From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Fri, 14 Dec 2001 15:26:42 PST To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [R-G] Afghanistan: The Conquest of the Cities - Stratfor STRATFOR Afghanistan: The Conquest of the Cities Summary The war in Afghanistan is proceeding successfully for the Bush administration, but a split between the media's and the government's view of the situation could pose a challenge. The Bush administration has allowed the war to be personalized, and if Osama bin Laden is not captured or killed, it could lead to a crisis in confidence among the American public. Analysis With the recent fall of Kandahar, all of Afghanistan's cities are now in the hands of anti-Taliban forces. There is a sense that the war in Afghanistan has been brought to a successful conclusion, that the capture of Osama bin Laden is fairly near at hand and that therefore victory in the war on terrorism is close to reality. To a great extent, this is the media's view. It is important to note that statements from U.S. government officials have been substantially more cautious. Washington has made it clear not only that a stable solution to the Afghan situation is still a long way off but also that it is not something the United States is interested in imposing even if it were able. U.S. officials say they believe bin Laden will be captured soon. But they have also said that this presumption is based on intelligence that is not entirely reliable and that they are not completely certain where bin Laden is. Most important, the government has emphasized that the conclusion of the Afghan portion of the anti-terror campaign does not mean al Qaeda has been rendered impotent. The threat and the war will continue. The disjuncture between the government's view and the media's presentation represents a tremendous challenge to the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush. Bush though has partly caused this split. While placing caveats on almost all positive statements, he has also adopted an upbeat tone about the state of the war in recent weeks. It is important that he show progress, and events in Afghanistan have certainly moved in the right direction from his point of view. However, administration officials have carefully footnoted positive statements with serious cautions and concerns so that they can point to them later if necessary. Let's review the status of the anti-terror campaign: First, the cities of Afghanistan are now in the hands of anti-Taliban forces. Anti-Taliban is the only way to describe such groups because all they have in common are varying degrees of opposition to the former ruling militia. The cities in essence are being held by various fractious, contentious groups deeply split by ethnicity and experiences. The Taliban no longer hold state power, but that does not mean they have ceased to exist. Only a fraction of Taliban fighters have been captured, and most of them remain armed. Reliable Russian and Indian estimates indicate there are about 10,000 Taliban captives out of an initial force of 40,000 to 50,000. If the estimates are correct, then the 30,000 to 40,000 heavily armed Taliban still in Afghanistan will remain a force to be reckoned with -- if they can maintain some degree of cohesion. As conflicts among the victors deepen, any number of groups will find an alliance with all or part of the Taliban to be advantageous. The conquerors of Kandahar, for example, had neither the interest nor stomach for annihilating or capturing the Taliban fighters. They didn't want to spend their own forces on the battle, and they knew they might have use for them later. Second, the United States has not captured bin Laden. Having first believed he was in the Kandahar region, Washington now says he might be in the Tora Bora mountain region. This is a logical place to be if he is inside Afghanistan. The problem is that bin Laden would be a fool to remain in the country. It has been clear for several months that the cities were going to fall whether because the Taliban decided to leave or were beaten out. Under those circumstances, bin Laden could not expect to operate the al Qaeda command cell effectively out of Afghanistan. He had ample opportunity to slip across the Afghan-Pakistani border and disappear among his many supporters, or he could slip out of one of Pakistan's ports for redeployment in any number of other countries. Finally, even if the Taliban were truly finished as a force and Mullah Omar and bin Laden were killed, Washington's fundamental strategic problem would remain. The U.S. government cannot know for certain that al Qaeda has been destroyed in the United States or in the world. Nor can it guarantee that if the network were destroyed, parts of it could not regroup into another organization. Victory in Afghanistan, as the government has said over and over, does not in any way translate into an end to attacks on the United States. If we understand al Qaeda correctly, it was designed to operate even if the command cell were destroyed. A new command cell would generate, or task forces already deployed would operate autonomously. Thus the success in Afghanistan must now be followed with successes in more critical theaters of operations. The strategy in the U.S. theater has been fairly successful. Lacking clear intelligence on the threat, but having a general idea of where al Qaeda members might be located, U.S. security forces grabbed whoever seemed either likely to be part of the group or to have any reasonable pretext for being detained. The theory was that someone of value would be captured, and even if the FBI didn't know who they were, al Qaeda would abort operations due to fears of exposure. Similar tactics are being used in Europe and elsewhere. It is not the best strategy, but it is certainly an acceptable interim plan while intelligence improves. An insight into this plan was provided in a story in this week's edition of Newsweek, in which administration sources alleged that a suspected al Qaeda cell abandoned post-Sept. 11 plans to attack Washington, D.C., after the FBI unknowingly captured members of the attackers' support team during a sweep of visa violators. In preparation for the deployment of new al Qaeda command cells, U.S. forces have reportedly been moving into key countries. One media report has U.S. military officers arriving in Somalia while others say U.S. forces have been made available to the Philippines in its fight against Muslim rebels with pro-bin Laden sentiments. Clearly, the Bush administration understands that events in Afghanistan are merely the first act of a much more complex drama, to be acted out globally for years. Moreover, they understand it is a drama that will go on whether bin Laden is captured, killed or escapes. The problem for the Bush administration is that it has allowed the war to be personalized. It has focused on bin Laden and his fate as a key issue in the battle against terrorism. To be more precise, it has allowed the media to focus on bin Laden without counteracting this. There were good psychological reasons for this. It is much easier to mobilize public energies by personalizing a war. Indeed, the most frightening aspect of al Qaeda for the American public was its lack of definition. Its amorphousness meant it could strike anywhere. By personalizing the enemy, the public was both energized and calmed. This is now the problem. The administration avoided a crisis of confidence immediately after Sept. 11 because it seemed prepared to act decisively and forcefully. The intelligence failure that led up to the attacks did not create a problem for the Bush administration, but it is still lurking in the public's mind. If the government were to appear not to have a handle on the war, a crisis of confidence could develop with startling suddenness. What looks like a decisive victory in Afghanistan has reinforced public confidence. Americans are now waiting for the death or capture of bin Laden and Omar. If that happens, the administration will have time and forbearance to explain the next phase of the war. If, on the other hand, bin Laden is not found, the old fear of the amorphousness of al Qaeda will start to resurface. Worst of all, if bin Laden shows up in some other country, having safely escaped the U.S. net, and starts giving interviews that confirm his survival, then both the nature of the victory in Afghanistan and the competence of the administration will come into question with a vengeance. It is important both psychologically and for reasons of propaganda that bin Laden, and to a lesser extent Omar, be demonstrably captured or killed. It is important bin Laden not be allowed to become the Swamp Fox, with his legend outliving his life. It is utterly crucial that he not slip through the nets to other countries. This is not critical from a strictly war-fighting standpoint. Alive or dead, the fight goes on. But it is critical from a psychological point of view. This is true not only for bin Laden's supporters but also for his enemies. The reason Bush needs bin Laden's head is not to win the war but to be able to continue to execute it without a crisis in confidence. _________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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