With CIA help, NYPD built secret effort to 
monitor mosques, daily life of Muslim neighborhoods
By Associated Press, Published: August 24

NEW YORK — Since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, 
the New York Police Department has become one of 
the nation’s most aggressive domestic 
intelligence agencies, targeting ethnic 
communities in ways that would run afoul of civil 
liberties rules if practiced by the federal 
government, an Associated Press investigation has found.

These operations have benefited from 
unprecedented help from the CIA, a partnership 
that has blurred the line between foreign and domestic spying.

The department has dispatched undercover 
officers, known as “rakers,” into minority 
neighborhoods as part of a human mapping program, 
according to officials directly involved in the 
program. They’ve monitored daily life in 
bookstores, bars, cafes and nightclubs. Police 
have also used informants, known as “mosque 
crawlers,” to monitor sermons, even when there’s no evidence of wrongdoing.

Neither the city council, which finances the 
department, nor the federal government, which has 
given NYPD more than $1.6 billion since 9/11, is told exactly what’s going on.

Many of these operations were built with help 
from the CIA, which is prohibited from spying on 
Americans but was instrumental in transforming the NYPD’s intelligence unit.

A veteran CIA officer, while still on the 
agency’s payroll, was the architect of the NYPD’s 
intelligence programs. The CIA trained a police 
detective at the Farm, the agency’s spy school in 
Virginia, then returned him to New York, where he 
put his new espionage skills to work inside the United States.

And just last month, the CIA sent a senior 
officer to work as a clandestine operative inside police headquarters.

In response to the story, the Council on 
American-Islamic Relations, a leading Muslim 
civil rights organization, called on the Justice 
Department to investigate. The Justice Department 
said Wednesday night it would review the request.

“This is potentially illegal what they’re doing,” 
said Gadeir Abbas, a staff attorney with the organization.

The NYPD denied that it trolls ethnic 
neighborhoods and said it only follows leads. 
Police operations have disrupted terrorist plots 
and put several would-be killers in prison.

“The New York Police Department is doing 
everything it can to make sure there’s not 
another 9/11 here and that more innocent New 
Yorkers are not killed by terrorists,” NYPD 
spokesman Paul Browne said. “And we have nothing 
to apologize for in that regard.”

AP’s investigation is based on documents and 
interviews with more than 40 current and former 
New York Police Department and federal officials. 
Many were directly involved in planning and 
carrying out these secret operations for the 
department. Though most said the tactics were 
appropriate and made the city safer, many 
insisted on anonymity, because they were not 
authorized to speak with reporters about security matters.

In just two episodes showing how widely the NYPD 
cast its net, the department sought a rundown 
from the taxi commission of every Pakistani cab 
driver in the city, and produced an analytical 
report on every mosque within 100 miles, officials said.

One of the enduring questions of the past decade 
is whether being safe requires giving up some 
liberty and privacy. The focus of that debate has 
primarily been federal programs like wiretapping 
and indefinite detention. The question has 
received less attention in New York, where 
residents do not know for sure what, if anything, they have given up.

The story of how the NYPD Intelligence Division 
developed such aggressive programs begins with one man.

___

David Cohen arrived at the New York Police 
Department in January 2002, just weeks after the 
last fires had been extinguished at the debris 
field that had been the twin towers. A retired 
35-year veteran of the CIA, Cohen became the 
police department’s first civilian intelligence chief.

Cohen had an exceptional career at the CIA, 
rising to lead both the agency’s analytical and 
operational divisions. He also was an 
extraordinarily divisive figure, a man whose 
sharp tongue and supreme confidence in his own 
abilities gave him a reputation as arrogant. 
Cohen’s tenure as head of CIA operations, the 
nation’s top spy, was so contentious that in 
1997, The New York Times editorial page took the 
unusual step of calling for his ouster.

He had no police experience. He had never 
defended a city from an attack. But New York wasn’t looking for a cop.

