"Hosnie Musharraf in making."
by Abid Ullah Jan
Has the process of Egyptianising Pakistan reached its final stage? Are we
inching towards the ultimate tragedy - the Algerian kind of a civil war?
With the strongest ever president in the office in Islamabad; with the
strangest measures ever taken against Islamic institutions and religious
groups; with the persuasive claims ever made about "moderate" Pakistan,
with all the Jihad related Quarnic verses removed from school curricula,
and
with the explicit Pakistani support ever given to anti-Afghan US-UN
policies,
the stage seems to be set for a long stay of the South Asian Hosnie Mubarak
in
making. The US has also came down to "business as usual" with Musharraf
regime and its assistant secretary of defence, Peter Rodman claims the US
relationship with Pakistan as "valuable " to the American administration.
According to Rodman: "India values its independence. It values its
non-alignment. So I don't think anybody should expect that India is going
to collude with us," (AFP August 23, 2001). It clearly shows that we do not
value our independence, we have been colluding and the US still needs us
to collude to de-Islamise Pakistan and deprive Afghans of the fruits for
which they have lost thousands of lives. Like Turkey, Egypt and Algeria,
the
self-proclaimed secular bulwarks in Pakistan are playing their role in
sidelining majority of the public associated with the religious
organisations and institutions. Their various approaches to collusion
under the banner of liberalisation deserve a careful analysis.
Two themes are particularly relevant. The first is the dysfunctional,
corrupt, and repressive nature of the western sponsored, declared and
undeclared, secular regimes in the Muslim world. Their inability to put
their economies on a sound footing, along with their reliance on foreign
powers for protection and security, has generated crises of identity,
legitimacy, and performance, provoking sharp debates. Secondly, religious
groups lack a coherent reform programme and unity among their ranks to
save the core of Islam. They remain stuck to their branches while the core
of
Islam is under attack.
THE LOGIC OF COMPARISON
In a decreasing order, the cases of Algeria, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan
illustrate the encounters between secular and religious forces. Religious
organisations in Algeria have vehemently confronted the military-backed
secular regime, and the country is being ripped apart by political
violence that has left thousands of civilians dead. In Egypt, we see the
worst kind
of military dictatorship in the guise of democracy that has vowed to crush
everything that can fuel religious sentiments. Turkey is led by a secular
regime that has been constantly challenged by Islamic groups. In a bid to
please their western Masters, Pakistani regimes since General Zia have
adopted secular approaches under the labels of "liberal" democracy and
"moderate" Islam.
In the last two decades, these countries have experienced the rise of
anti-Islam bias to varying degrees. Turkey forced elected governments to
step down, banned political parties, harassed women to remove hijab and
threw men out of the job for growing beard or performing Hajj. Egyptian
government on the other hand has broken all the records of human rights
violations in order to silence the Islamic opposition. Algeria's current
upheaval can best be described as the ultimate tragedy of an identity
crisis initiated by the unjust western support of the repressive measures
of an
illegitimate secular government. In Pakistan, it is wrong to assert that
the government and the opposition invoked Islam as a primary vehicle of
mass
politicisation. Islam, in fact, has been the only rallying force behind
the creation of Pakistan and as such, Islam has dominated politics,
economics,
law, and social life. The problem only began when Benazir Bhutto started
claiming herself to be a "secular bulwark" working for establishing a
"liberal democratic state." The final march towards the ultimate tragedy,
however, began with the present government's dedicated efforts to improve
its "moderate" image with crack down on religion under different pretexts.
GROWING MISCONCEPTIONS
Although religious groups increasingly view Islam as a revitalized
politico-religious vision and seek to advance its values, ideal, and
institutions, but it is wrong to classify them under a variety of
ideological strands. Almost all of them promote Islamic perspectives
regardless of the western classification of Islam. None of them use
Islamic ideology to inspire political violence. Linking sectarian violence
to
terrorism and terrorism to Islamic schools (Madrassa) and their curriculum
is the sign of our consummate inanity. Even in Algeria, no one had thought
of going violent until the state denied the winning parties fruits of
their genuine struggle. In Egypt, the same story of unequal but opposite
reaction goes in response to state terrorism against Islamic groups.
Pakistan has
just taken a start to please the Indian and American policy makers in the
name of restoring "internal security." No matter how we may label these
moves, they remain part of a grand anti-religion crusade towards
establishing Mubarak like regimes -- apparently democratic but at the core
the worst kind of dictatorships controlling anti-American and anti-Israel
sentiments aroused as a result of their unprecedented aggression and
terrorism.
While the totalising secular agenda has destroyed civil society in
Algeria, it is coming to grips with it in Egypt, albeit slowly. In pre-1992
Algeria, religious parties worked more within the system than outside of
it,
advocating free elections and rejecting violence as a means of achieving
their political objectives. Religious parties in Turkey have used
political processes to challenge the state-imposed secularisation.
Secularist
regimes' abysmal records of economic and political development have
furthered the
revivalist movements. The absence of democratic means has led to colossal
difficulties for the Islamic organisations. Since 1992, a traumatized
Algeria has been locked in a civil war. Tunisia's Islamic movement,
al-Nahda, has been banned from participating in politics. The heavy-handed
policies of Egyptian President have yet to silence the Islamic opposition.
