_ From: "Magnus Bernhardsen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Mon, 06 Aug 2001 11:29:21 +0200 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Peoples War] Katmandu Post editorial <http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishdaily/ktmpost/2001/aug/aug06/ed itorial.htm#2> Maoist insurgency and government By Lok Raj Baral Nepalis are now heaving a sigh of relief following announcement of the truce by both the government and the Maoists. How long they hold the truce is beyond our imagination except that the road ahead seems to be not only slippery and traverse but also full of rugged Himalayan terrain and peaks. Yet, in general political parleys, such difficulties are not explicitly construed as unsurmontable. It can be assumed that both the negotiating parties know each other�s compulsions for either mutual accommodation or for safe landing. The proposed dialogue between the government and the Maoists can therefore be seen in this light, though the common agenda of the constitutional parties and government is yet to be spelt out publicly. If the Maoist side is going to negotiate on the basis of its newly acquired recognition and strength despite occasional swings in its stated positions, then the dialogue is likely to be fraught with uncertainties. Under this premise, a few constraints can be advanced for consideration. They can also be taken as caveats for the government. The first constraint is the rigid constitutional status of some of the "basics" of the present arrangement to which no constitutional amendment, let alone replacement, is possible. Our constitution makers seemed to be too shortsighted to see beyond the parameters of the unplanned jan andolan because of its one point demand i.e. restoration of multiparty system in the country. Other developments that followed the deletion of partylessness from the previous constitution came as afterthoughts when the movement leaders realized that the people, in Ganesh Man Singh�s view, went much ahead of the leaders thus causing the collapse of the Panchayat edifice. In fact, the then United People�s Front (UPF) whose sizable section is now a part of the Maoist group, had all along been demanding the election to a constituent assembly for providing legitimacy to the movement as well as to settle intricacies of Nepal�s historical development in a more scientific and popular manner. Since politics as is being witnessed in Nepal is full of uncertainties and unpredictabilities, it is difficult to adhere to the constitutional rigidity as envisaged then. According to Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba�s recent declaration, negotiation is not possible on two issues� constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. Any reaction of the Maoists to this is likely to determine both the rigidity and flexibility of the future Maoist movement. Pursuing a flexible course by the Maoist leaders would amount to accepting a peaceful method of change that can be possible within the parameters of the present constitution either by retaining its present form or by bringing about some amendments to it. Obversely, however, the Maoists may take the advantage of the present truce for further intensifying the armed movement across the country. The second constraint relates to the failure of the Nepali state to show its resilience and strength. Constitutional anomalies and leaders� inability to streamline the spirit of the constitution and behave accordingly did create the crisis of governance as if the elected government was/is armless and helpless to handle the crisis situation. Guided by the traditional concept and motivation, the agencies of the state have not worked in tandem as if each one of them needs a separate command structure. Many Prime Ministers who faced the problem of Maoist violence could neither assert their position nor did they come out with their own views on the role of these agencies, particularly the army. Consequently, the government was forced to depend on the police whose basic job is not to fight counterinsurgency but to relate itself to civic duties including the use of force to the minimum level. The issue of state in its wider ramifications therefore remains unaddressed today pointing to yet another caveat if the negotiation fails. If the state power is attritive along with loss of the popular base of power, how can the government manage the crisis? The third constraint relates to the psychological battle that the Maoists are said to have won. The Maoist�s psychological vantage position has gone deep into the grassroots level due both to the failure of the state and to the demoralization of parties local leaders and workers. Organizationally, all constitutional party have failed to respond to the Maoist agendas of varying nature and implications. Some of these agendas could have been snatched by the governments over a period of six years and implement them with all sincerity. Issues of social and economic disparity, continued feudalistic traits of politics and political culture, the failure of the Nepali system to be radical and forward looking are some of the issues that could have been addressed by the mainline parties in order to demonstrate that the present system is no less transformatory and democratic than the campaign of the Maoists for bringing about a qualitative change in the country. One thing is certain today, democracy without a human face and radical programmatic action cannot be sustainable despite our pious wish and intents. The final constraint relates to the bargaining position of the government. Perceptions that the Maoists have already won the psychological battle, if not war, have been made over these years and could be attributed to many points raised before. Traditional approach seems to be reigning supreme putting the elected government in the backseat which, however surprisingly, the leaders themselves have begrudgingly accepted. Unless the government and party leaders fail to reach a consensus on the agenda to be pursued during the negotiation and with a definite �Yes� or �No�, or unless the Maoists change their basic demands that are considered non-negotiable by the other party, talks are not likely to yield acceptable results thus pushing them again to resort to force. Thus, before entering the impending negotiation, the constitutional parties should be able to forge a broad coalition for fortifying their own position in accord with the spirit of popular legitimacy through multiparty democracy and then should try to impress on the Maoists to be reasonably flexible. If the constitutional flaws stand in the way of good and effective governance, the parliamentary parties should reach a unanimous decision on amending those clauses after examining their implications. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ---------------------~--> Small business owners... Tell us what you think! http://us.click.yahoo.com/vO1FAB/txzCAA/ySSFAA/XcSolB/TM ---------------------------------------------------------------------~-> "Without a Peoples Army the people have nothing" Mao _________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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