“Post-9/11, we needed someone in there who knew 
how to really gather intelligence,” said John 
Cutter, a retired NYPD official who served as one 
of Cohen’s top uniformed officers.

At the time, the intelligence division was best 
known for driving dignitaries around the city. 
Cohen envisioned a unit that would analyze 
intelligence, run undercover operations and 
cultivate a network of informants. In short, he 
wanted New York to have its own version of the CIA.

Cohen shared Commissioner Ray Kelly’s belief that 
9/11 had proved that the police department could 
not simply rely on the federal government to prevent terrorism in New York.

“If anything goes on in New York,” one former 
officer recalls Cohen telling his staff in the early days, “it’s your fault.”

Among Cohen’s earliest moves at the NYPD was 
making a request of his old colleagues at CIA 
headquarters in Langley, Va. He needed someone to 
help build this new operation, someone with 
experience and clout and, most important, someone 
who had access to the latest intelligence so the 
NYPD wouldn’t have to rely on the FBI to dole out information.

CIA Director George Tenet responded by tapping 
Larry Sanchez, a respected veteran who had served 
as a CIA official inside the United Nations. 
Often, when the CIA places someone on temporary 
assignment, the other agency picks up the tab. In 
this case, three former intelligence officials 
said, Tenet kept Sanchez on the CIA payroll.

When he arrived in New York in March 2002, 
Sanchez had offices at both the NYPD and the 
CIA’s station in New York, one former official 
said. Sanchez interviewed police officers for 
newly defined intelligence jobs. He guided and 
mentored officers, schooling them in the art of 
gathering information. He also directed their efforts, another said.

There had never been an arrangement like it, and 
some senior CIA officials soon began questioning 
whether Tenet was allowing Sanchez to operate on 
both sides of the wall that’s supposed to keep 
the CIA out of the domestic intelligence business.

“It should not be a surprise to anyone that, 
after 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency 
stepped up its cooperation with law enforcement 
on counterterrorism issues or that some of that 
increased cooperation was in New York, the site 
of ground zero,” CIA spokeswoman Jennifer Youngblood said.

Just as at the CIA, Cohen and Sanchez knew that 
informants would have to become the backbone of 
their operation. But with threats coming in from 
around the globe, they couldn’t wait months for the perfect plan.

They came up with a makeshift solution. They 
dispatched more officers to Pakistani 
neighborhoods and, according to one former police 
official directly involved in the effort, 
instructed them to look for reasons to stop cars: 
speeding, broken tail lights, running stop signs, 
whatever. The traffic stop gave police an 
opportunity to search for outstanding warrants or 
look for suspicious behavior. An arrest could be 
the leverage the police needed to persuade someone to become an informant.

For Cohen, the transition from spying to policing 
didn’t come naturally, former colleagues said. 
When faced with a decision, especially early in 
his tenure, he’d fall back on his CIA background. 
Cutter said he and other uniformed officers had 
to tell Cohen, no, we can’t just slip into 
someone’s apartment without a warrant. No, we 
can’t just conduct a search. The rules for policing are different.

While Cohen was being shaped by the police 
department, his CIA background was remaking the 
department. But one significant barrier stood in the way of Cohen’s vision.

Since 1985, the NYPD had operated under a federal 
court order limiting the tactics it could use to 
gather intelligence. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
the department had used informants and undercover 
officers to infiltrate anti-war protest groups 
and other activists without any reason to suspect criminal behavior.

To settle a lawsuit, the department agreed to 
follow guidelines that required “specific 
information” of criminal activity before police 
could monitor political activity.

In September 2002, Cohen told a federal judge 
that those guidelines made it “virtually 
impossible” to detect terrorist plots. The FBI 
was changing its rules to respond to 9/11, and 
Cohen argued that the NYPD must do so, too.

“In the case of terrorism, to wait for an 
indication of crime before investigating is to wait far too long,” Cohen wrote.

U.S. District Judge Charles S. Haight Jr. agreed, 
saying the old guidelines “addressed different 
perils in a different time.” He scrapped the old 
rules and replaced them with more lenient ones.