LIBERALISATION AND ISLAM
It is not modernisation in the Muslim world that has generated a visible
upsurge in religious revivalism. It is only the American and its allies'
forcing their will and double standards over the Muslim world that has
created the problem. An emphatic rejection of the amoral rationalism of
secular modernity is, undoubtedly, an aspect, but the main reasons are the
continued western support of the Israeli aggression and repression in
Palestine, Indian terrorism in Kashmir, Russian blood sport in Chechnya,
continued sanction on Iraq, double standards in dealing with India and
Pakistan, support of the repressive regimes like Algeria and crushing the
Afghans' desire to rebuild their country.
John Esposito has observed: "the secularisation of processes and
institutions did not easily translate into the secularisation of minds and
culture. While a minority accepted and implemented a Western secular
worldview, the majority of most Muslim populations did not internalise a
secular outlook and values."(Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or
Reality?) Initially, secularisation was synonymous with the adoption of a
code of
law from a European country but it has now become an all out anti-religion
war. Algeria and Iran adopted the French civil code; Pakistan conformed to
the
British civil code, and Turkey followed the Swiss civil code. To that
extent, many in these countries regarded secularism as an indispensable
element of the government system. Fortunately, the Iranian Revolution of
1979 challenged the assumption and unfortunately secularism turned into an
anti-Islam crusade after the demise of Soviet Union.
In Pakistan, the present government's moves to bring about secularisation
under the label of anti-terrorism campaign would certainly backfire.
According to S.V.R. Nasr, Islamic parties in Pakistan have benefited
immensely from a democratic system that allows them political
participation. Such a participation has averted radicalisation of Islamic
movements, and
has also effectively restricted them to a small niche in the electoral
arena: "They can influence state policy but are not in a position to
launch a successful bid for power," ("Islamic Opposition in the Political
Process: Lessons from Pakistan," in Esposito, ed., Political Islam:
Revolution,
Radicalism, or Reform?, 135-36; see esp. 154). The recent moves by the
government would shatter this illusion of the "small niche." Of course,
religious parties have been restricted to limited number of seats but it is
only due to people's taking Islam for granted and divided vote bank among
religious groups. Once united against the anti-religion crusade, we would
witness an eventuality that none of the secular fundamentalists and their
supports would like: the metamorphoses from Klashnikov to the nuclear
Taliban.
With the most powerful president sitting in the office, transforming the
genesis of Pakistan and identity of the nation would require massive human
rights abuses. Death from torture in police custody is already epidemic.
Indefinite detention without any charges, sometimes up to one year under
Article 10 of the constitution, is commonplace. Self-censorship is widely
practiced, especially on matters relating to the armed forces, (Charles
Humana, World Human Rights Guide, 242). With the new pro-secularism
policies in place, the press would frequently taste censorship. In the near
future,
the government would have no option but to abrogate all political freedoms
and hold thousands of "Islamists" in detention camps like Egypt and
Algeria.
The secular government of Hosnie Musharraf in Pakistan would continue to
obtain support of its western backers. The case of Egypt and Algeria
proves this point. Unlike the Taliban, despite extra-judicial executions,
disappearances, torture, rape, and continued impunity for abuses by the
security forces, the west has maintained routine economic transactions
with Algeria and Egypt. The European Union has granted 350 million ECU to
Algeria with the expectation that more will come out of the 5.5 million ECU
package to the Mediterranean area over the next five years. The IMF has
provided a
$1 billion loan, and the Paris Club has rescheduled $5 billion of the
country's international debt, (Andrew J. Pierre and William B. Quandt,
"Algeria's War on Itself," Foreign Policy 99, 1995: 131-48; see esp. 144).
France has provided the equivalent of nearly $1.2 billion annual aid,
mostly in the form of government-backed credits, (Human Rights Watch, World
Report, 1997, 271). Similarly, Egypt is receiving billions of dollars in
annual
American aid.
State-imposed secularisation has failed to create a sense of
cultural-political identity and unity in Algeria, Egypt and Turkey.
Secularisation in Algeria has divided it in the wake of resurgent Islamic
tides. Forced secularisation (1953-1977) failed to take root in Iran,
where faith is central to life, and morality is based on religious
foundations.
The Turkish experience shows that 70 years of militant secular rule have
failed to generate a mass secular culture. More importantly, how can the
seculars expect to de-Islamise a country created in the name of Islam when
the communists could not flush Islam out of the former Soviet Union
despite almost eight decades of strict ban on religious institutions and
organisations.
The tensions between secularists and religious activists, however
disruptive and violent at times, are creative when they are capable of
inspiring the
struggle to secure greater justice. The Islamic groups and movements must
be included in the political process, for to exclude them is to foster
extreme, radical, and violent reaction. There is no real alternative to
stop
listening to Masters sitting in the Western capitals. Agendas of the
"moderates" must meet the standards of the much vaunted "international HR"
if they are to claim legitimacy. Without religion, however, secular
ideologies tend to become totalitarian and the underpinnings of a
normative tolerance are weakened. At the same time, religion is central to
the life
and social mores of Muslim societies. Any attempt to free us from religion
will miserably fail at a great cost to the stability of the country.
Concluded.
