From: "Stasi" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [Peoples War] Nicaragua: A Forgotton Revolution - Le Monde Diplomatique > Le Monde diplomatique > > ----------------------------------------------------- > > December 2001 > > ORTEGA 'A FRIEND TO UNITED STATES ENEMIES' > > Nicaragua: a revolution forgotten > _______________________________________________________ > > Arnoldo Alem�n's government is unprecedentedly corrupt and > so the Sandinista National Liberation Front seemed to have a > chance, with its moderately reformist plans, in the November > presidential election. It lost. > > by FRAN�OIS HOUTART * > _______________________________________________________ > > "Without Somoza, Nicaragua will be free!" After over a > decade's struggle against the Somoza dictatorship, which > had been backed by the United States since 1936, the > Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) came to power > on 17 July 1979. The revolution launched agrarian reform, > a literacy campaign to teach 400,000 people, and a health > programme covering the country. It nationalised the > Somoza clan's non-productive assets and its property. > Original and without the dogma of earlier revolutions, it > attracted sympathy and was much copied in the region. "If > Nicaragua has conquered, El Salvador will conquer," the > insurgents sang. It was a time of hope in Central > America. > > The United States was not pleased to see Cuba, and to a > lesser extent the Soviet Union, backing a country so long > under its control. In 1980, as part of his struggle > against what he called the "evil empire", President > Ronald Reagan ordered an embargo against Nicaragua and > used the CIA to organise, equip and train an armed > opposition, the Contras former Somoza guards who had > taken refuge in neighbouring Honduras. > > Daniel Ortega won the presidential election with 63% of > the vote on 4 November 1984 (and more than 500 foreign > observers said the ballot had been properly conducted), > but US actions continued. They were condemned on 27 July > 1986 by the International Court of Justice, but > Washington was quick to denounce this. The whole business > was riddled with scandals, such as Irangate (the illegal > sale of US arms to Iran to fund the Contras), caused > 29,000 deaths and destabilised Nicaragua. > > At the end of the 1980s the revolution expired. Stifled > by the US embargo, Nicaragua had to mobilise and economic > pressure made austerity measures essential. The agrarian > reforms favoured landless peasants but forgot some of the > peasants who became a social base for the Contras (see > article by Rapha�lle Bail). Despite three priests in the > government, the Church, represented by Monsignor Obando y > Bravo, archbishop of Managua, and supported by Pope > John-Paul II, demonised the regime and marginalised > Christians involved. > > Much to the Sandinista Front's surprise, it lost the > February 1990 elections. Despite considerable social > gains in education, land ownership, food, health, social > security and housing, Nicaraguans could no longer > tolerate the war, the conscription of the younger > generation, austerity measures and the rising cost of > living. The opposition promised peace, an end to the US > embargo, and prosperity. The electors chose Violeta > Chamorro, with 54.2% of the vote. Defeated, the FSLN and > its candidate, Daniel Ortega, agreed to hand over power > democratically (1). > > Despite the difficulties of the post-war period, a tacit > agreement between Chamorro and the Sandinista leadership > made for a peaceful transition. The new government > introduced socially devastating policies: this period was > marked by what is called the pi�ata, after the children's > game where clay pots are broken and the players grab > their contents. Some of the front's leaders seized state > assets to prevent them from falling into the hands of the > dominant class as it returned to power, partly as > compensation for the sacrifices of the revolution, but > also, in some cases, from greed. As well as these ethical > failings, there was a crisis between reformers and > orthodox, accused of authoritarian methods. Former > vice-president Sergio Ram�rez, and many others, including > the brothers Fernando and Ernesto Cardenal, priests and > former members of the government, left the party that > Ortega still held so tightly. Although the roots of > Sandinism remained loyal to the FSLN, the misdeeds of > that time allowed the ultraconservative Arnoldo Alem�n to > win the presidential election for the Constitutional > Liberal Party (PLC) on 20 October 1996. > > A decade of neoliberal policies, adjustment programmes > and opening of the market left the working classes > exhausted. As sociologist Oscar Ren� Vargas explains: > "The privatisation of businesses, liberalisation of trade > and destruction of local small firms, the end of rural > food production for the domestic market, the tendency to > nullify agricultural reform by freezing credit to farming > cooperatives and the gradual loss or weakening of > progressive thought among the main Sandinista leadership, > created a Nicaragua totally different from the one born > with the Sandinista revolution. It allowed governments to > consolidate a conservative restoration throughout the > 1990s" (2). > > Politically, the FSLN has acted like an opposition party > over the last 10 years. After the 1996 elections it tried > to strike a difficult balance between support for > working-class demands, respect for the norms of > parliamentary democracy and safeguarding the interests of > those of its members who had become part of the new > middle class. > > A political pact > > During the last legislative period, a political "pact" > was concluded between the ruling liberals and the > Sandinista