>government troops will probably begin operations with only rough parity >with the guerrillas massing in the south, particularly in the Putumayo >department. A variety of theories suggest government forces need >overwhelming numerical advantages to defeat the guerrillas. > >Meanwhile, the United States continues to ratchet up its involvement in >Colombia. On Aug. 29, the Colombian government inaugurated a new >high-tech command-and-control center in Bogota built with cutting-edge >U.S. technology. Although Colombians officially will run the new center, >a senior U.S. military officer in Bogota will lead U.S. troops providing >intelligence and logistical support in Colombia. > >President Clinton has made assurances that the United States will not >get into a shooting war in Colombia. But the gap between rhetoric and >the likely course of action is growing. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >Stratfor.com, 09/29/00 >The Price of War: America�s Risks in Colombia > >--- Summary >The Clinton administration insists its $1.3 billion military aid >package will be used only to eradicate the cocaine trade in Colombia, >not to battle Marxist rebels. But to reach the coca fields of southern >Colombia, new U.S.-trained troops must first battle the guerrillas. >Because American aid will bring the war to the guerilla strongholds, >they are likely to strike back - against American targets. > >--- Analysis >In releasing the first of $1.3 billion in aid beginning in October, the >Clinton administration is making a claim it cannot possibly ensure. The >White House says it intends the aid to battle the cocaine trade only, >not the guerrillas - specifically the largest group, the Revolutionary >Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). But the FARC earns its income, $500 >million annually, from drugs. > >The eradication of southern Colombia�s coca fields requires battling >the guerrillas who guard them. Though Washington has provided aid in >the past, guerrilla leadership sees the new package as an act of war >meant to destroy them. As a result, the FARC in particular will >retaliate against U.S. military presence in Colombia and a more >extensive set of targets: American business interests and executives. > >The American presence in Colombia is more extensive than the Clinton >administration lets on. When President Clinton visited Colombia recently >he pledged not to get into a shooting war with the FARC, saying Aug. >29, "We have no military objective. We do not believe your conflict has >a military solution," according to El Tiempo. > >But a new command and control center in Bogota exemplifies the extent >to which the Colombian military is depending on Washington. The >Defense Ministry has established a sophisticated and expensive new >center linking the Colombian military directly to the U.S. national >security establishment. > >Though funded by the Colombians at a cost of $545,000, the center relies >on state-of-the-art U.S. technology. The center links the Colombian >army�s U.S.-trained and financed anti-narcotics battalions by >satellite, computer and microwave technology directly to the Pentagon, >the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), the Central Intelligence Agency, >the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Federal Bureau of >Investigation and the State Department. > >The new center will coordinate the efforts of the three U.S.-trained >battalions of the Colombian Army in their effort to eradicate >FARC-controlled coca plantations in the south. That�s about 3,000 >troops, backed by 60 transport and assault helicopters. Officially, >Colombian personnel will operate the new center, while U.S. military >personnel will only provide training, logistical and intelligence >support. > >The U.S. military group, however, will likely play a more prominent >role. The Pentagon wants to assign U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Keith Huber, >SOUTHCOM�s operations director, to the U.S. embassy in Bogota to >command U.S. military personnel in Colombia. The Pentagon�s desire to >send a general officer indicates the importance of the post. Huber >would not report to the U.S. ambassador, but rather directly to >SOUTHCOM and the Pentagon. > >The U.S. military appears keenly aware that its personnel are >high-profile targets for guerrilla attacks. Congress set a cap of 800 >U.S. personnel in Colombia, including 500 uniformed military personnel >and 300 civilians working for the Department of Defense (DOD). > >There is historical precedent for U.S. troops being targeted for >terrorist attacks in Latin America. Attacks took place in El Salvador >in the 1980s, for example, at the height of U.S. involvement there. A >SOUTHCOM official said about Colombia that the number of uniformed >military personnel will be held to "between 150 and 250 at any given >time. We want to have a minimal U.S. footprint in Colombia to assure >good force protection." > >However, the actual American military presence in Colombia, including >DOD civilians, will actually be larger than the personnel caps Congress >has approved. > >Thousands of U.S. soldiers rotate through SOUTHCOM�s theater of >operations, and up to 5,000 DOD civilians support operations, including >anti-narcotic surveillance, interdiction and training activities. > >Many rotate through Colombia. U.S. military pilots fly frequent >intelligence gathering missions over Colombia, and civilian American >pilots working as contractors for U.S government agencies have provided >direct airlift support to Colombian army units, despite official U.S. >denials. > >The American presence in Colombia is open-ended. In its final months, >the Clinton administration has acknowledged the United States will be >involved in Colombia for years. The State Department says prospects for >advancing the peace talks are