U.S. aid package doesn't take >into account the problem of the paramilitary groups, which are heavily >involved in drug trafficking and have links to the army. Like in El Salvador >when the Reagan administration tolerated the death squads because they were >viewed as being "an essential weapon in its war against the left," the article >speculates that in Colombia too, it is likely that the U.S.'s focus on the war >against the guerrillas will cause Washington to turn a blind eye to the >"army's other partner in this dirty war." > >Although we're still waiting to see who will be the next president of the >United States, one thing is certain, neither candidate is likely to stray from >the failed and favored military approach to dealing with the drug problem. >The issue did not generate any attention during the three presidential debates >and neither candidate has been outspoken on the issue. Both Bush and Gore >support Plan Colombia and an increase in U.S. assistance to Colombia. On a >positive note, both candidates have acknowledged the need for more domestic >drug treatment and prevention programs, yet how they would advance this idea >in a resistant Congress is unclear. > >But, the question of who will take over for Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey when he >officially resigns his post on January 6, 2001 will have an even greater >impact on the future of U.S. drug policy. McCaffrey's repeated claims that >we're winning the drug war are wearing thin. The situation in Colombia >notwithstanding, domestically, drug use by junior high students has increased >by 300%, prevention and treatment programs are constantly shortchanged, and >the prison population is exploding with more than 400,000 non-violent drug >offenders in prison. The list goes on. > >The U.S. should be encouraging the peace process in Colombia, not fanning and >fueling the war. As LeoGrande and Sharpe aptly put it, "Even if the United >States defoliates every acre given over to growing coca, burns every >laboratory, and destroys every last gram of Colombian cocaine, it will have >won a hollow victory. The drug business will simple move elsewhere, as it >always does. But it is the people of Colombia who will pay the price for the >inability of the United States to face the fact that its 'war' on drugs can >only be won at home." > >COLOMBIA RESOURCES: >World Policy Journal, Fall 2000, "Two Wars or One? Drugs, Guerrillas, and >Colombia's New Violencia," by William M. LeoGrande and Kenneth E. Sharpe >(www.worldpolicy.org/journal/leogrande.html) - Join the online interactive >discussion. > >The Center for International Policy is an invaluable resource for activists >wanting to learn more about US aid to Colombia >(www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/). > >NACLA, September/October 2000, 'Report on Colombia' - includes articles on >Colombia's two major guerrilla groups (FARC and ELN), the paramilitaries >connections to both the drug traffickers and Colombia's armed forces, the >ongoing peace process, displaced Colombians, and biowarfare in Colombia, - >www.nacla.org > >State Department's September 11 report to Congress on progress toward human >rights goals (required by the aid package law) at >www.ciponline.org/colombia/aid/091101.htm > >General Accounting Office - New report: US Assistance to Colombia Will Take >Years to Produce Results - www.gao.gov/new.items/d0126.PDF > > > >Frida Berrigan >Research Associate, >World Policy Institute >66 Fifth Ave., 9th Floor >New York, NY 10011 >ph 212.229.5808 x112 >fax 212.229.5579 > > _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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