It was a turning point for the NYPD.

___

With his newfound authority, Cohen created a 
secret squad that would soon infiltrate Muslim 
neighborhoods, according to several current and 
former officials directly involved in the program.

The NYPD carved up the city into more than a 
dozen zones and assigned undercover officers to 
monitor them, looking for potential trouble.

At the CIA, one of the biggest obstacles has 
always been that U.S. intelligence officials are 
overwhelmingly white, their mannerisms clearly 
American. The NYPD didn’t have that problem, 
thanks to its diverse pool of officers.

Using census data, the department matched 
undercover officers to ethnic communities and 
instructed them to blend in, the officials said. 
Pakistani-American officers infiltrated Pakistani 
neighborhoods, Palestinians focused on 
Palestinian neighborhoods. They hung out in 
hookah bars and cafes, quietly observing the community around them.

The unit, which has been undisclosed until now, 
became known inside the department as the 
Demographic Unit, former police officials said.

“It’s not a question of profiling. It’s a 
question of going where the problem could arise,” 
said Mordecai Dzikansky, a retired NYPD 
intelligence officer who said he was aware of the 
Demographic Unit. “And thank God we have the 
capability. We have the language capability and 
the ethnic officers. That’s our hidden weapon.”

The officers did not work out of headquarters, 
officials said. Instead, they passed their 
intelligence to police handlers who knew their identities.

Cohen said he wanted the squad to “rake the 
coals, looking for hot spots,” former officials 
recalled. The undercover officers soon became 
known inside the department as rakers.

A hot spot might be a beauty supply store selling 
chemicals used for making bombs. Or it might be a 
hawala, a broker that transfers money around the 
world with little documentation. Undercover 
officers might visit an Internet cafe and look at 
the browsing history on a computer, a former 
police official involved in the program said. If 
it revealed visits to radical websites, the cafe might be deemed a hot spot.

Ethnic bookstores, too, were on the list. If a 
raker noticed a customer looking at radical 
literature, he might chat up the store owner and 
see what he could learn. The bookstore, or even 
the customer, might get further scrutiny. If a 
restaurant patron applauds a news report about 
the death of U.S. troops, the patron or the 
restaurant could be labeled a hot spot.

The goal was to “map the city’s human terrain,” 
one law enforcement official said. The program 
was modeled in part on how Israeli authorities 
operate in the West Bank, a former police official said.

Mapping crimes has been a successful police 
strategy nationwide. But mapping robberies and 
shootings is one thing. Mapping ethnic 
neighborhoods is different, something that at 
least brushes against what the federal government considers racial profiling.

Browne, the NYPD spokesman, said the Demographic 
Unit does not exist. He said the department has a 
Zone Assessment Unit that looks for locations 
that could attract terrorists. But he said 
undercover officers only followed leads, 
disputing the account of several current and 
former police and federal officials. They do not 
just hang out in neighborhoods, he said.

“We will go into a location, whether it’s a 
mosque or a bookstore, if the lead warrants it, 
and at least establish whether there’s something 
that requires more attention,” Browne said.

That conflicts with testimony from an undercover 
officer in the 2006 trial of Shahawar Matin 
Siraj, who was convicted of planning an attack on 
New York’s subway system. The officer said he was 
instructed to live in Brooklyn and act as a “walking camera” for police.

“I was told to act like a civilian — hang out in 
the neighborhood, gather information,” the 
Bangladeshi officer testified, under a false 
name, in what offered the first narrow glimpse at 
the NYPD’s infiltration of ethnic neighborhoods.

Officials said such operations just made sense. 
Islamic terrorists had attacked the city on 9/11, 
so police needed people inside the city’s Muslim 
neighborhoods. Officials say it does not conflict 
with a 2004 city law prohibiting the NYPD from 
using religion or ethnicity “as the determinative 
factor for initiating law enforcement action.”

“It’s not profiling,” Cutter said. “It’s like, 
after a shooting, do you go 20 blocks away and 
interview guys or do you go to the neighborhood where it happened?”