poor. White House drug czar Barry >McCaffrey has warned Colombia�s drug problem will get much worse during >the next year or two, and that three to five years will pass before the >three anti-narcotics battalions are fully equipped with their transport >and combat helicopters. U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson has cautioned >that the coca eradication timetables in the aid package are too >optimistic and that the coca industry cannot be eradicated before 2005. > >The FARC leadership understands this and will move to exploit the >situation. One of the plan�s great vulnerabilities is the presence of >U.S. military personnel. U.S. soldiers and civilians in Colombia will >be highly prized by the FARC as political and military targets for >kidnapping and assassination. The guerrilla leadership believes that if >the price of American involvement is dead U.S. soldiers, Congress and >voters will not support the effort. > >The guerrillas will likely extend attacks beyond U.S. military personnel >to other American targets. In the past two weeks, the National >Liberation Army (ELN), a smaller guerrilla group, has blown up a tanker >truck owned by Occidental Petroleum. > >Earlier, the FARC reportedly kidnapped four Colombian employees of >Drummond Co., a U.S. mining company based in Birmingham, Alabama. Three >have been released in an apparent attempt to intimidate and extort the >company. Guerrillas have also struck the company�s railway. > >FARC leaders have defiantly stated they are looking forward to the >coming battles in southern Colombia, and that their units have many >"surprises" prepared for the anti-narcotic battalions shortly coming >their way. > > http://www.stratfor.com/latinamerica/analysis/0009290035.htm > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >Stratfor.com - 02 October 2000 >Oil and the Coming Global Economic Slowdown > >--- Summary >Oil prices have exploded. From a low point in 1999, prices have nearly >quadrupled. In the back of most minds lurks a fear: Will this rise in >prices trigger a depression? Will it be 1973 all over again? The answer >lies in looking at the structural and cyclical parts of the world's >economies. They - not oil - were at the heart of the 1970s economic >downturn and will determine events in this decade, as well. > >--- Analysis >Since petroleum is the key industrial mineral, without which nothing >works, there has been an economic consequence to the recent rise in >prices. The most immediately perceptible consequences, however, have >been political. Oil prices, which caused civil disobedience in Europe, >are now a centerpiece in the American presidential campaign. Prices >raise concerns about Asia's ability to recover from the 1997 crash. > >Embedded in the concern over oil is a deep, dark fear: Will the rise in >prices so disrupt the global economy that it will tumble out of control >and into a general depression? Certainly, higher oil prices cause pain. >But the real fear is whether these oil prices will be the nail in the >coffin in the expanding global economy. In the back of everyone's mind >is this question: Are we about to experience 1973 all over again? > >The 1973 Arab oil embargo created a massive price rise and economic >dislocation, from Tokyo to Paris to Chicago. The explosion in oil prices >ushered in a decade of "stagflation" in which inflation soared while >economies stagnated. By the end of the decade, the United States >experienced double-digit unemployment, double-digit inflation and >double-digit interest rates. For Europe, the situation was worse. Even >Japan, in the early stage of its economic explosion, experienced >derailment. > >What few people remember is that the 1973 oil shock did not usher in the >stagflation period. It may have accelerated it and intensified it, but >the slowdown was in the works for quite a while. President Nixon had >imposed price and wage controls before the 1973 crisis. The United >States was in enough economic trouble for the president to impose >unprecedented controls on the economy. > >What drove the global economy toward stagflation was a set of deep >structural and cyclical problems. The first of these was essentially >demographic. The global population explosion following World War II took >place as people entered a period of family formation -- a time when >consumption is highest and savings is lowest. This wave of people >created tremendous pressure on commodity and money markets. > >Then came an inevitable cyclical event. The massive post-war expansion >that began in the early 1950s was about a generation old. By the late >1960s, it was, not surprisingly, out of gas. The time had come for a >cyclical downturn. Coupled with the demographic, structural reality, a >cyclical shift turned into a massive economic, social and political >dislocation. > >Deep cyclical and structural patterns magnified the effect of the oil >price rise in 1973. Without these other factors, the prices would not >have had the effect they had. Alternatively, the rise in oil prices >would not have been possible. It could not have occurred after the 1967 >Middle East War. But it could take place in 1973, because of a general >rise in commodity prices; the rise in oil prices was at most an >exaggeration of something that was happening anyway. > >Today, the real issue is not oil - not any more than it was in 1973. The >real issues are the structural and cyclical forces that underpin the >economy. By themselves, oil prices are not definitive. They are merely >part of the general operating pattern of global economies. The >structural pattern remains in place, with positive and negative >consequences. > >In the case of the former, the same demographic factors that created >stagflation in the 1970s are now creating powerful patterns of capital >formation, particularly in the United States. Much focus