leadership. The agreement was over electoral > alliances, the proportion of the vote small parties > (there were 23 in the 1996 elections) would need, the > banning of non-party candidates and the restoration of > better Sandinista representation in state bodies. It was > also decided to lower the minimum required to win the > first round of elections from 45% to 40%, and even to 35% > if the distance from the next candidate was at least 5%. > Former presidents, including Alem�n and Ortega, would > enjoy immunity, automatically becoming members of > parliament (3). > > Many believed that the pact weakened democracy by > concentrating too much power in the hands of the two main > parties, each of which promised the other immunity. Many > Sandinistas saw it as a betrayal of revolutionary ideals > and a compromise with a party representing corruption. > > This year's elections on 4 November were a three-way > fight between the ruling PLC, the Conservative Party (PC) > and the Sandinista Front (FSLN). The PLC candidate > Enrique Bola�os, representing agrarian capitalism,was in > a difficult position because of unprecedented levels of > corruption under the Alem�n government (4) when he was > vice-president for four years; but he won the support of > the main protestant Christian party and a section of the > Contras. > > Led again by Ortega, whose choice as candidate was > strongly opposed within his party, the Sandinista Front > forged an alliance with the Christian Democrats. They > chose as vice-president Agust�n Jarqu�n, a former > chairman of the national audit office who had been > imprisoned by Alem�n for accusing him of corruption (the > Sandinistas had also imprisoned him for six months for > organising an illegal demonstration). > > The coalition also included several small parties, a > minority group of former Contras and even Steadman > Fagoth, who, in the 1980s dragged the Miskitos Indians of > the Atlantic coast into a war against the Sandinistas. At > the last moment, the dissidents of the Sandinista Renewal > Movement (MRS) joined the coalition (the National > Convergence), as did Myriam Arg�ello's Popular > Conservative Alliance. Contacts were even made with > members of the Somoza family. > > In his speeches, Ortega begged forgiveness for past > mistakes. As a result, some thought the front had become > reformist and lost touch with its original plans for > social transformation. The leadership replied that the > measures proposed were the only possible way of improving > the condition of working people and that it had not > abandoned longer term objectives. The FSLN said it would > respect the market economy, encourage national and > foreign investment, defend private property, create a > land bank for peasants, restore credit for small farmers > and businesses, and fight corruption. > > The pre-election polls were favourable to the Sandinistas > and caused alarm. In a letter to the Holy See, Cardinal > Obando y Bravo complained of the activities of priests > who were "sowing confusion in the minds of the faithful > when the danger of the left returning to power" was > looming, and asked the Vatican to intervene. Enrique > Bola�os was praised in televised homilies. > > In the US, the return to power of the former > revolutionaries and the possible emergence of a Fidel > Castro (Cuba), Hugo Ch�vez (Venezeula), Daniel Ortega > (Nicaragua) triangle awakened old feelings. The terrorist > attacks provided pretexts. "We have serious concerns > about the Sandinistas' history of violating democratic > principles, basic human rights, seizing property without > compensation, and ties to supporters of terrorism," said > under-secretary of state Marc Grossman. Oliver Garza, US > ambassador to Nicaragua, repeatedly said the same thing > and, a few days before the election, Jeb Bush, the US > president's brother and governor of Florida, sent Bola�os > a letter of support, widely circulated. He wrote: "Daniel > Ortega is an enemy of everything the US represents. > Further, he is a friend of our enemies" (5). > > PLC campaign organisers were quick to display old > photographs of Ortega with Muammar Gadafi and Saddam > Hussein. The message was clear. On 4 November, floating > voters tipped the balance and Enrique Bola�os was > elected. That means another five years of difficulty for > ordinary people. > ____________________________________________________ > > * Director of the Centre Tricontinental, > Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium > > (1) Regardless of historical truth, this period is > sometimes summed up after the manner of this defamatory > headline in the French press just before the recent > elections: "Former Sandinista dictator Daniel Ortega > tries to return to power" (Le Monde, 4 November 2001). > > (2) Oscar Ren� Vargas, Once a�os despues del ajuste, > published by the author, Managua, 2001. > > (3) The immunity granted to President Alem�n was in fact > only an adjunct to that he enjoyed anyway as an automatic > member of the Central American parliament. > > (4) According to Sergio Garc�a, a dissident PLC deputy > and long time associate of Alem�n, he had amassed a > fortune of $250m (his declared wealth was $1m in 1996). > > (5) El Nuevo Herald, Miami, 2 November 2001. > > > > Translated by Malcolm Greenwood > > > ____________________________________________________ > > ALL RIGHTS RESERVED � 1997-2001 Le Monde diplomatique > _________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki Phone +358-40-7177941 Fax +358-9-7591081 http://www.kominf.pp.fi General class struggle news: [EMAIL PROTECTED] subscribe mails to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Geopolitical news: [EMAIL PROTECTED] subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] __________________________________________________