In 2007, the Los Angeles Police Department was 
criticized for even considering a similar 
program. The police announced plans to map 
Islamic neighborhoods to look for pockets of 
radicalization among the region’s roughly 500,000 
Muslims. Criticism was swift, and chief William Bratton scrapped the plan.

“A lot of these people came from countries where 
the police were the terrorists,” Bratton said at 
a news conference, according to the Los Angeles 
Daily News. “We don’t do that here. We do not want to spread fear.”

In New York, current and former officials said, 
the lesson of that controversy was that such programs should be kept secret.

Some in the department, including lawyers, have 
privately expressed concerns about the raking 
program and how police use the information, 
current and former officials said. Part of the 
concern was that it might appear that police were 
building dossiers on innocent people, officials 
said. Another concern was that, if a case went to 
court, the department could be forced to reveal 
details about the program, putting the entire operation in jeopardy.

That’s why, former officials said, police 
regularly shredded documents discussing rakers.

When Cohen made his case in court that he needed 
broader authority to investigate terrorism, he 
had promised to abide by the FBI’s investigative 
guidelines. But the FBI is prohibited from using 
undercover agents unless there’s specific 
evidence of criminal activity, meaning a federal 
raking program like the one officials described 
to the AP would violate FBI guidelines.

The NYPD declined to make Cohen available for 
comment. In an earlier interview with the AP on a 
variety of topics, Police Commissioner Kelly said 
the intelligence unit does not infringe on civil rights.

“We’re doing what we believe we have to do to 
protect the city,” he said. “We have many, many 
lawyers in our employ. We see ourselves as very 
conscious and aware of civil liberties. And we 
know there’s always going to be some tension 
between the police department and so-called civil 
liberties groups because of the nature of what we do.”

The department clashed with civil rights groups 
most publicly after Cohen’s undercover officers 
infiltrated anti-war groups before the 2004 
Republican National Convention in New York. A 
lawsuit over that program continues today.

During the convention, when protesters were 
arrested, police asked a list of questions which, 
according to court documents, included: “What are 
your political affiliations?” ‘’Do you do any 
kind of political work?” and “Do you hate George W. Bush?”

“At the end of the day, it’s pure and simple a 
rogue domestic surveillance operation,” said 
Christopher Dunn, a New York Civil Liberties 
Union lawyer involved in the convention lawsuit.

___

Undercover agents like the rakers were valuable, 
but what Cohen and Sanchez wanted most were informants.

The NYPD dedicated an entire squad, the Terrorist 
Interdiction Unit, to developing and handling 
informants. Current and former officials said 
Sanchez was instrumental in teaching them how to develop sources.

For years, detectives used informants known as 
mosque crawlers to monitor weekly sermons and 
report what was said, several current and former 
officials directly involved in the informant 
program said. If FBI agents were to do that, they 
would be in violation of the Privacy Act, which 
prohibits the federal government from collecting 
intelligence on purely First Amendment activities.

The FBI has generated its own share of 
controversy for putting informants inside 
mosques, but unlike the program described to the 
AP, the FBI requires evidence of a crime before 
an informant can be used inside a mosque.

Valerie Caproni, the FBI’s general counsel, would 
not discuss the NYPD’s programs but said FBI 
informants can’t troll mosques looking for leads. 
Such operations are reviewed for civil liberties concerns, she said.

“If you’re sending an informant into a mosque 
when there is no evidence of wrongdoing, that’s a 
very high-risk thing to do,” Caproni said. 
“You’re running right up against core 
constitutional rights. You’re talking about freedom of religion.”

That’s why senior FBI officials in New York 
ordered their own agents not to accept any 
reports from the NYPD’s mosque crawlers, two retired agents said.

It’s unclear whether the police department still 
uses mosque crawlers. Officials said that, as 
Muslims figured out what was going on, the mosque 
crawlers became cafe crawlers, fanning out into the city’s ethnic hangouts.

