At Sun, 30 Apr 2006 22:08:36 -0400, "Jonathan S. Shapiro" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Mon, 2006-05-01 at 03:20 +0200, Pierre THIERRY wrote: > > > But there is something very strange, an assumption that you make, in > > your arguments: why should I own what I use in a computer? > > There is a *second* assumption that Marcus made: that divided ownership > is not ownership. What Marcus actually wrote was: > > >This is the meaning of ownership: You own something if you have the > > exclusive right to access, control and dispose it. > > I may be mis-reading this, but it appears to deny co-equal sharing, or > of cooperation in enabling a computation.
Well, it's almost literally a dictionary definition. In the case of co-equal sharing, the right is not exclusive. > Perhaps two parties have insufficient space individually, but > together they have enough. In this situation, it is possible > (technically) to create the following alternatives: > > 1. Either party can destroy, only one party can access and control. > 2. Either party can destroy, *both* parties can access and control. > > The first corresponds to one user making a "loan" of the space to the > second. If I make you a "loan" of my right to storage, this does not > imply that I should be able to read what you put in that storage. Right, it does not. However, it's not hard for you to encrypt the data on write out. > I need the right to reclaim (destroy), but not the right to > access. This is similar to the right of privacy that you have when > you rent from a landlord. But the landlord, at least in Germany, can not kick you out from one second to the next. Also, if there is a dispute, the final decision is (if no other resolution takes place), done by a judge, and in the trial the information how the property was used may be subpoenaed, for example to check if it was used for commercial purposed (requiring a higher rent than private use). I am mentioning this to draw attention to the fact that the real real world allow for much wider range of nuances than a superficial analysis suggests. This should make one suspicious if the simple technical means have the right properties, especially if they can be enforced rigorously. > From his note, I believe that what Marcus is trying to disable is the > ability to own *information*, which is different from storage. Actually, both are separable concerns. The struggle for freedom of information is a struggle for free culture. It is of secondary concern here in this discussion. The struggle for free hardware is a conservative cry: I should be in control over how the bits flow in my computer (yes, even if I choose to store information on it that is owned by somebody else). > Suppose that I own a painting in the sense that Marcus means. It hangs > on my wall. I control who goes into the room. I can burn it. I can sell > it. > > I can allow you into the room, and I can impose conditions. For example, > I can verify that you do not carry a camera. That is: you can look, but > you cannot copy through mechanical means. > > I would like to understand how this is morally different from DRM. This > is not a "troll." I am sincerely trying to understand the moral > difference here -- if there is one. Well, first, there is a very obvious difference that can matter. The painting is not digital data. Digital data has the peculiar property that it can be copied and distributed to everybody who wants to have it without loss of quality, quantity, and without marginal costs. Now, if you have a precious painting from the middle ages, it may be photo-sensitive. So, not allowing to make pictures using a flash may be ok to protect the integrity of the original. Or, upkeeping and restauration of the painting may be expensive. If this is true, and allowing to take pictures would mean that nobody comes looking at the picture anymore, then it _may_ be ok to forbid making photos. (I think that is a bit far stretched, but in some situations this might even hold). However: If the picture is part of our cultural heritage (in other words: if it makes a significant contribution to the general public), then I think you are wrong in forbidding to make reproductions that are not harmful to the original. Many museums allow taking pictures without flash. Paintings beyond a certain age are in the public domain and can be reproduced at will: For these it is just a matter of making the first copy, which could be imposed on you by the state out of public interest. This is in essence nothing else but the acknowledgement that art is, to some extent, a public good. If this painting however is just a picture of your dog that you made, then, feel free. I hope you did not expect a simpler answer. The impact that DRM has which makes it morally reprehensive is that it artificially and needlessly causes a shortage of intellectual goods, which could instead be distributed to everybody in the world at no marginal costs. To again quote Eben Moglen, now a shorter version of a quote I already posted: "In a world where everything is a bitstream, where the marginal cost of culture is zero, where once one person has something, everything can be given to everybody at the same costs that it was given to its first possessor, it is immoral to exclude people from knowledge and from beauty." So, the right analogy to DRM is not a painting in oil, but a painting in oil that can be endlessly copied without any costs, and that can distributed to everybody who wants to have it, without any costs for storage or distribution. Now, imagine that this is an important painting that a significant number of people in the world want to look at, enjoy, study, analyze, remix for other creative works. How could one morally justify to _not_ give a copy to everybody in the world? Thanks, Marcus _______________________________________________ L4-hurd mailing list [email protected] http://lists.gnu.org/mailman/listinfo/l4-hurd
