----- Original Message ----- From: Serbian News Network <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: News <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; NATO <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; BALKAN <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Monday, April 02, 2001 3:18 PM Subject: NATO Needs to Grow [STOPNATO.ORG.UK] STOP NATO: NO PASARAN! - HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK --------------------------- ListBot Sponsor -------------------------- Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb ---------------------------------------------------------------------- #9 New York Times April 2, 2001 NATO Needs to Grow By ANTONY J. BLINKEN Antony J. Blinken, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was President Bill Clinton's senior adviser for European affairs. WASHINGTON-The turn toward confrontation in America's relations with Russia threatens to undermine the expansion of NATO in northern Europe, a prospect that could seriously damage American security interests. If the current difficulties persist, Moscow will try to draw a red line around the Baltic states, keeping them out of the treaty organization and the European allies will probably go along. This would result in a fundamental weakening of NATO's role in bringing stability to post-cold-war Europe. During the presidential campaign, NATO enlargement was among the few foreign policy issues that caught the candidates' attention. George W. Bush and Al Gore both indicated their support for it. Among the nine countries seeking membership, Lithuania is the most advanced in reaching NATO's military standards; Latvia and Estonia are not far behind. Failure to include one of them in the next enlargement would destroy the incentive for would-be NATO members to meet those standards. When President Clinton opened NATO's doors in 1994, some predicted a crisis with Russia. That did not occur, mainly because the Kremlin understood that NATO enlargement did not threaten Russia's interests. President Clinton also negotiated a special security partnership between NATO and Russia, and made clear that America was more concerned by a weak Russia than a strong one. The Bush administration, if it remains committed to enlarging NATO, needs to lay the groundwork with Russia. It should begin by toning down its rhetoric. The administration can use less confrontational terms to make clear its concerns about Russian nuclear proliferation, Chechnya and President Vladimir Putin's ambiguous attitude toward democracy. The administration should look for ways to enhance cooperation between NATO and Russia. Since the Kursk submarine incident, the Russians have indicated their interest in talking to NATO about maritime safety. NATO could propose information exchange and search-and-rescue coordination. The Russians also want to discuss theater missile defense, a useful acknowledgment that nuclear proliferation is a threat to both Russia and the West. Finally, Moscow wants, and deserves, more of a say in the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia. The Bush administration should make the case to Moscow that NATO enlargement to the Baltic states would advance Russia's own interests as well as ours. Russia wants stability along its Western borders, neighbors who treat their Russian minorities with respect and prosperous trading partners. NATO enlargement promotes such developments. Aspirants know that strong democratic structures, respect for minority rights and free markets are necessary for inclusion in the club; just as important, they are necessary to remain members in good standing. NATO's three newest members Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, all added in the first enlargement, in 1999 have concluded 10 agreements among themselves and with their neighbors to ensure stable borders, promote interstate cooperation and address minority concerns. Not coincidentally, Hungary and Poland enjoy two of the strongest growth rates in Europe. Finally, NATO must make it clear that, as was the case in 1999, it does not intend to place nuclear weapons or station foreign troops on the soil of new allies. Bringing the Baltics into the alliance is not a zero sum game in which NATO's gain is Russia's loss, NATO's strength Russia's weakness. But unless the administration acts soon to convince it otherwise, that is what Russia will believe. Then further enlargement could become so difficult that NATO's first three new members may prove to be its last. Miroslav Antic, http://www.antic.org/SNN/ ______________________________________________________________________ To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