“Someone has a great imagination,” Browne, the 
NYPD spokesman, said. “There is no such thing as mosque crawlers.”

Following the foiled subway plot, however, the 
key informant in the case, Osama Eldawoody, said 
he attended hundreds of prayer services and 
collected information even on people who showed no signs of radicalization.

NYPD detectives have recruited shopkeepers and 
nosy neighbors to become “seeded” informants who 
keep police up to date on the latest happenings 
in ethnic neighborhoods, one official directly 
involved in the informant program said.

The department also has a roster of “directed” 
informants it can tap for assignments. For 
instance, if a raker identifies a bookstore as a 
hot spot, police might assign an informant to 
gather information, long before there’s concrete evidence of anything criminal.

To identify possible informants, the department 
created what became known as the “debriefing 
program.” When someone is arrested who might be 
useful to the intelligence unit — whether because 
he said something suspicious or because he is 
simply a young Middle Eastern man — he is singled 
out for extra questioning. Intelligence officials 
don’t care about the underlying charges; they 
want to know more about his community and, 
ideally, they want to put him to work.

Police are in prisons, too, promising better 
living conditions and help or money on the 
outside for Muslim prisoners who will work with them.

Early in the intelligence division’s 
transformation, police asked the taxi commission 
to run a report on all the city’s Pakistani cab 
drivers, looking for those who got licenses 
fraudulently and might be susceptible to pressure 
to cooperate, according to former officials who 
were involved in or briefed on the effort.

That strategy has been rejected in other cities.

Boston police once asked neighboring Cambridge 
for a list of Somali cab drivers, Cambridge 
Police Chief Robert Haas said. Haas refused, 
saying that without a specific reason, the search was inappropriate.

“It really has a chilling effect in terms of the 
relationship between the local police department 
and those cultural groups, if they think that’s 
going to take place,” Haas said.

The informant division was so important to the 
NYPD that Cohen persuaded his former colleagues 
to train a detective, Steve Pinkall, at the CIA’s 
training center at the Farm. Pinkall, who had an 
intelligence background as a Marine, was given an 
unusual temporary assignment at CIA headquarters, 
officials said. He took the field tradecraft 
course alongside future CIA spies then returned 
to New York to run investigations.

“We found that helpful, for NYPD personnel to be 
exposed to the tradecraft,” Browne said.

The idea troubled senior FBI officials, who saw 
it as the NYPD and CIA blurring the lines between 
police work and spying, in which undercover 
officers regularly break the laws of foreign 
governments. The arrangement even made its way to 
FBI Director Robert Mueller, two former senior 
FBI officials said, but the training was already 
under way and Mueller did not press the issue.

___

NYPD’s intelligence operations do not stop at the city line.

In June 2009, a New Brunswick, N.J., building 
superintendent opened the door to apartment No. 
1076 and discovered an alarming scene: terrorist 
literature strewn about the table and computer 
and surveillance equipment set up in the next room.

The panicked superintendent dialed 911, sending 
police and the FBI rushing to the building near 
Rutgers University. What they found in that 
first-floor apartment, however, was not a 
terrorist hideout but a command center set up by 
a secret team of New York Police Department intelligence officers.

 From that apartment, about an hour outside the 
department’s jurisdiction, the NYPD had been 
staging undercover operations and conducting 
surveillance throughout New Jersey. Neither the 
FBI nor the local police had any idea.

The NYPD has gotten some of its officers 
deputized as federal marshals, allowing them to 
work out of state. But often, there’s no specific jurisdiction at all.

Cohen’s undercover squad, the Special Services 
Unit, operates in places such as New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, officials said. 
They can’t make arrests and, if something goes 
wrong — a shooting or a car accident, for 
instance — the officers could be personally 
liable. But the NYPD has decided it’s worth the 
risk, a former police official said.

With Police Commissioner Kelly’s backing, Cohen’s 
policy is that any potential threat to New York 
City is the NYPD’s business, regardless of where it occurs, officials said.