has been on the >very narrow measure of savings rates, which are at a historical low in >the United States. This measure ignores aggregate and personal capital >formation rates. The boomers are in a period of low consumption and >massive capital formation, fueling tremendous growth in the capital >markets. > >That means that net worth-and even liquid net worth-is rising. This >inevitably depresses savings rates, since saving from current income >while net worth expands dramatically is unlikely. > >Now, some ominous long-term clouds are out there. The first is that the >boomers cannot maintain this capital formation for more than another >decade at best. Indeed, they will begin liquidating holdings at some >point. At that point, capital markets will start imploding, slowly at >first and then quite suddenly. But that time is not now. > >The other very real cloud is this: The rest of the world does not share >the American boom. Asia is certainly not participating. Europe shares in >it only fractionally and unevenly. Russia is in a massive depression. In >short, while the aggregate global picture remains structurally positive, >when you break the picture down into its component parts, you see that >American expansion makes up for much of the world's deep structural >problems, which do not yet parallel those of the 1970s. > >However, there are some serious cyclical problems. Many people have >asked, "When will the bull market end?" By most definitions the bull >market ended many months ago. In some cases there were massive declines. >In others, there has been stagnation. But the period in which all >global markets reached new heights has been over for quite a while. > >The stock market is an important element, snapshot and, above all, an >important precursor of the economy. In that sense, there are clearly >cyclical problems. > >Consider the following cases: > >*United States: The Standard and Poors 500 hits 1553.11 in April and has >moved sideways since then, closing at 1436.51 on Friday, about six >months later, a decline of about 7.5 percent. The Dow topped out in >January, showing a similar pattern and decline. > >*Japan: The Nikkei topped out at 20833 in April. It closed on Friday at >15747, about its low for the year, a decline of nearly 25 percent. It >was at nearly 40,000 in 1990. > >*Hong Kong: The Hang Seng reached its high for the year in April at >18397.97. It fell below 14000, rallied to just below its high and then >plunged again, closing at 15648 on Friday, a decline of about 15 >percent. Unlike other Asian markets, the Hang Seng did recover from its >1998 lows before beginning the current decline. > >*Singapore: The Straits Times Index peaked at 2582.94 in January, and >closed Friday at 1997.03, a decline of about 23 percent. > >*Germany: The DAX fell from 8136.16 in March to 6798.12, near the >yearly low. This is a decline of about 8,4 percent, but like the >American markets, coming off historical highs. > >*France: The CAC index has gone from an all-time high of 6367.25 in >September to 5944.77 on Friday. This is a decline of 6.6 percent, but >over a very short period of time. > >*United Kingdom: The FTSE index peaked in late December at 6930.2, >moving sideways mostly and closing on Friday at 6294.2, a decline of >about 9.2 percent. > >An extremely consistent pattern shows itself. Global markets have begun >to move down on a cyclical basis. From a long-term perspective, this is >not a big deal. After all, the American and European markets, having >risen extraordinarily for years, are more than overdue for rest and >regrouping. The Asian markets, however, save for the Hang Seng, have >failed to recover from the 1997 battering. Their structural problems >remain untouched. > >Thus we see the following three results: > >* We are moving into a cyclical downturn on a synchronized basis. >Everyone is going in the same direction pretty much at the same time. >The downturn may be shallow-a mere sideways movement-in the stronger >economies. These cases may simply be a slowdown rather than a recession. > >* The structural de-synchronization remains in place. Asia's >cyclical downturn is a resumption of a long-term downtrend. The United >States cyclical downturn represents an interruption of a long-term >up-trend. The same may be true for Europe. >* Increased oil prices will therefore have disproportionate >effects. More vulnerable, Asia will be hurt more than the United States. >Europe, for social and political reasons will make more noise than the >United States, but still hurt less than Asia. > >But the world's cyclical and structural shifts are not coinciding. We >expect, therefore, that oil prices will not affect the world as they did >in 1973, nor will they be sustainable for a decade. They may participate >in a cyclical downturn and some will blame oil prices for the downturn. >But equity prices already reflect this downturn and have for about half >a year on a global basis. Oil prices will affect the depth and length of >a downturn, but are not the cause. > >Instead, a weakening will occur across the globe, one that gives the >United States and Europe a healthy breather, but hits Asia very hard. >Russia will benefit marginally from increased oil prices, but its deep >structural problems are political rather than economic; Russia will be >cast further out of the international system. > >In other words, for all the sound and fury, there will be a slowdown or >even a recession, but it will not be the end of the world. Not for a >while, at least. _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi _______________________________________________________ Kominform list for general information. Subscribe/unsubscribe messages to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Anti-Imperialism list for anti-imperialist news. 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