On Sun, Apr 19, 2009 at 03:27:22PM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> Gleb Natapov wrote:
> > On Fri, Apr 17, 2009 at 09:55:45PM +0200, Jan Kiszka wrote:
> >> Gleb Natapov wrote:
> >>> Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <[email protected]>
> >>> ---
> >>> arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 1 +
> >>> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 49
> >>> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> >>> 2 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> >>>
> >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >>> b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >>> index 8b6f6e9..057a612 100644
> >>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
> >>> @@ -766,6 +766,7 @@ enum {
> >>> #define HF_GIF_MASK (1 << 0)
> >>> #define HF_HIF_MASK (1 << 1)
> >>> #define HF_VINTR_MASK (1 << 2)
> >>> +#define HF_NMI_MASK (1 << 3)
> >>>
> >>> /*
> >>> * Hardware virtualization extension instructions may fault if a
> >>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> >>> index c605477..cd60fd7 100644
> >>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> >>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> >>> @@ -1834,6 +1834,13 @@ static int cpuid_interception(struct vcpu_svm
> >>> *svm, struct kvm_run *kvm_run)
> >>> return 1;
> >>> }
> >>>
> >>> +static int iret_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct kvm_run
> >>> *kvm_run)
> >>> +{
> >>> + svm->vmcb->control.intercept &= ~(1UL << INTERCEPT_IRET);
> >>> + svm->vcpu.arch.hflags &= ~HF_NMI_MASK;
> >>> + return 0;
> >>> +}
> >> First, this must return 1 (or set an exit reason, but there is no reason
> >> to escape to user space here). And second, I think a corner case is not
> >> handled the same way as on real iron: If there is already the next NMI
> >> waiting, we will inject it before iret, not after its execution as it
> >> should be.
> >>
> >> No easy solution for this yet. Maybe emulating iret, but there is no
> >> implementation, specifically for protected mode. Maybe setting a
> >> breakpoint. Or maybe enforcing a single step exception. Nothing trivial
> >> in this list. On the other hand, this may only be a slight imprecision
> >> of the virtualization. Need to think about it.
> >>
> > What about this:
> > Instead of clearing HF_NMI_MASK in iret_interception() we can set
> > another flag (HF_IRET) and on guest entry clear HF_NMI_MASK (and
> > HF_IRET) if HF_IRET is set, but do that after checking for NMI
> > injection. The pending NMI will be injected on the next entry.
> > Also not how real HW works, but may be better then current situation.
>
> It's OK as a first step towards correct NMI emulation. Additionally, you
> could enable the IRQ window interception in case the is an NMI pending.
> The resulting behavior should then much like the VNMI mask emulation for
> vmx.
>
Yeah, but the question is if IRQ windows is already opened will exit
happens before or after IRET.
--
Gleb.
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