That aggressiveness has sometimes put the NYPD at 
odds with local police departments and, more 
frequently, with the FBI. The FBI didn’t like the 
rules Cohen played by and said his operations 
encroached on its responsibilities.

Once, undercover officers were stopped by police 
in Massachusetts while conducting surveillance on 
a house, one former New York official recalled. 
In another instance, the NYPD sparked concern 
among federal officials by expanding its 
intelligence-gathering efforts related to the 
United Nations, where the FBI is in charge, 
current and former federal officials said.

The AP has agreed not to disclose details of 
either the FBI or NYPD operations because they 
involve foreign counterintelligence.

Both Mueller and Kelly have said their agencies 
have strong working relationships and said 
reports of rivalry and disagreements are 
overblown. And the NYPD’s out-of-state operations have had success.

A young Egyptian NYPD officer living undercover 
in New Jersey, for example, was key to building a 
case against Mohamed Mahmood Alessa and Carlos 
Eduardo Almonte. The pair was arrested last year 
at John F. Kennedy Airport en route to Somalia to 
join the terrorist group al-Shabab. Both pleaded guilty to conspiracy.

Cohen has also sent officers abroad, stationing 
them in 11 foreign cities. If a bomber blows 
himself up in Jerusalem, the NYPD rushes to the 
scene, said Dzikansky, who served in Israel and 
is the co-author of the forthcoming book 
“Terrorist Suicide Bombings: Attack Interdiction, Mitigation, and Response.”

“I was there to ask the New York question,” 
Dzikansky said. “Why this location? Was there 
something unique that the bomber had done? Was 
there any pre-notification. Was there a security lapse?”

All of this intelligence — from the rakers, the 
undercovers, the overseas liaisons and the 
informants — is passed to a team of analysts 
hired from some of the nation’s most prestigious 
universities. Analysts have spotted emerging 
trends and summarized topics such as Hezbollah’s 
activities in New York and the threat of South Asian terrorist groups.

They also have tackled more contentious topics, 
including drafting a report on every mosque in 
the area, one former police official said. The 
report drew on information from mosque crawlers, 
undercover officers and public information. It 
mapped hundreds of mosques and discussed the 
likelihood of them being infiltrated by al-Qaida, 
Hezbollah and other terrorist groups.

For Cohen, there was only one way to measure 
success: “They haven’t attacked us,” he said in a 
2005 deposition. He said anything that was bad 
for terrorists was good for NYPD.

___

Though the CIA is prohibited from collecting 
intelligence domestically, the wall between 
domestic and foreign operations became more 
porous. Intelligence gathered by the NYPD, with 
CIA officer Sanchez overseeing collection, was 
often passed to the CIA in informal conversations 
and through unofficial channels, a former 
official involved in that process said.

By design, the NYPD was looking more and more like a domestic CIA.

“It’s like starting the CIA over in the post-9/11 
world,” Cohen said in “Securing the City,” a 
laudatory 2009 book about the NYPD. “What would 
you do if you could begin it all over again? Hah. This is what you would do.”

Sanchez’s assignment in New York ended in 2004, 
but he received permission to take a leave of 
absence from the agency and become Cohen’s deputy, former officials said.

Though Sanchez’s assignments were blessed by CIA 
management, some in the agency’s New York station 
saw the presence of such a senior officer in the 
city as a turf encroachment. Finally, the New 
York station chief, Tom Higgins, called 
headquarters, one former senior intelligence 
official said. Higgins complained, the official 
said, that Sanchez was wearing both hats, 
sometimes acting as a CIA officer, sometimes as an NYPD official.

The CIA finally forced him to choose: Stay with 
the agency or stay with the NYPD.

Sanchez declined to comment to the AP about the 
arrangement, but he picked the NYPD. He retired 
last year and is now a consultant in the Middle East.

