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From: Miroslav Antic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: BALKAN <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; SIEM NEWS <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: NATO <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Friday, December 29, 2000 11:18 PM
Subject: The United States Is Driving Russia And China Together Again
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International Herald Tribune
December 28, 2000

The United States Is Driving Russia And China Together Again
By Evan A. Feigenbaum

The writer, executive director of the Asia-Pacific Security Initiative at
Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, contributed this
comment to the International Herald Tribune.

CAMBRIDGE, Massachusetts -- A new poll released this week by the Russian
subsidiary of the American Gallup polling organization reveals that a
majority of Russian politicians, business leaders, and journalists view
China as a more reliable partner than the United States.

These poll results are noteworthy: Just four months ago, General Leonid
Ivashov, head of the Russian Defense Ministry's international cooperation
department, called China Russia's "ideological ally," citing common goals
in rejecting "military diktat in international relations," as well as
American missile defense plans. The two countries' growing partnership is,
of course, in many ways a marriage of convenience. China and Russia so far
remain "strategic partners" in name alone.

Perhaps the most important strategic underpinning of the increasingly close
Chinese-Russian view of international affairs is that both countries share
a deepening conviction that a principled stand against certain core
American strategic concepts will give them the high ground against the
United States.

It is telling that as American foreign policy has discarded the notion that
state sovereignty is inviolable, with interventions in Panama, Haiti, and
Kosovo, both Chinese and Russian diplomacy have responded in similar terms,
opposing NATO efforts to formulate a strategy that is not exclusively
defensive, and other creeping American challenges to the inviolability of
state sovereignty.

China continues to cling to long and often repeated principles of
nonintervention and territorial self-defense, even as the post-Cold War Pax
Americana has rewritten these rules by promoting new rationales for the use
of force. Taiwan, however, remains China's great exception. Indeed, an
unprovoked Chinese use of force against Taiwan, that many Americans,
Asians, Europeans and even some Russians would view as aggressive, would be
justified by Beijing as a strictly defensive action involving territorial
integrity - the one interest that Chinese diplomacy claims as "vital."

The more encompassing American definition of "vital" interests, by
contrast, ranges beyond the mere defense of homeland. Many Chinese argue
that American statements of the national interest tend to enshrine a law of
the jungle in international politics that violates norms of law and is
conceptually distinct from peacekeeping.

In this, China and Russia have some important common goals, rejecting the
use of military "diktat" as a principled response in some key external
contingencies. Such trends are hardly new, and strands of American
strategic analysis have wrestled in recent years with the prospect of a
renewed China Russia "alliance" relationship.

Such a notion is ironic indeed, not least because both countries have
increasingly rejected the very notion of alliances on grounds of principle.
Four months ago, General Ivashov claimed that "military alliances have no
future." His view jibes neatly with a Chinese view of the world that
increasingly sees alliance structures as a threat to peace and
intrinsically aggressive in nature.

NATO strategy in Kosovo reinforced Chinese and Russian perceptions that
America's alliances in Europe and Asia have evolved away from original
concepts of cooperative defense toward more expansive definitions of
alliance roles and missions.

Above all, it was Kosovo that demonstrated to Chinese, Russian, and other
strategists that the United States and its allies were prepared to
circumvent the United Nations and the norms of international law that
China, in particular, views in inflexible terms. All of this supplements
the shared concern about American missile defense plans.

China may yet discover that its Russian partner will abandon its shared
principled stance in favor of a closer working relationship with
Washington, particularly on anti-ballistic missile norms. But Beijing will
continue to reject the NATO notion that defense is always benign in nature,
a form of deterrence plus. Shared Chinese and Russian perspectives on world
affairs, therefore, suggest the possibility of greater coordination. Yet
whatever principles the two countries may share derive from very different
concerns.

For China, all such issues almost entirely derive from the Taiwan problem.
Beijing worries that the US-Japan alliance may take on new roles and
missions in a contingency in the Taiwan Strait. Its opposition to missile
defenses, especially theater systems, reflects a broadly political concern
that the United States is reviving its former military alliance with Taiwan.

What is required is an approach by American and European states that seeks
to delink the big questions of international politics, such as intervention
and alliances, from a view of the world that sees many such questions
through the prism of national problems and national pride. This is
especially true of China, whose foreign policy on nearly every strategic
issue is now inseparable from the Taiwan question.

Without such an effort, Chinese and Russian perspectives will move closer
together.

Miroslav Antic,
http://www.antic.org/SNN/


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