I'm not an expert in this subject, but my gut reaction is that this is the first step in a process of creeping incrementalism where it goes from passports, and then later (after the squealing & mooing & bawing of 'we the sheeple' has died down) into other forms of identification like driver licenses and credit cards....
And then, then the govt will do away with the cards and just start chipping people. (Oh happy day!) I can well understand that from a management point of view a chipped population would be a lot easier to 'manage', as it digitizes our individuality and makes record keeping much easier. But , IMHO, it gives too much power to the govt... If the govt was always good and just and righteous then it would be Ok, but if the govt was subverted by evil influences then it would be a nightmare... The Nazi's could only have dreamed of such efficiencies in their fondest fantasies... I think the encryption issue is kind of a red herring because, while it's terrible that the data is unencrypted, encryptions can eventually be broken (and what strength of encryption can they put in these little chips?), and so encryption would only give a false sense of 'security'. w On Sat, 02 Apr 2005 10:15:11 -0800, Chris Mauricio wrote: > On Saturday 02 April 2005 11:02, David J. Looney wrote: > >> On Sat, 2 Apr 2005 00:35:16 -0800 >> Wayne Jr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> [r.e. rfid chips in passports] >> >>> The data will not be encrypted or protected in any way. This >>> reckless plan could put Americans traveling overseas at risk of >>> attack by thieves, muggers, kidnappers, and even terrorists who >>> could use portable reader devices to zero in on the radio >>> signals emanating from our passports. Don't let the federal >>> government put a spychip in *your* pocket! >>> >> >> It's not clear to me that *access* to the data will "...not be >> ... protected..." in any way. While the data broadcast is "in >> the clear", one part of 22 CFR Part 512, RIN 1400-AB93 does >> mention PKI & electronic shielding in regard to readers at ports >> of entry. Unfortunately the detail provided is not specific >> enough to determine if they really mean machine readable zone >> (MRZ) technology. If so, it means a thief would have to steal >> the key from the government to get the RFID to talk, or eavesdrop >> in the protal of entry. >> >> However, Even if the data is encrypted, and MRZ PKI technology is >> used to restrict access, nothing is going to stop big brother >> from tracking you as long as you are carrying you passport. >> Clearly, this is the reason the DHS doesn't want any kind of user >> "PIN" or button incorporated (the simplest anti-theft provision), >> as they want to be able to track foreign visitors in the US >> without (or even against) any volitional component. >> >>> NOTE: While the maximum legal read range of the passport chips >>> is only a few inches, criminals can eavesdrop on official >>> reader devices to capture your data from across a room or >>> potentially even down the block. >>> >> >> I think 30' was the maximum distance in the tests in the >> references. >> >> Dave Looney >> > say it with me. > > Faraday cage. > > Am I the only one that sees a future market for mylar / tinfoil > lined passport sleeves and wallets? > > nothing to see here - move along. move along... > > C. -- [email protected] http://www.kernel-panic.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/kplug-list