Last month, the CIA deepened its NYPD ties even 
further. It sent one of its most experienced 
operatives, a former station chief in two Middle 
Eastern countries, to work out of police 
headquarters as Cohen’s special assistant while 
on the CIA payroll. Current and former U.S. 
officials acknowledge it’s unusual but said it’s 
the kind of collaboration Americans expect after 9/11.

Officials said revealing the CIA officer’s name 
would jeopardize national security. The 
arrangement was described as a sabbatical. He is 
a member of the agency’s senior management, but 
officials said he was sent to the municipal 
police department to get management experience.

At the NYPD, he works undercover in the senior 
ranks of the intelligence division. Officials are 
adamant that he is not involved in actual intelligence-gathering.

___

The NYPD has faced little scrutiny over the past 
decade as it has taken on broad new intelligence 
missions, targeted ethnic neighborhoods and 
partnered with the CIA in extraordinary ways.

The department’s primary watchdog, the New York 
City Council, has not held hearings on the 
intelligence division’s operations and former 
NYPD officials said council members typically do not ask for details.

“Ray Kelly briefs me privately on certain 
subjects that should not be discussed in public,” 
said City Councilman Peter Vallone. “We’ve 
discussed in person how they investigate certain 
groups they suspect have terrorist sympathizers or have terrorist suspects.”

The city comptroller’s office has audited several 
NYPD components since 9/11 but not the 
intelligence unit, which had a $62 million budget last year.

The federal government, too, has done little to 
scrutinize the nation’s largest police force, 
despite the massive federal aid. Homeland 
Security officials review NYPD grants but not its underlying programs.

A report in January by the Homeland Security 
inspector general, for instance, found that the 
NYPD violated state and federal contracting rules 
between 2006 and 2008 by buying more than $4 
million in equipment through a no-bid process. 
NYPD said public bidding would have revealed 
sensitive information to terrorists, but police 
never got approval from state or federal 
officials to adopt their own rules, the inspector general said.

On Capitol Hill, where FBI tactics have 
frequently been criticized for their effect on 
civil liberties, the NYPD faces no such opposition.

In 2007, Sanchez testified before the Senate 
Homeland Security Committee and was asked how the 
NYPD spots signs of radicalization. He said the 
key was viewing innocuous activity, including 
behavior that might be protected by the First 
Amendment, as a potential precursor to terrorism.

That triggered no questions from the committee, 
which Sanchez said had been “briefed in the past on how we do business.”

The Justice Department has the authority to 
investigate civil rights violations. It issued 
detailed rules in 2003 against racial profiling, 
including prohibiting agencies from considering 
race when making traffic stops or assigning patrols.

But those rules apply only to the federal 
government and contain a murky exemption for 
terrorism investigations. The Justice Department 
has not investigated a police department for 
civil rights violations during a national security investigation.

“One of the hallmarks of the intelligence 
division over the last 10 years is that, not only 
has it gotten extremely aggressive and 
sophisticated, but it’s operating completely on 
its own,” said Dunn, the civil liberties lawyer. 
“There are no checks. There is no oversight.”

The NYPD has been mentioned as a model for 
policing in the post-9/11 era. But it’s a model 
that seems custom-made for New York. No other 
city has the Big Apple’s combination of a low 
crime rate, a $4.5 billion police budget and a 
diverse 34,000-person police force. Certainly no 
other police department has such deep CIA ties.

Perhaps most important, nobody else had 9/11 the 
way New York did. No other city lost nearly 3,000 
people in a single morning. A decade later, 
police say New Yorkers still expect the 
department to do whatever it can to prevent 
another attack. The NYPD has embraced that expectation.

As Sanchez testified on Capitol Hill: “We’ve been 
given the public tolerance and the luxury to be very aggressive on this topic.”

____

Associated Press writers Tom Hays and Eileen 
Sullivan in Washington contributed to this report.

____

Matt Apuzzo and Adam Goldman can be reached at 
dcinvestigations(at)ap.org or 
http://twitter.com/mattapuzzo and http://twitter.com/goldmandc

Copyright 2011 The Associated Press. All rights 
reserved. This material may not be published, 
broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.



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